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i 
Helsinki University of Technology      Abstract of Study 
As Public-Private Partnership (PPP) activity has increased as a means of 
organizing the production of major infrastructure assets and services in the 
economy globally, it has attracted increasing attention among scholars. 
However, given the relatively recent introduction of PPP schemes, there is 
not as yet a substantial body of academic literature on such projects. 
Nevertheless, a number of key questions have emerged, namely: The 
differences in private and public sector cost of capital, the relative efficiency 
of public and private sectors, and the proper distribution of risk and rewards 
between the two.  
This study contributes to knowledge in the scope of PPP in the Finnish 
transport sector by subjecting the two first concerns to a multi-disciplinary 
study, grounded in the theories of industrial organization and investment, 
project business literature, research on project finance and public 
procurement legislation. The research methodology can be characterized as 
building of qualitative theoretical constructs through logical, inductive 
reasoning. 
There are three main results: The first is a unified economic model of PPP 
that captures the basic nature, key parties, cash flows, dynamics and 
uncertainty involved in a PPP project. The second is an analytical result, 
which shows that the difference in private and public sector cost of capital is 
simply a consequence of the implicit costs of public finance customarily 
omitted from analysis. Third, the study explicates five positive propositions 
explaining the comparative economic advantages of PPP relative to 
traditional paths of transport infrastructure procurement. 
The implications of these results are essentially two-fold: First, the result that 
sovereign finance is not cheaper than private finance, when both implicit and 
explicit costs are considered, suggests that the cost-efficiency of the PPP is 
higher than customarily assumed. Second, a theoretical analysis of the 
rationale for incorporating traditionally segmented, fixed-fee, short-term 
contracts under a single, long-term performance-based concession, shows that 
this creates opportunities for economies of scale and scope, investment in 
specialized capital and contractual mechanisms that contribute to minimizing 
both production and transaction costs relative to traditional procurement. 
These, in turn, suggest that the PPP market is attractive from a total welfare 
perspective, and can be expected to grow, given a political acknowledgment 
of the benefits of PPP and subsequent political promotion. 
 
ii 
Teknillinen korkeakoulu     Tutkimuksen tiivistelmä 
Julkisen ja yksityisen sektorin kumppanuus, joka Suomessa tunnetaan 
elinkaarimallina, on yleistynyt merkittävien infrastruktuurisidonnaisten 
palvelujen tuottamisen organisointimuotona. Ilmiö on kerännyt yhä enemmän 
tutkijoiden huomiota, mutta ottaen huomioon elinkaarimallin uutuuden ei 
aiheesta vielä ole merkittävästi akateemista kirjallisuutta. Eräitä 
avainkysymyksiä on kuitenkin noussut esiin, nimittäin: Ero julkisen ja yksityisen 
puolen pääomakustannuksissa, julkisen ja yksityisen sektorin suhteellinen 
tehokkuus, sekä riskien ja tuottojen jako julkisen ja yksityisen toimijan kesken.  
Tämän työn panos tutkimustietoon Suomen kuljetus- ja liikennesektorin 
puitteissa on alistaa edellisistä kysymyksistä kaksi ensimmäistä perusteelliselle 
poikkitieteelliselle tarkastelulle, nojaten toimialan talousteoriaan, 
investointiteoriaan, projektiliiketoiminnan kirjallisuuteen, projektirahoituksen 
tutkimukseen, sekä julkisten hankintojen lainsäädäntöön. Tutkimusmenetelmää 
voi luonnehtia loogiseen, induktiiviseen päättelyyn perustuvaksi, laadullisten 
teoreettisten konstruktioiden rakentamiseksi.  
Tutkimus johti kolmeen olennaiseen tulokseen: Ensimmäinen on taloudellinen 
malli, joka huomioi elinkaarimallin keskeisimmät piirteet, osapuolet, kassavirrat, 
ajassa etenevän luonteen sekä epävarmuuden. Toinen on analyyttinen tulos, joka 
osoittaa, että ero yksityisen ja julkisen puolen pääomakustannuksissa on 
yksinkertaisesti seuraus julkisyhteisön pääoman implisiittisistä kustannuksista, 
jotka on tyypillisesti jätetty tarkasteluissa huomiotta. Kolmas on erittely viidestä 
tekijästä, jotka selittävät elinkaarimallin suhteellista kustannustehokkuutta 
verrattuna perinteisiin liikenneinfrastruktuurin hankintamalleihin.  
Näillä tuloksilla on olennaisesti kahtenaiset seuraukset: Ensiksi, havainto, että 
julkinen rahoitus ei itse asiassa ole halvempaa kuin yksityinen, kun niin 
implisiittiset kuin eksplisiittiset kustannukset otetaan huomioon, merkitsee että 
elinkaarimallin kustannustehokkuus on vielä parempi kuin on perinteisesti 
oletettu. Toiseksi, teoreettinen tarkastelu osoittaa, että perinteisesti hajanaisten, 
kiinteähintaisten, lyhyen aikavälin sopimusten kokoaminen yhden, pitkän 
tähtäimen, suoritusperusteisen konsession alle tarjoaa mahdollisuuksia 
mittakaavakustannusetuihin, investointeihin erikoistuneeseen pääomaan, ja 
sopimusmekanismeihin, jotka toimivat yhdessä niin tuotanto- kuin 
transaktiokustannuksia minimoivasti suhteessa perinteiseen julkiseen 
hankintamalliin. Nämä huomiot vuorostaan tarkoittavat, että elinkaarimallilla on 
edellytykset oikein toteutettuna synnyttää merkittäviä kustannussäästöjä, mikä 
tulisi ottaa nykyistä huomattavasti laajemmin huomioon julkisessa 
päätöksenteossa. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the basic approach of the study is described. The chapter is 
divided into five sections.  The purpose of the first section is to 
demonstrate the relevance and novelty of the research. The second section 
states more formally the identified gap in knowledge and the purpose of 
this research in the form of explicit research questions and objectives. The 
third section presents the constraints by which the scope of the study is 
narrowed. The fourth section describes the methodological approach of 
the study. The chapter concludes with a description of the overall structure 
of the study.  
1.1 Background 
The investment and productivity challenge faced by governments in the 
development and modernization of transport infrastructure is a focus for 
Finnish and European public policies.1 Public-Private Partnership (PPP) 
projects are increasingly accepted as a viable approach to the procurement 
and delivery of major public infrastructure assets and related services.2 
There is evidence of strong PPP deal flow in a number of countries within 
Europe, increasing adoption in countries with previously low levels of PPP 
activity, and shared interest in the project model across the region.3 As is 
the case with any new phenomenon on the verge of taking off, backers are 
pressed to justify, defend and win acceptance of their actions, and 
therefore PPP is subject to significant debate in Finland as well.4
Given the relatively recent introduction of PPP schemes, there is not as yet 
a substantial body of academic literature on such projects. There are 
multiple industry reports and surveys on PPPs, but they are typically 
directed at a non-academic audience and lack a rigorous theoretical 
foundation.5 Nevertheless, the quantity of relevant literature is increasing 
                                            
1 European Commission 2003 
2 European Commission 2004 
3 Dealogic ProjectWare 2005 
4 See e.g. Helsingin Sanomat 2006, Kauppalehti 2006 
5 See e.g. Davies & Eustice 2005, Rakennusteollisuus 2002 
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and a number of key questions have emerged, namely: The differences in 
private and public sector cost of borrowing, the relative efficiency of 
public and private sectors, distribution of risks between the government 
and a private supplier, and value for money considerations.6 These 
concerns have not been subjected to a theoretically well-founded study and 
are therefore a relevant and novel focus for research. 
1.2 Research Problem 
PPPs are complex arrangements and knowledge on the subject cuts across 
multiple knowledge domains including economical, financial, and legal 
disciplines. This research is mainly concerned with an economic analysis 
of two of the two key concerns that have emerged in multiple industry 
reports, surveys and a growing body of academic literature on PPPs, 
namely: the differences in private and public sector cost of borrowing, and 
the relative efficiency of public and private sectors.7
It seems possible to trace and link both of these considerations to the 
explicit and well-founded conceptual frameworks of industrial 
organization and investment theory. This theoretical background and the 
associated conceptual tools help develop a better and deeper understanding 
of the nature and rationale of PPP, as well as the key concerns that have 
emerged in literature. 
There are three, largely self-standing research problems, which can be 
stated and justified as follows: 
Research question 1: What is PPP? 
The notion of Public-Private Partnership is by no means simple.  The 
scheme involves a government, a private company and some major capital 
investment project. It is not self-evident why centralized government 
                                            
6 See e.g. Franks 2002 
7 Value for money considerations essentially study productivity: the ratio of benefits to costs. In fact, 
value for money considerations coincide with efficiency considerations, when either benefits or 
costs are held constant, and differences in the free variable are studied.  
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involvement is necessary in the first place, since most economic goods are 
produced and priced through decentralized interaction in markets. 
Similarly, some economic activity is typically organized centrally by the 
government. It is important to inquire into why should both public and 
private sector involvement be desired, and what roles they play, 
respectively. The basic nature, key parties, cash flows, ownership, and so 
forth are basic concerns that need to be addressed for any further study to 
proceed.  Economic theory provides a robust framework for achieving this 
understanding. 
Research question 2: What are the differences in private and public 
cost of capital? 
Financing is one of the most important functions in PPP, and a key theme 
in the literature on PPPs. Differences in the costs of debt service between 
the private and public sector are a recurrent topic of debate in research as 
well as media. The typical argument is that a government can save on debt 
service costs relative to private companies due to an excellent credit rating. 
However, debt service costs are only the explicit costs of capital, whereas 
a comprehensive economic perspective also includes implicit costs that 
result from foregone opportunities – the opportunity costs. Prior studies 
have not embraced this economically sound view, which is why the cost of 
capital deserves a separate elaboration in this study. 
Research question 3: What factors encourage organizing the 
production of transport infrastructure through a PPP? 
PPP is a relatively novel means of organizing the production of transport 
infrastructure and stands in rather stark contrast to traditional paths of 
public procurement, which is why PPP is subject to significant debate in 
Finland and elsewhere. Although its rationale can ultimately be answered 
only through empirical studies, a number of arguments against PPP have 
been developed, based on primarily hypothetical calculations. A 
theoretically well-founded study is thus warranted to develop clarity and 
in-depth understanding of PPP, and to provide a strong foundation with 
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which to evaluate the validity of hypothetical calculations, as well as to 
guide further empirical research.  
Again, it seems that prior studies have not embraced an economically 
comprehensive view, which foremost distinguishes between, and accounts 
for both direct production costs, as well as transaction costs. In particular, 
due to the economic nature of infrastructure goods, transaction costs and 
the contractual mechanisms designed to mitigate them seem to play a more 
significant role than research has customarily recognized. For example, 
costly quality problems that result from inappropriate contractual 
mechanisms, which allow a supplier to opportunistically deviate from 
agreed specifications are captured in the concept of transaction costs. For 
another example, under certain contracting practices a supplier may have 
no interest to voluntarily exert effort that is costly, but which would result 
in much higher life-cycle cost savings – the difference is again captured in 
transaction costs. The basic point is that a narrow focus on production 
costs fails to account for long-run cost inefficiencies which arise from 
inappropriate contracting practices.   
1.3 Research Objectives 
The research questions engulf a wealth of literature and cross disciplinary 
boundaries. The basic challenge is one of gathering information in these 
domains, developing deep understanding of the subject, investigating what 
is relevant in it, interpreting it from the perspective of PPPs and finally 
processing it into a communicable format.  
It is customary to distinguish between five types of objectives in scientific 
research.8 First, research may seek to problematize taken-for-granted 
knowledge in the first place. Second, research may strive to produce a 
description of a phenomenon or object. Third, an objective of research 
may be to produce an explanation of the causalities related to a 
phenomenon. Fourth, research may want to use descriptions of phenomena 
                                            
8 Niiniluoto 1980 
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and explanations of causalities to predict the consequences of changes in 
factors related to the phenomena. Finally, research may seek to provide a 
prescription as to what action should be taken, which involves making an 
essentially non-scientific value-judgment as to what is desirable. 
The first research question is what is a PPP?  
Objective 1: Produce a description of PPP, based on a profound 
economic understanding of transport infrastructure production, 
complemented with insights from project business literature, project 
finance research, and public procurement legislation.  
The second research sub-question is what are the differences in the costs of 
private and public capital? 
Objective 2: Produce an explanation of the differences in public and 
private cost of capital, based on the theories of industrial 
organization and investment. 
The third research sub-question is what factors encourage organizing the 
production of transport infrastructure through a PPP?  
Objective 3: Produce an explanation of the comparative cost 
advantages of PPP, reduced to an economic description of 
infrastructure production, and the concepts and results provided by 
the theory of industrial organization. 
1.4 Research Scope 
The research questions in this study are cross-disciplinary, addressing the 
domain where PPP as a form of project business, project finance, the 
economics of infrastructure goods, and legal frameworks overlap. PPP can 
be conceived as a form of project business and a distinct mode of 
organizing the delivery of major capital investments. 
Therefore the overarching discipline in this study is project business, 
although the analysis primarily relies on the excellent conceptual tools of 
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industrial organization and investment in its approach. This is not 
unconventional, since being primarily a practical discipline and lacking its 
own basic theory, project business study draws from multiple theoretical 
backgrounds.9 Nonetheless, this makes it particularly important to narrow 
down the scope of the research through a set of precisely specified 
constraints. The main constraints whereby the scope of this study is 
focused, and validity ensured, are driven by primarily practical motivations 
as follows. 
The decision to focus on PPPs is based on evidence, which suggests the 
model is becoming more established in Finland and elsewhere across 
Europe, with the UK market reaching already a level of maturity.10 The 
model has proven its efficacy under certain circumstances world-wide, and 
although Finland has been slow in its adoption, the domestic market for 
PPPs is expected to grow in the near future.11 Local construction 
companies as well as public authorities have demonstrated considerable 
interest in the market as exemplified, for instance, by the commission of a 
number of research initiatives.12
The decision to focus on capital-intensive transportation infrastructure 
projects is justified by the fact that in Finland, like elsewhere, the first 
major PPP projects are developed precisely in the transport sector.13 The 
Finnish PPP model best conforms to the model denoted by BOT in the US 
and PFI/DBFO in the UK.14 In these models a separate legal company is 
established and the sources of project funds are overwhelmingly private. 
The term capital-intensity is used to refer to projects where a significant 
commitment of capital is necessary for the provision of the service, which, 
in turn, contributes to the importance of financing. 
                                            
9 Artto & Wikström 2005 
10 Salmela 2005 
11 Kaislanlahti 2001 
12 For instance, Life-cycle Initiative at VTT, and InCoPro Research Project at BIT research center 
13 The first ”authentic” PPP deal in Finland, the E18 Lohja-Muurla highway was closed in 2005.  
14 Jokela 2002 
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Given the relatively recent introduction of PPP schemes, there is not as yet 
a substantial body of academic literature on such projects. There are 
multiple industry reports and surveys on PPPs, but they are typically 
directed at a non-academic audience and lack a rigorous theoretical 
foundation. As already noted, this research is concerned with two specific 
concerns that have emerged: the differences in private and public sector 
cost of borrowing and the relative efficiency of public and private sectors.  
For a common, unified treatment of these concerns, a consistent, accepted 
and fundamental theoretical framework is warranted. For this purpose, the 
research chooses to rely on the theories of industrial organization and 
investment, which seem to provide excellent and profound conceptual 
tools to facilitate the study. Moreover, they both draw from the same 
background: economics. Investment theory is often characterized as 
applied economics, and industrial organization is a branch of 
microeconomics that conforms to the ideas of optimizing behavior and the 
common motive of cost-minimization. In fact, they are both based on the 
paradigm of rational decision making, applied to industrial markets and 
financial markets, respectively.  
 
Public-Private Partnership
in the Finnish transport sector
Economics of Public-Private
Partnership
Comparative efficiency
of PPP relative to 
traditional procurement
Differences in public and
private cost of capital 
Theory of industrial
organization and
investment
 
Figure 1 A schematic representation of the scope of the study 
This theoretical background helps to describe in subsequent chapters the 
rationale of PPP, its distinctive characteristics and the two key concerns 
that have emerged in literature. The theory of industrial organization and 
investment theory therefore serve to inquire into the empirical context of 
 
8 
PPP and to integrate the different knowledge domains, which intersect in 
this study. The figure above (Figure 1) gives a simple schematic 
representation of the scope of the study, the main concerns and the main 
theories applied.  
1.5 Research Methodology 
This research is carried out within the tradition of industrial engineering 
and management (IEM) in Helsinki University of Technology (HUT), 
under the guidance of International Project Business -professorship. In the 
classification of sciences, research in IEM is positioned as applied science. 
The purpose of applied science is to serve as a bridge between basic 
science and practice.15 As applied science, IEM aims at practical results 
applicable in industry.16 With reference to this research tradition, the 
purpose of this study is to ground the study of PPP in the Finnish transport 
sector to the basic theories of industrial organization and investment, and 
produce novel knowledge applicable within the Finnish economy.  
General research characteristics that are valued at IEM are relevance, 
contribution and evidence.17 Relevance means high priority in the domain 
of business problems and potential value for practitioners. Contribution 
means novelty of the research findings among the research community and 
positioning the findings in an existing body of knowledge. Evidence needs 
to be based on both empirical data and rational reasoning.  
In this study, relevance is derived from the growing role of PPP in 
addressing the investment and productivity challenge faced by 
governments in the development and modernization of transport 
infrastructure in Finland and Europe. Contribution is sought by subjecting 
two of the key concerns related to PPP to a theoretically well-founded, 
structured study. Evidence, in turn, is gathered primarily by inductive, 
                                            
15 Niiniluoto 1980 
16 Olkkonen 1993 
17 Eloranta 1998 
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logical reasoning of the key concerns within established theoretical 
frameworks.  
At IEM, deep understanding of the phenomenon as a research result is 
valued18 which is why the dominant research method has been empirical 
case study research.19 Deep understanding means explanation of potential 
‘how’ and ‘why’ questions of the phenomenon under study. The empirical 
context in this research is selected using theoretical sampling, i.e. the 
empiric focus is chosen for theoretical, not statistical reasons.20  
Although this study lacks a particular empirical case study, the research 
approach is not purely theoretical, because the empirical context of inquiry 
is well defined. Deep understanding of PPP in the transport sector is 
sought by translating the empirical phenomenon to fundamental 
conceptual frameworks, which allow producing ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
explanations to the research questions, in the form of theoretical 
constructs.  
It can be argued that sound theoretical constructs are a prerequisite for 
later empirical case studies. In other words, some profound theoretical 
effort is required to guide more empirical analysis of the particularities of 
the Finnish regulatory environment, construction industry and government 
agencies, and so forth. Yet, the objective even of this study is not to arrive 
at results, which can be readily generalized to other variations of PPP 
initiatives and industries; instead, to direct attention to the unique 
conditions prevalent as defined in the research scope. 
An important feature of this research is also the overlap of information 
collection, analysis and interpretation, which together form an iterative 
process, similar to the one employed in case studies.21 The process starts 
by definition of the research questions and selection of the relevant 
                                            
18 Ranta 1999 
19 Eloranta 1981 
20 Eisenhardt 1989 
21 Glaser & Strauss 1967 
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concepts, which in this study are grounded in the theories of industrial 
organization and investment. The principles and concepts of these theories 
are used to direct attention to what should be studied in order to answer the 
research questions, as suggested by Yin.22
The sources of information, and their relative standing utilized in this 
study can be divided into literature, which is the primary source, and 
authorities who provide secondary information. The literature consists of 
academic research articles and textbooks on the theory of industrial 
organization, investment theory, project business, project finance, public 
procurement legislation and PPPs. The main authorities, which the study 
relies on, can be divided further into two: First, industry representatives, 
who can be considered as credible authorities on the infrastructure 
industry, financial advisors and corresponding legislation; and second, 
scholars in the field of project business and finance.  
The research accesses these two data sources with two distinct data 
collection methods. The use of multiple sources and data types, i.e. 
triangulation, provides stronger substantiation of argumentation; moreover, 
combination of data types can also be highly synergistic.23 The process is 
essentially iterative, but begins with a literature study carried out in order 
to establish the necessary basic understanding and terminology of 
industrial and financial theory. The second data collection method involves 
interviews with open-ended questions based on the literature study in order 
to provide qualitative data on the subject, i.e. to verify, substantiate and 
validate the analysis utilizing the expertise of practitioners. 
1.6 Structure of Report 
This report is divided into eight chapters. In Chapter 1, the basic approach 
of the study is described, claiming the novelty and relevance, defining the 
research questions, objectives and scope, and characterizing the 
methodological approach and structure of the of the study. In Chapter 2, 
                                            
22 Yin 1989 
23 Jick 1979 
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the main theoretical background of the study is reviewed, introducing the 
basic principles and concepts, which are necessary for the articulation and 
analysis in the subsequent chapters. In Chapter 3, the Public-Private 
Partnership scheme and traditional public procurement practices are 
reviewed from various disciplinary perspectives. In Chapter 4, the 
economic fundamentals of transport infrastructure production are 
analyzed, and the traditional paths of public procurement as well as PPP 
are characterized on basis of the theory of industrial organization. In 
Chapter 5, the differences in public and private cost of capital are 
analyzed, based on the same theoretical background. In Chapter 6, the 
comparative efficiency of PPP relative to the traditional path of 
procurement is analyzed, grounded mainly in the theory of industrial 
organization. In Chapter 7, the key results of the study are summarized, 
with a separate section dedicated for each of the research questions and 
results. Finally, in Chapter 8, the practical relevance and theoretical 
contribution of the results are discussed and reflected against prior 
research as well as industry practice; the reliability and validity of the 
study is assessed; and avenues for further research are suggested.  
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2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In this chapter the primary theoretical background of the study is 
reviewed, introducing the basic principles and concepts, which are used in 
the subsequent chapters for articulation and analysis. Although project 
business is the overarching body of knowledge in this study, the discipline 
typically draws from multiple theoretical backgrounds. The complexities 
and recurrent themes in the study of PPP warrant a theoretically well-
founded methodology, for which the theories of industrial organization 
and investment seem best suited. The idea is to review these theories first, 
so as to gain freedom to apply their concepts and ideas freely in 
subsequent chapters. If an audience encounters unfamiliar concepts in the 
main body of the study, it is encouraged to refer to this chapter. The 
chapter is divided into two sections, with the first one focusing on the 
theory of industrial organization, and the second focusing on investment 
theory. 
2.1 Theory of Industrial Organization 
2.1.1 Core Definitions 
Definition of Industrial Organization 
Theory of industrial organization is a branch of microeconomics, which 
focuses on the study of how firms make themselves as well of as possible 
in a world of scarcity and the consequences of those decisions for markets 
and the entire economy. Theory of industrial organization is also known 
as producer theory and the terms are used synonymously in the study.24 
The basic structure of the theory’s review here is divided into two parts, of 
which the first focuses on various views to the notion of the firms, as 
compositions of economic activities, and the second part on the behavior 
of firms, first as a unitary optimizing entities, and subsequently from the 
contracting perspective of multiple unitary, but interacting optimizers. 
                                            
24 The key ideas are denoted in italics 
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 The theory, like any science, employs various models to approximate 
reality and focus the study on only the critical aspects of a given 
phenomenon or object. Industrial organization uses, in particular, 
mathematical expressions relating two or more quantitative terms to make 
explicit assumptions that elevate an analysis to a higher level of abstraction 
and allow the use of standard mathematical techniques. It is customary to 
distinguish between positive and normative models:  Positive models 
simply present a cause-effect relationship, but refrain from taking any 
prescriptive stance as to what is desirable, which is the role of normative 
inquiries. Finally, it should be noted that the theory in this chapter is 
widely accepted, and the contributors are so many that references are 
mostly omitted. The primary sources that this study draws from are 
Tirole,25 Jehle and Reny,26 and Perloff.27
Methodology of Industrial Organization  
In historical retrospective, modern producer theory owes to two research 
traditions of which the first is sometimes called the Harvard tradition. 
This tradition was empirical in nature and developed the famous structure-
conduct-performance paradigm, according to which market structure (the 
number of sellers, their degree of product differentiation, etc.) determines 
conduct (price, R&D, advertising, etc.) and conduct yields market 
performance (efficiency, profits, etc.).28 This approach, although plausible, 
was mainly informal, rested on loose theories and produced what is best 
defined as descriptive statistics.  
The second tradition, which was mainly theoretical, adopted non-
cooperative game theory as a unified methodology for the study of market 
structure and firm behavior, where the elegant and general analysis of 
competitive markets was inapplicable. Furthermore, serious progress of the 
concepts of dynamics and asymmetric information allowed formalizing 
                                            
25 Tirole 2002 
26 Jehle & Reny 2000 
27 Perloff 2001 
28 Bain 1954 
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many of the informal insights of the earlier Harvard tradition.29 The core of 
the modeling methodology is the assumption of optimizing behavior, and 
firms are treated as single unitary decision makers that maximize profits. 
Problems of managerial control by shareholders or bankers are typically 
assumed away, but are sometimes enclosed in the analysis through 
principal-agent models, which build on asymmetric information and, 
again, optimizing behavior.30  
Producer theory methodology, in the line of the second tradition, 
customarily starts with models of monopoly, where a firm encounters a 
passive environment absent of competitors. The model of monopolistic 
competition is extended into models of oligopolistic market competition, 
where multiple separate firms behave in their own self-interest. If the 
number of firms in markets is increased to infinity, the models of 
oligopolistic markets coincide with the competitive-equilibrium model; the 
best-developed and most applied model in producer theory, and in fact, all 
of economics. Since this study is concerned with a PPP market, where a 
single buyer (the government) trades with a single seller (the project 
consortium) chosen from a pool of only a few potential candidates, the 
competitive equilibrium is hardly an accurate representation of the market. 
However, is seems sensible to treat in brief this model, which is highly 
prominent in all of economics, and provides a conceptual background 
against which the study of PPP can be understood.  
Producers in Competitive Total Market 
The competitive equilibrium model of markets starts with a description of 
available economic goods, which are characterized by their physical 
properties, the date, location and the state of nature on which they are 
available. Consumers are perfectly informed about all goods’ properties 
and have preferences over bundles of goods. Producers, i.e. firms, are 
owned by consumers and endowed with production possibility sets. A 
                                            
29 Tirole 2002 
30 See e.g. Arrow 1985 
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paradigm of a passive market organization is then added. All market 
participants are price takers. The consumers maximize their welfare, given 
that their expenditures must not exceed their income, which gives rise to 
demand functions, i.e. correspondences of several well-fare maximizing 
bundles. Producers maximize profits over their technological possibilities, 
captured in production functions, giving rise to supply functions. Within 
this setting, a competitive equilibrium is a set of prices, with associated 
demands and supplies, such that all the markets, one for each good, clear, 
i.e. total demand matches total supply.31
The assumptions of the competitive equilibrium model strongly limit the 
scope of its application. Among the conditions that are required is the 
absence of externalities between economic agents. An externality arises 
when a consumption of a good by a buyer directly affects the welfare of 
another, or when a firm’s production affects other economic agents. 
Another key condition is that goods are of a private nature, which rules 
out public goods that can be consumed simultaneously by several 
consumer-citizens. A third important requisite condition is that all parties 
have perfect information about goods, prices, and so forth. It seems 
reasonable to assert that for an accurate representation of a highway PPP, 
all of these conditions are in fact violated: A highway involves significant 
positive and negative externalities and the parties are hardly fully informed 
about the quality, value and cost of such a complex project.  
Producers in Non-Competitive Partial Markets 
Where externalities between economic units exist, where a market is 
concerned with public goods, where information is imperfect, and where 
the market is served by a small number of firms with non-negligible 
pricing power, a more realistic model is required. First of all, the analysis 
must focus on a partial-equilibrium set-up, in which a good, or a closely 
related group of goods is singled out and the interaction with the rest of the 
economy is ignored.  
                                            
31 Tirole 2002 
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The notion of a market is not simple, however, and the definition should 
not be too broad or too narrow. Any good is potentially a substitute for 
another, if only in an infinitesimal way, but a single market should not be 
equivalent to the entire economy. On the other hand, if only perfect 
substitutes belong to the same market, all markets would be served by a 
single firm, since firms produce goods that are differentiated, if only in an 
infinitesimal way. In this study, (PPP) markets are assumed to be well 
defined and the interaction with the rest of the economy is ignored. This 
simply means that we will assume that a PPP market is a meaningful 
scoping and the analysis can be constrained to the main elements that 
comprise any particular PPP project. 
Nevertheless, the important point is that to study producers is to study the 
functioning of markets, because producers operate within markets. A 
market is essentially an exchange mechanism that allows sellers to trade 
with buyers and therefore consists of three elements: an economic good 
(object of exchange), the supply side (sellers) and the demand side 
(buyers). Models of markets are typically classified on the basis of the 
assumed number of sellers and buyers.  
As already noted, a competitive market is characterized by a very large 
number of buyers and sellers (analytically speaking, infinitely many), who 
consequently have no effect on the market price alone and receive normal 
returns on their business. On the other extreme, a monopoly is a market 
with a sole supplier of a good for which there is no close substitute, and 
the seller can, within limits of regulation, set its price freely and receive 
abnormal returns. Monopolistic competition refers to a market structure in 
which there are multiple suppliers of slightly differentiated goods, which 
are nevertheless such close substitutes that the sellers enjoy only limited 
pricing power, and no additional firm can enter and earn abnormal returns. 
Oligopolistic competition is a market with only a few suppliers of a good, 
and the sellers compete on price, cost structures, production techniques, 
product characteristics and advertising to earn abnormal returns. On the 
demand side, the key distinction is a monopsony, where there is only a 
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single buyer of a good in a given market. Finally, in a bilateral monopoly, 
there is only one relevant buyer and one relevant seller.32  
The firm is the basic object of producer theory, and the focus in the 
following sections is on various fundamental views to the firm. This 
theoretical background helps to describe with conceptual clarity the 
rationale of PPP, its distinctive characteristics and the key concerns that 
have emerged in literature. Although the focus is on the firm, the views 
address the three basic economic questions that are at the core of producer 
theory, markets and more broadly microeconomics: Which goods and 
services to produce (the economic good), how to produce (the supply side) 
and to whom (the demand side). 
2.1.2 The Notion of Firms 
Dimensions of the Firm 
The notion of a firm is by no means simple, and consequently it has been 
given various definitions in literature; yet, they all share the idea that a 
firm should be able to produce (or sell) more efficiently than would its 
constituent parts separately. It is customary to distinguish between the 
horizontal dimension of a firm, which refers to the scale and scope of 
production, and the vertical dimension, which refers to the extent to which 
goods and services that can be purchased from outsiders are produced in 
house. Horizontally integrated thus describes a firm that produces multiple 
related products, or one that has internalized several activities that 
accompany the production of a single product. Vertically integrated refers 
to a firm that participates in more than one successive stage of the 
production or distribution of goods.  
There are three established definitions of a firm: the technological, the 
contractual, and the incomplete contracting one. The definitions are in fact 
complementary views on what determines the size of a firm along the 
vertical and horizontal dimensions, and all three are based on the motive of 
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cost-minimizing organization of economic activity. The three views can 
also be seen as successive stages on a research continuum, which begins 
with a static conception of a firm that is next complicated by the inclusion 
of the time dimension, and finally by the inclusion of uncertainty and 
admittance of limits to human rationality. It should be noted that there is a 
fourth tentative definition of the firm, which complements the three others 
with an informal social perspective, and all four will be elaborated and 
summarized in what follows. These views are important to study, because 
they provide profound insights as to why it might make sense to set up 
PPPs in the first place. 
Technological View of the Firm  
The first, technological view represents the classical, economical view of 
the firm, and focuses on the synergy between different production units at 
a given time to exploit economies of scale or of scope. Roughly, 
economies of scale exist when the production cost of a single unit of 
output decreases with the number of units produced; economies of scope 
are cost-savings resulting from interdependences between product lines.  
In general, higher levels of production permit the use of more efficient 
techniques, and motivate investment in cost-reducing technologies, worker 
specialization and sharing of production techniques between products. For 
a concrete example, in a production plant with a large number of 
machines, the flow of output that can be sustained is proportionally higher 
than one with a small number of machines, because the random breakdown 
of one machine can be reallocated to other machines reducing the 
associated cost impact. Similarly, a firm serving several markets with 
imperfectly correlated variable demands faces less uncertainty than a 
collection of independent firms, and can therefore save on costly peak-load 
investments. The gathering of multiple activities within a firm – be they 
related to production, marketing, or finance – may also avoid duplication 
of fixed costs, or at least reduce average costs related to these functions.  
The returns to scale and scope can be formalized in the concept of 
subadditivity, which requires some simple notation. Let total production 
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cost C(qi) represent the total cost of producing outputs qi, where i = 
1,2,…,n.  The total production cost of a firm is typically assumed to be the 
sum of a firm’s variable cost and fixed cost C(qi) = ciqi + F, where fixed 
cost F is a production expense that does not vary with output, and variable 
cost VC = ciqi is a production expense that changes with the quantity of 
output produced. Assuming that C(qi) is the minimum cost of a bundle of 
inputs that allows the production of outputs q1, …,qn. The cost function is 
then said to be strictly subadditive, if ∑C(qi) > C(∑qi).  
Subadditivity therefore simply means that it costs less to produce various 
outputs together than separately, and encourages the gathering of activities 
within a firm. Yet this is not an ultimate conclusion, since the average cost 
AC of production, which is the total cost divided by the units of output 
produced, AC(qi) = C(qi) / qi, typically increases at high output levels, as a 
result of increasing marginal costs MC(qi) = δC(qi) / δqi, and thereby limits 
the size of firms. Increasing marginal costs are typically explained by the 
diseconomies of scale at high levels of production and higher cost of 
managing a larger, more complex firm that offset the scale and scope 
benefits. 
Moreover, inherent problems with the technological view can be 
highlighted by two examples: First, if producing output qi + δqi were to 
cost more than producing outputs qi and δqi separately, a firm could simply 
set up two divisions, operated as “quasi-firms” to resolve the problem. 
Second, it is not entirely clear why economies of scale and scope should be 
exploited within a single firm, since they could, in principle, be obtained 
through contracting with legally separate entities. For example, a firm 
could serve several markets with imperfectly correlated variable demands 
through vertical restraints specified in distribution agreements, without 
having to internalize the activities. Or ensure a steady supply of inputs 
through supplier agreements. In conclusion, the technological view 
basically focuses on static reasons of the firm, i.e. reasons, outside of the 
time dimension, why economic units might want to merge. But a dynamic 
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perspective must account for the possibility of contracting with other 
firms, which is the focus of the next section. 
Contractual View of the Firm 
The contractual view of the firm focuses on the arrangement of economic 
units in a long-run relationship to avoid contractual hazards resulting 
from opportunism.33 Possibility of opportunism and contractual hazards 
arise when parties to an exchange must sink trade-specific investments 
before trading. Before agreement to trade there may be many suppliers and 
buyers, but once investments have been made, the parties may end up in a 
bilateral monopoly situation. The supplier may not find alternative outlets, 
and the buyer may not be able to contract with a new supplier on time. A 
long-term contract must ex-post guarantee the parties a fair return in order 
to ex ante encourage investment specific assets (as well as prohibit 
monopoly pricing).  
For simplicity, the review will focus on a vertical relationship between a 
supplier and a buyer, and both parties are assumed to be risk-neutral, 
which means that they are indifferent between a certain outcome and a fair 
bet, with expected value equal to the certain outcome. Long-run 
relationships are associated with idiosyncratic investment and resulting 
asset specificity. Idiosyncratic investment is associated with the prospect 
of future trading that exploits the use of specialized assets. This is the case, 
for instance, when a supplier must design equipment, the characteristics of 
which are specific (dedicated) to a buyer’s particular order, or when a 
buyer spends resources to design a final deliverable before an intermediate 
good used to produce this good is delivered by the supplier. Idiosyncratic 
investment increases switching costs, prominent among which are the 
needs for a new supplier to learn the trade and the reluctance of the old to 
transmit information to the new one. 
                                            
33 Opportunism refers to taking advantage of another party when circumstances permit. 
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Williamson34 distinguishes two further types of specificity: site specificity 
and specific investments in human capital. Site specificity is associated 
with the gain (or cost savings) in trading with a nearby supplier or buyer. 
Specific investments in human capital involve, for example, the learning of 
production processes and managerial dedication. Nevertheless, all these 
types of asset specificity have the same outcome: The parties that contract 
now know that later on staying together can yield a surplus relative to 
trading with other parties. It is important that the surplus gain from trade 
will be exploited correctly ex post (after contracting) and that they will be 
divided properly in order to induce the efficient amount of investment ex 
ante (at contracting). 
A crucial aspect of specific investment is that even though the supplier and 
the buyer may select each other ex ante from a pool of potential trading 
partners, they end up forming an ex post bilateral monopoly in that they 
have an incentive to trade between them rather than with outside parties. 
The hazard is that under bilateral monopoly, each party wants to maximize 
its share of the common surplus ex post, which jeopardizes the incentives 
to make efficient amounts of specific investments ex ante, which in turn 
promotes the writing of contracts. 
The alternative to contracting would be to rely on ex post bargaining. It is 
important to realize that an ex ante contract and ex post bargaining are, in 
principle, substitutes to one another. The parties to a trade, could refrain 
from writing a contract ex ante, sink specific investments, and engage in ex 
post bargaining to decide on the distribution of the consequent surplus 
yields. However, when there is an information asymmetry,35 bargaining 
may not be efficient, which stems from the fact that both parties would like 
to appropriate the gains from the trade, but run the risk of foregoing the 
trade by being too demanding. Generally, bargaining under symmetric 
information is efficient, but not necessarily equitable. In other words, the 
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35 Asymmetric information is a situation in which one party knows a substantial fact relevant to a 
trade, which another party does not know 
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party with higher bargaining power, i.e. with better alternatives outside of 
the negotiation, may be able to capture most or all of the implied surplus 
yields.  
The most obvious limitation of a long-run relationship is the presence of 
outside opportunities. Forcing parties to stick to a trade through high 
penalties for breach may be undesirable if there are no gains from the 
trade, or if better outside opportunities are available to one or both parties. 
The contract must therefore find an optimal trade-off between flexibility 
and the prevention of opportunism. In conclusion, the theory suggests that 
firms should write long and detailed contracts where that is feasible and 
not too costly, and that the incentive to do so increases with the specificity 
of investments and the lack of outside opportunities, to which investments 
can be substituted. In other words, “a verbal contract is worth the piece of 
paper it is written on.”    
Complete ex ante contracts are also known as classical contracts, and can 
be described as “sharp in by clear agreement; sharp out by clear 
performance.” These contracts are associated with trades in the absence of 
unforeseeable uncertainty or bounded rationality, i.e. where complete 
specification of the object of exchange is possible.36 The basic challenge in 
designing a complete contract is to exhaustively embody the expectations 
and conditions of an exchange relationship and creating conditions for 
monitoring, or alternatively inducing optimal effort through incentives. In 
classical contracts, there is an emphasis on the letter of agreement, the 
documented contract, and contingencies are clearly and narrowly defined. 
The result is that consequences of fulfillment or of failure are well 
understood from the beginning of the relationship, which is not necessarily 
an appropriate assumption of reality – explored in the next section. 
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Incomplete Contracting View of the Firm 
The contracting view of the firm studied organizations in terms of 
complete contracts. In practice, however, contracts are fairly incomplete, 
due to transaction costs. Coase37 and Williamson38 have distinguished 
between four types of transaction costs, two of which occur at the 
contracting date and two of which occur later. First, some contingencies 
may not be foreseeable at the contracting date. Second, even if they could 
be foreseen, there may be too many contingencies to write into the 
contract. Third, monitoring the contract and checking that the counterparty 
abides by its terms may be costly. Fourth, enforcing contracts may involve 
considerable legal costs. The incomplete view of the firm asserts that the 
minimization of transaction costs is a major concern in determining the 
optimal size of the firm. In order to avoid hazards in the future, parties 
should sign complete contracts, or, if this is impossible or too costly to 
write, the parties should at least make correct use of authority. 
The incomplete contracting view thus focuses on the extent to which 
authority is distributed between economic units through different 
governance modes. Authority to choose the ways in which capital and 
personnel are employed is important, because contingencies unforeseen 
and unspecified in a contract may arise. The ownership of assets give the 
owner of a firm the power to make decisions that minimize costs within 
the broad lines of the relationship as specified in a contract.  
The alternative to distributing authority instead of allocating ownership is 
to establish neutral arbitration mechanisms. Arbitration offers 
opportunities for more cooperative or interactive approaches than 
litigation, and arbitrators can be chosen who have a better business 
understanding than a judge of the transaction in question. The involvement 
of a neutral third party is a mechanism which promotes identifying private 
information of the parties and acting on it without opportunism. The 
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arbitrator is given the authority to make joint decisions should 
unforeseeable conditions arise. 
Incomplete contracts are also known as neoclassical contracts. In the 
presence of uncertainty and bounded rationality, it can be impossible to 
write contracts which describe all possible contingencies. Rather than 
abandon the exchange altogether, or produce the good internally, the 
practice of writing incomplete contracts has developed. Such contracts are 
of long term, and include specification of mechanisms for adapting the 
agreement as conditions change, foremost including the involvement of 
third party arbitration.39 An important difference between private 
arbitration and court litigation is the intention to preserve the exchange 
relationship.  
Relational Contracting View of the Firm 
In practice, however, MaCaulay40 has found that relations between firms 
tend to be more informal than is predicted by the theory. This is true even 
in long-run relationships, but can be explained by the concept of 
reputation. A firm that cheats at some date, or makes decisions that are not 
in joint interest, runs the risk of losing future profitable deals with its 
partner – or with third parties, to whom the information is transmitted. 
Cheating or not cheating is a form of signaling, i.e. action taken by an 
informed party to send information to an uninformed party on a hidden 
variable. Parties may receive the signal directly or refer to other 
uninformed industry parties to screen potential trading partners, i.e. take 
action to determine the information possessed by an informed party. 
Recurring positive signals build a positive reputation.  
Although, reputation is no substitute for technological synergies, it allows 
a firm to save on the costs of writing complete contracts or on the costs of 
distributing authority. On the other hand, informality exposes the firms to 
the threat of opportunism, and therefore informality is expected to be most 
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prevalent when specific investments are limited and when trade is 
sufficiently frequent so that the incentive to engage in opportunistic 
behavior is low. 
Contracts may in fact damage exchange performance by undermining 
relational governance.41 If one party trusts the other there is little need for 
exhaustively specifying actions - trust replaces contracts with handshakes. 
Therefore relational contracts refer to relationships, which typically 
include extra-legal cultural elements to foster cooperation, and include 
commitments not enforceable in the courts. A relational contract specifies 
only the general terms and objectives of a relationship and specifies 
mechanisms for decision making and dispute resolution, i.e. self-
enforcement. They also involve informal agreements and unwritten codes 
of conduct that powerfully affect the behavior of the unitary parties to the 
trade. Complex and long-term exchange relations are sometimes 
impossible without a presumption of fundamentally cooperative intent 
foreign to the notion of litigation. Reciprocity and risk-sharing are 
common as tokens of good faith and trust.  
Summary of the Views to the Firm 
The table below (Table 1) summarizes the lessons from the various views 
to the firm. The logic of the representation is to show the line of thinking 
for each view(left side), starting with the basic conditions each view 
assumes and show two intermediate steps leading to the conclusion as to 
what means (right side) are instrumental in minimizing the costs of 
organizing economic activity. All of the means imply integration in some 
sense. The first, “plain” integration refers to internalizing activities within 
a legally separate unit. The second, complete contracts, approximates 
integration through contracting, and is therefore customarily referred to as 
quasi-integration. The third, authority, complements quasi-integration by 
assigning explicit decision making rights to resolve potential costly 
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conflicts. The fourth, reputation, entails integration of economic units 
within an informal social setting.  
Table 1 Cost-minimizing lessons from the various views to the firm  
Views of the firm Assumed 
conditions 
Key concepts Key motives Means to 
minimize costs 
Technological Potential for 
technological 
synergies 
Economies of 
scale and 
scope 
Achieve lower 
total production 
costs 
Integrate 
activities within 
a unitary firm 
Contractual Possibility of 
engaging in a 
long-run trading 
relationship 
Asset specificity Achieve 
surplus yields 
by lower total 
production 
costs or higher 
value in the 
long-run 
Design ex ante 
complete 
contracts that 
secure 
investments in 
specialized 
capital 
Incomplete 
contracting 
Presence of 
complexity and 
unforeseeable 
uncertainties 
Transaction 
costs 
Save on costs 
of writing 
contracts and 
avoid 
potentially 
costly future 
conflicts and  
litigation 
Write 
incomplete 
contracts and 
design ex ante 
contract 
adaptation 
mechanisms  
Relational 
contracting 
Social 
embeddedness 
of economic 
activity 
Reputation Achieve lower 
contracting 
costs and 
secure future 
profits 
Develop 
positive 
reputation by 
sending 
consistent 
signals of 
cooperation 
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The first view assumes the possibility of technological synergies that can 
be achieved by higher levels of output that allow exploiting economies of 
scale or of scope. Economies of scale and scope are motivated by a 
decrease in the production cost of a single unit of output (economies of 
scale) in a single product firm, or a decrease in the production cost of a 
single unit of output in a multi-product firm (economies of scope), 
resulting in a lower total cost, captured in the concept of subadditivity.  
The second view focuses on the possibility of long-run trading 
relationships. Under long-run trading, it may be advantageous to make 
idiosyncratic investments, i.e. commit capital to relation-specific 
operational, human or site assets, which either decrease costs or increase 
value of production. Long-run trading with specific assets can yield a 
surplus relative to trading with other parties. The parties may be 
nevertheless be reluctant to make these investments, because they fear that 
the counterpart may take opportunistic advantage of the investments once 
they are committed and capture the surplus alone. To capture the benefits 
of asset specificity, the trading partners are therefore motivated to write 
contracts, which ensure that surplus gain from trade will be exploited 
correctly and divided properly ex post (after contracting) in order to induce 
the efficient amount of investment ex ante (at contracting). Theory thus 
suggests that firms should write long and detailed contracts where that is 
feasible and not too costly, and that the incentive to do so increases with 
the opportunities for specific investments and the lack of outside 
opportunities, to which investments can be substituted 
The third view assumes that under complex circumstances and 
unforeseeable future, the contracts may nevertheless be incomplete, again 
discouraging investment in specific assets that could yield a trading 
surplus. Complexity42 and uncertainty43 expose the trading partners to four 
                                            
42 Or, in reverse, bounded rationality: both are relative concepts. Under extremely bounded 
rationality even a simple situation seems complex. 
43 Uncertainty here refers to future events that are unforeseeable, in contrast to outcomes and 
associated probabilities that can be conceived in advance. 
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types of transaction difficulties, which may lead to costly conflicts and are 
therefore denoted as transaction costs.  First, some contingencies may not 
be foreseeable at the contracting date. Second, even if they could be 
foreseen, there may be so many contingencies that it is too costly to write 
them into the contract. Third, monitoring the contract and checking that the 
counterparty abides by its terms may be costly. Fourth, enforcing contracts 
may involve considerable legal costs. To salvage idiosyncratic investment 
and implied surplus yields, the parties may try to avoid transaction costs by 
writing incomplete contracts, and ex ante distribute authority either to a 
third party, or between one another, to determine a proper course of action 
should conflicts arise.  
The fourth view assumes that economic activity is embedded in social 
structures. The parties to a trade lacking a complete contract may in spite 
be motivated to secure and divide gains from trade properly. A social 
context can sustain informal relationships that allow the parties to an 
exchange save on the costs of writing ex ante complete contracts and 
distributing authority, when they anticipate gains from future trade that 
offset the gains from opportunistic behavior. A firm that cheats at some 
date, or makes decisions that are not in joint interest, runs the risk of losing 
future profitable deals with its partner; or even third parties, to whom the 
information is conveyed. Firms therefore seek to build a positive 
reputation to save on contracting costs and to secure future profits.  
2.1.3 The Behavior of Firms 
Profit Maximization Hypothesis 
The most common assumption regarding the behavior of firms is that they 
maximize profits, but there are many ways in which business decision 
makers may deviate from this hypothesis, as well as many mechanisms 
that may limit managerial discretion. The shareholders of a firm are 
claimants for its revenue, net of various input costs. Thus, if they were able 
to run the firm, they would choose courses of action that would minimize 
costs and maximize profit. Non-profit maximization is mainly associated 
with the separation of ownership and control – the key concern of 
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principal-agent theory. Reviewing the principal-agent literature 
comprehensively is beyond the scope of this study, but some insights from 
the theory seem to warrant attention. First, however, we need to describe 
the profit maximization hypothesis, from which agents may deviate.  
If output is the quantity q produced, and revenue R is the price p of goods 
sold times the quantity, R = pq, then profit π is the difference between 
revenues R and costs C, π = R – C. The total production cost of a firm is 
typically assumed to be the sum of a firm’s variable cost and fixed cost C 
= VC + F, where fixed cost F is a production expense that does not vary 
with output, and variable cost VC = cq is a production expense that 
changes with the quantity of output produced. Hence, profit can be written 
as π = pq – cq – F = (p-c)q – F. With reference to this expression, firms 
maximize profit π, by maximizing the unit price p, minimizing unit cost c, 
maximizing output q, and minimizing fixed cost F. 
Transaction costs 
With reference to the profit maximization hypothesis, it is essential to 
distinguish between two fundamental types of costs: First, those paid for 
an economic good (inputs or outputs, depending on the actor perspective); 
and second, those incurred beyond the price paid for the good, termed as 
transaction costs.44 The former is simple to understand; the latter is 
somewhat more difficult since it includes all the other costs related to 
planning, executing and completing an economic exchange. Because the 
concept is highly important, but far from simple, it warrants some 
additional elaboration. 
In an ideal world, where economic actors were fully informed and 
trustworthy, they could simply place orders on one another and receive the 
goods that maximized their welfare given budget constraints. However, 
given that real people are not fully informed, they have to search for 
                                            
44 A typical way of illustrating the concept intuitively is by drawing an analogy between economics 
and natural physics, and conceiving transaction costs as the economic equivalent to friction in 
physics. 
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information on the availability of goods, their characteristics, and their 
prices; moreover they have to decide on the least costly means of 
accessing this information in the first place, and so forth. Nonetheless, 
given sufficient information, people could, in principle, subsequently 
engage in economic exchanges, where one receives a good and the other 
something (usually money) in return.  
But often the prices of goods are not fully determined, and most 
importantly, people are not strictly benevolent by nature, so they may not 
respect their commitments. Consequently, the parties to an exchange have 
to first engage in costly bargaining, and second, in costly drafting, 
monitoring and enforcing of contracts that ensure their vested interests are 
protected. Bargaining involves two aspects: the surplus value that a 
possible trade implies, i.e. efficiency, as well as the distribution of the 
surplus value, i.e. equitability.  
Drafting contracts that embody the joint agreement gained through 
bargaining involves four aspects: the specifications explicit in a contract, 
the observation of the actions of the counterpart, the verification of these 
observations; or alternatively inducing action through incentives, 
observing and verifying the actions and thereby sharing net benefits; and 
finally, enforcement of verified observations, or arbitration of non-
verifiable observations. 
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Figure 2 Illustration of the transaction costs associated with alternative 
contracting paths under progressively more challenging circumstances  
The point is that, in principle, some costs in addition to prices paid for 
goods are unavoidable – known as transaction costs. However, the 
common motive of minimizing costs still applies, and there are alternative 
contracting paths that can be followed to minimize transaction costs 
(Figure 2). Foremost, the costs of contracting need to be weighed against 
the yields of a better trade, but this evaluation can be broken down into 
components. Monitoring, incentives and arbitration are contract 
mechanisms for handling progressively greater interdependence of the 
parties under progressively more difficult monitoring, more complex and 
uncertain circumstances at minimum cost.45  
The costs of crafting more detailed contracts (along with observation of 
effort, verification, enforcement) have to be weighed against the possibility 
and costs of inducing the same effort by incentives (along with observation 
of output, verification, enforcement); or the costs implied by assuming 
                                            
45 Williamson 1985 
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ownership or employing arbitration mechanisms (along with observation 
or authority).   
Nonetheless, the basic idea is that the parties to an economic trade are 
willing to bear transaction costs, although basically unnecessary, to capture 
the benefits of trading – when those benefits offset the higher transaction 
costs. Thus, it is essential to consider the fundamental, underlying benefits 
implied by any potential economic activity and then to evaluate whether or 
not they outweigh the (minimum) transaction costs involved. 
Opportunity costs 
Another important cost concept related to the profit maximization 
hypothesis is economic cost, also known as opportunity cost.46 An 
opportunity cost is defined as the value of the best alternative use of a 
resource. It is therefore different from the explicit production expenses, 
and refers to the foregone opportunity to which the resources used for the 
production of any particular output could have been used. This idea gives 
rise to the concept of economic profit, which is defined as the revenue 
generated minus the opportunity cost of the resources sacrificed to 
generate the revenue. A firm can thus create a negative economic profit, 
although the total of revenues minus direct production costs is positive. 
This means that a firm must always consider the best uses of its resources 
to make an economic profit; the value of a foregone opportunity must be 
equal to, or lower than the revenue generated by any chosen use of 
resources. 
Let us formalize this idea using some simple notation. Suppose the firm 
can commit its resources in a given time period to serving two different 
markets, M1 and M2. Moreover, suppose the firm produces the same 
quantity q of a good, incurring the same variable cost c and fixed cost F, 
regardless of which market it serves, and it is able to sell all of its output. 
                                            
46 The classic anecdote signifying this concept is: “There is no such thing as a free lunch.” Even if 
someone pays for your lunch, the lunch is not without cost – you could have spent the time 
working and earning a wage. The foregone earnings are your opportunity cost.  
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However, suppose that the buyers in M1 are willing to pay P, for the good, 
and buyers in market M2 are willing to pay only p, where P > p.  
The firm could thus make a profit of π1 = (P – c)q – F  in market M1, and 
a profit of π2 = (p – c)q – F  in M2, where π1 > π2.  If the firm chooses, for 
some arbitrary reason , such as plain management ignorance, political 
pressure or social loyalty to serve market M2 solely in some given period, 
it will incur an opportunity cost OC, defined by OC = Pq, which is the 
revenue from M1 it chooses to forego. Although the firm makes a positive 
plain profit, it actually makes a negative economic profit πe, defined by 
revenue minus opportunity cost, πe  = pq – Pq =(p – P)q < 0, since p < P. 
Its resources are not in the best use  
We have already distinguished between two fundamental types of costs, 
those paid for an economic good, and those beyond the price paid for the 
good, termed transaction costs. With reference to the profit function let us 
assume for a while that transaction costs are zero, which allows us to 
distinguish between two more basic cost concepts: Explicit costs are the 
direct payments for inputs to the production process during a given time 
period. Implicit costs are inputs to the production process that are not 
necessarily paid an explicit price for. The opportunity cost OC includes 
both explicit EC and implicit costs, IC, i.e. OC = EC + IC. Then, since the 
firm’s explicit costs are EC = cq + F, its implicit costs are defined by IC = 
OC – EC = OC – (cq + F) = Pq – cq –F = (P – c)q – F .   
Externalities and Property Rights 
The profit maximizing behavior of firms may also create market 
externalities, which are assumed to be absent in perfect markets. An 
externality is the direct effect of the actions of a firm on another party’s 
well-being or a firm’s production rather than an indirect effect through 
changes in market prices.  A negative externality is a harm that one firm 
inflicts on others, and a positive externality a benefit that a firm provides to 
others. Internalizing an externality refers to bearing the cost or to capturing 
the benefit that one party inflicts on others.  
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Economic activity may therefore benefit (harm) other parties, but a 
producer may not be able to capture (forced to bear) those benefits (costs) 
privately. A situation where a firm is not be able to capture positive 
externalities privately, may lead to a market failure. A market failure 
occurs when the aggregate of private revenue and positive externalities 
(social revenue) exceed the aggregate of private cost and negative 
externalities (social cost). Producers may not find a market attractive, but 
the society, at large, would benefit if certain goods were provided. This is 
why the government, in its role as a social planner typically intervenes in 
the market to ensure that such a good is produced, either by producing the 
good by itself or contracting out to ensure its production. These concepts 
are important, because a PPP market is typically concerned with private 
market failure and consequently involves the direct presence of the 
government. 
It is therefore essential to distinguish between private and social costs. 
Private cost refers to the cost of production only, not including 
externalities, where as social cost is the private cost plus the cost from 
externalities. The same logic applies to revenues and profits, so that private 
revenue refers to the private income, not including externalities, and social 
revenue to private income plus the benefits from externalities; and profit is 
the net value of revenues and costs, respectively. 
According to the Coase Theorem externalities arise from the lack of 
property rights, which is an exclusive right to use an asset.47 If no party 
holds a property right to an asset, be it good or bad, it is unlikely to have a 
price or a cost. For multiple goods property rights are not clearly defined, 
which is why a producer’s private cost of production is less than the social 
cost, or the private revenue is less than the social revenue, i.e. benefit.  
The results of the Coase theorem basically show that if there are no costs 
to bargaining, assigning property rights results in an efficient outcome, at 
which social benefits are maximized. Efficiency is achieved regardless of 
                                            
47 Coase 1960 
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who receives the property rights; however, the allocation of the property 
rights affects how the joint surplus is maximized. The problem with the 
theory in practice is that such Coasian bargaining is unlikely to occur if 
transaction costs are high or if the parties have asymmetric information. 
Nevertheless, an important insight is that property rights theory suggests 
that the creation of a market for ownership rights results in an allocation of 
assets to owners who maximize efficiency in their use.48  
Classification of Economic Goods 
A classic way of classifying economic goods is thus based on whether the 
production creates externalities, i.e. whether there is rivalry in obtaining a 
given good or not; and whether the externalities can be internalized, i.e. 
whether it is possible to exclude a party from the consumption of a given 
good.49 On the basis of this consideration, economic goods can be 
classified into four major categories, illustrated in the figure below (Figure 
3).  
First, the top-right corner signifies private goods, goods that entail 
ownership rights, i.e. they have the properties of rivalry and exclusion, so 
they exhibit no externalities. In contrast, a pure public good is a good that 
lacks both rivalry and exclusion, i.e. a good whose consumption by one 
party does not preclude others from also consuming it, such as national 
defense forces. The problem with public goods and externalities at large is 
that they motivate free riding: to benefit from the actions of others without 
internalizing the costs of production, or to harm others without 
internalizing the costs of production. 
                                            
48 Alchian 1965 
49 Perloff 2001 
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Figure 3 The classic division of goods in economics 
The top left corner represents common goods, or common property, i.e. 
goods that entail rivalry of benefits to which everyone has free access, 
which is why common property is typically overexploited. For example, if 
anyone can freely drive on a highway, too many are likely to do so, 
because they ignore the externalities (congestion, pollution, delays) that 
they impose on others. Finally the bottom-right corner entails club goods, 
goods that exhibit exclusion but no rivalry. For example, private schools or 
country clubs create benefits that can be internalized by multiple parties 
when others are excluded from accessing them.  
Another essential distinction that seems to warrant attention is that 
between search and experience goods, originally given by Nelson.50 A 
search good is a product or service associated with symmetric information, 
where a buyer can easily observe the price and quality characteristics of a 
good before purchase. An experience good, in turn, is a good associated 
with asymmetric information, where characteristics are difficult to 
ascertain in advance of purchase, but they become evident upon 
consumption. Again, these concepts are important for an accurate 
description of transport infrastructure and will be employed later. 
                                            
50 Nelson 1970 
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Model of Principal-Agent Relationship 
A highly useful theory of analyzing more formally the interaction of 
multiple, unitary contracting optimizers is the principal-agent theory. The 
theory basically assumes that the ownership and control of assets are 
separated and that an agent controls the asset on behalf of the owner, the 
principal. Inefficiencies may arise, since the principal and agent may have 
divergent objectives, and the principal may not be able to effectively 
monitor the agent to ensure that the latter pursues the objectives of the 
asset owner. The relationship is typically discussed in the context of the 
separation of ownership and control between shareholders and managers. 
However, many of the problems and devices designed to address the 
problems of the division of ownership and control also apply to lower tiers 
of firm hierarchies, as well as trading contracts.51  
First, it is customary to distinguish between hidden action and hidden 
knowledge. Hidden action refers to an agent taking some action that is 
unobservable by the principal, which creates conditions for a moral 
hazard: the agent takes advantage of a less-informed principal. Hidden 
knowledge refers to an agent having superior information about some 
variable. If the agent possesses the information before contracting, the 
setting is known as adverse selection; if the agent obtains the information 
after contracting, the setting is called non-adverse selection. 
The most prominent principal-agent problem is moral hazard, which refers 
to a situation in which a principal contracts with an agent whose action is 
hidden, i.e. impossible to observe or evaluate. The agent may deviate from 
the profit maximizing hypothesis to pursue, for example, growth of output 
and consequent opportunities for promotion, or growth of labor input to 
create slack and increasing on-the-job leisure. These are example of 
shirking, a particular moral hazard, in which agents do not provide all the 
services they are expected and paid to provide. 
                                            
51 Tirole 2002 
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Random state 
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Figure 4 Model of Principal-Agent relationship 
Many principal-agent models can be described and analyzed using the 
above model (Figure 4), which represents the agency relationship in terms 
of total profit, the efforts of the agent and uncertainty: π = f(e, θ), where π 
denotes total profit, e the agents efforts and θ  is a random variable 
capturing uncertainty related to the total profit.  
Efficiency and Equitability of Principal-Agent Relationship 
If total profit were wholly independent of the agent’s action, i.e. π = f(θ), 
optimal insurance theory demonstrates that the division of the profit 
between a risk-neutral principal (shareholders)52 and a risk-averse agent 
(manager)53 should have the risk-neutral party bear all the risk, and pay a 
minimum acceptable fixed wage w to the agent, leaving the principal with 
π = f(θ) – w. However, if the profit is positively dependent on some level 
of effort e that is costly to the agent, the issue of agency costs arises.  
Agency costs are deviations from profit maximization, where the deviation 
from total profit is greater than the private benefit that the agent gains by 
exerting a low level of effort. To formalize this idea, let us assume profit is 
fully deterministic on the agent’s actions, π = f(e) and that the agent can 
exert two levels of effort, high e and low e*, where e produces high profit 
π and e* produces low profit π*. Choosing e over e* incurs costs c for the 
agent, which signify all the sweat and mental exertion that accompany 
“trying hard.” If the agent chooses low effort, and π – π* > c, the 
relationship is inefficient. If the trade-off is equal, i.e. π – π* = c, it is 
                                            
52 Shareholders are willing to place a fair bet in the capital markets, and can diversify their risk 
53 The manager is more reluctant to take on risk, because he or she cannot hold multiple positions 
simultaneously  
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irrelevant from an efficiency perspective which level of effort the agent 
chooses. If π – π* < c, the agent should relax to ensure efficiency from a 
total welfare perspective. 
The analysis is complicated by the inclusion of uncertainty, where profit is 
dependent on some random variable θ, so that total profit π = f(e, θ) is 
inherently risky. One party may differ from the other with respect to his or 
her attitude toward risk, so that the parties attach different utilities to an 
uncertain profit level. Therefore, it is not enough to analyze the trade-offs 
between (π – π*) and c; instead, the analysis must weigh (π – π*) and c by 
attaching risk attitudes to each monetary value resulting in utility values. It 
is therefore essential to distinguish between technological efficiency and 
risk efficiency, when discussing principal-agent relationships. However, 
although the distribution of risk can be analyzed using utility theory, we 
will not do so in this study; the focus is on technological efficiency, and 
we will assume that principals and agents have identical risk attitudes in all 
that follows.  
w
π
Principal’s
Payoffs
Agent’s
Payoffs Efficient 
contracts
“Inequitable”
contract
“Equitable”
contract
 
Figure 5 Illustration of the concepts of efficiency and equitability 
In addition, the principal-agency theory designates that an ideal contract 
satisfies the condition of equitability (Figure 5). To achieve equitability, 
the trading partners should engage in negotiations or decide on a procedure 
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to decide on a mutually fair sharing of costs and benefits. If all costs and 
benefits could be estimated with reasonable confidence, analytical 
solutions such as the cooperative Nash-equilibrium could be employed to 
decide on an equitable, fair sharing. Where analytical solutions are not 
used, the parties must engage in bargaining to converge on a “gut-feel,” 
“reciprocal” sharing of net benefits. A contract that provides one of the 
parties a major share and leaves the other with a minimum surplus 
necessary to make the trade desirable is hardly equitable, but it is up to the 
parties’ information and negotiation skills to determine how much each 
captures.   
Monitoring  
In the absence of unforeseeable contingencies there are basically two ways 
to ensure efficiency in principal-agent relationships, incentives and 
monitoring. If the total profit is positively dependent on some level of 
effort e that is costly to the agent but specifiable, observable and verifiable 
by the principal, the principal could choose any level of effort he or she 
wants and impose it on the manager, with the threat of a large punishment 
if he or she disobeys. Therefore, when effort is observable, agency costs 
can be mitigated by monitoring, and subsequent enforcement of contracts, 
if necessary. However, if the profit is positively dependent on some level 
of effort e that is costly to the agent and unobservable to the principal, the 
issue of incentives arises. Where unforeseeable contingencies may rise, 
costly ownership rights or contract adaptation mechanisms are called for, 
but these are beyond the scope of the study.54
An important distinction relating to monitoring is between the 
observability and verifiability of performance (effort e or profit π). The 
distinction relates to the possibility that a principal may be able to observe 
the agent’s or firm’s performance, but cannot verify his observations to a 
court. When performance cannot be verified by a court, contingent 
contracts cannot be made, as the courts will be unable to enforce them. For 
                                            
54 There are multiple different formalized arbitration procedures, such as the combined arbitration, 
the two-stage final offer arbitration and the multi-stage final offer arbitration. 
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example, if an agent is part of a team, accounting procedures may measure 
the team’s performance but not individual contributions. Nevertheless, an 
insider (e.g. a CEO) may be able to disentangle these contributions, 
whereas an outsider (e.g. a judge) cannot. The rewarding and 
incentivization of observable, but unverifiable performance can only take 
place through authority. When effort is unverifiable, even incentivization 
is thus insufficient and arbitration mechanisms may be necessary. 
There are three common types of contract that do not employ incentives 
and can be represented with the basic model. First, in a fixed fee contract, 
the wage w to the agent is independent of π, e or θ, and the principal 
receives π = f(e, θ) – w. The contract requires no monitoring or incentives, 
but may not be efficient. Second, in a hire contract, the agent receives 
remuneration based on some observable output measure e and a unit wage 
w, so that the principal receives π = f(e, θ) – we. This contract requires that 
the effort level e is observable and verifiable. Third, in a contingent 
contract, the payoff to each party depends some random, but observable 
variable θ, so that the agent receives e.g. a share s = (0, 1] of total profit, 
and the principal receives π = f(θ)(1 – s). This contract again requires that 
θ is observable and verifiable. 
Incentives 
If observation is impossible or too costly, the agent, if given a fixed 
income that does not depend on the profit, has no incentive to exert effort 
to maximize total profit. Effort cannot be induced by a constant wage 
structure so the agent’s wage must grow with the realized profit. Thus the 
basic point is that effort, if it is not observed, must be induced through 
incentives. When a contract induces optimal effort through incentives, it is 
said to be incentive compatible. Incentives are typically monetary, but 
incentives can also consist of rewards such as prestige, promotion, 
recognition and so forth. Sanctions can be conveniently defined as 
negative incentives. Nonetheless, the sign of the incentive is uninteresting 
and we will discuss four types of incentives: profit sharing, yardstick 
competition, hostages and market competition. 
 
42 
Profit sharing is the most used incentive mechanism, and it typically takes 
the form of bonuses, based on the total performance, i.e. agent receives 
some share s = [0, 1] of total profit, and the principal receives π = f(e, 
θ)(1-s). Another similar incentive is a stock option, which is also 
performance based, but dependent on the share price. The share price 
reflects more than periodic performance, so that managers are incentivized 
to take a action that maximizes future performance as well. Stock options 
actually also function as golden handcuffs, a form of hostage, because they 
are forfeited if the manager leaves the firm   
Yardstick competition refers to an opportunity to filter out the effect of θ, 
from the total profit, π = f(e, θ) to some degree. The idea is that even if 
total performance π (or share price) is observable and verifiable, it may be 
a distorted measure of the agent’s effort e, because performance may be 
dependent on multiple contingencies such as changes in demand or costs 
of inputs. These effects can be detected to some extent, by comparing the 
agent’s performance with other agents in similar situations. The 
shareholders may oversee for example two similar projects that serve 
markets with correlated demands or costs. In this case, the shareholders 
can make the wages of the managers of these two projects dependent on 
each other. The profit of the principal is the sum of the profits from the 
two profits from the two projects,  π = π1 +  π2, and the manager in each 
project receives a wage bill based on the efforts of both managers, w = f(π1 
+  π2)  = f (e1 +  e2).  
When direct monitoring is costly, principals typically use hostages to deter 
undesirable behavior. Agents, who are caught shirking, not only lose their 
contract, but give up the hostage too. If monitoring is low so that the 
probability p of being observed shirking is low, but the hostage h is 
sufficiently high, the expected cost of shirking s = ph may be high enough 
to offset the benefits of slack, leisure, or whatever payoff e* shirking 
below optimal level of effort e allows. In other words (e – e*) < ph, and 
the agent chooses a higher level of effort e instead of shirking. The bond 
can take the e.g. the form of a direct monetary post, which is typical in the 
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construction industry;  or deferred, but anticipated future payoffs that have 
a positive net present value. 
Market competition refers to a certain ultimate incentive, namely 
Darwinist natural selection. Firms that generate negative profits will be 
driven out of the market in the long run. Competitive firms that make 
inefficient decisions incur losses because they cannot simply transmit the 
extra costs to buyers, because the market price is taken as given. A firm is 
thus led to search for new and better decisions in order to survive. Firms in 
a competitive environment are more hard-pressed to reduce costs and end 
up being more efficient. For example government units, which are 
financed on a budget-basis, typically have low or no incentives to improve 
efficiency if their costs are simply covered out of tax-payers’ 
contributions. The shareholders of a competitive firm can base managerial 
rewards on the competitor’s profits, which would not be possible if there 
are no competitive references. 
2.2 Theory of Investment 
2.2.1 Core Definitions 
Theory of investment studies the pattern of cash flows, and could as well 
be termed the theory of finance. The term investment is however favored, 
because finance is more of an applied theory of the same ideas to the 
actual discipline of corporate finance and pure investment problems. Yet, 
even the theory of investment is in a sense applied – the application of 
microeconomics within the framework of financial markets. Both fields are 
fundamentally grounded in the model of rational decision making, applied 
to contexts that are classified by distinctions of individual or multi-party 
(strategic) decision making; static or dynamic settings; deterministic or 
stochastic problems; and single or multiple goals. It should again be noted 
that the theory in this chapter is widely accepted, and the contributors so 
many that references are mostly omitted. The primary source that this 
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study draws from is Luenberger,55 who gives an excellent, clear and 
concise treatment of the fundamental ideas of investment and finance.56
An investment is traditionally considered as the current commitment of 
resources to achieve later benefits. A broader definition views an 
investment as a pattern of cash flows in time. Every investment can be 
defined in terms of its resulting cash flow sequence, with individual cash 
flows differing in magnitude and timing. Investment science is the 
application of scientific methods and techniques to tailoring the pattern of 
cash flows to be as desirable as possible. Investment analysis is at its root 
concerned with examining alternative investments, i.e. cash flow 
sequences, and deciding which alternative is most preferable. Like 
economic analysis, investment analysis is therefore basically decision 
making characterized by optimizing behavior, with the unique feature that 
the decision is carried out within the framework of financial markets. 
Investment theory relies in its core on four simple, but powerful principles, 
which provide the basis for solving most investment problems. First, the 
fact that investment analysis is carried within the framework of financial 
markets, simplifies selection by providing good outside comparables for 
the basis of evaluating any single investment. This condition gives rise to 
the first principle, the comparison principle.  
Second, when the financial market is well developed, two different 
investments with identical properties will have approximately the same 
market price. This assumption (and empirical property) is the result of the 
interplay of supply and demand in financial markets reaching equilibrium, 
and is referred to as the no-arbitrage principle.  
Third, trading in financial markets takes place on a continuing basis, i.e. 
the interaction of supply and demand is a process moving in time and 
                                            
55 Luenberger 1998 
56 The secondary source used is Howells & Bain 2002  
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subject to uncertainty. This gives rise to the principle that the value of an 
investment may change in time, stated as the dynamics principle.  
The fourth and perhaps most consequential one is called the principle of 
risk aversion. Cash flows are subject to uncertainty, but they may also 
differ in degree of uncertainty. The risk aversion principle rests on the idea 
that given two different investment opportunities with equal expected 
return, in probability terms, but of which the other is certain and the other 
uncertain, an investor will prefer the certain one. This means that more risk 
is acceptable only with a greater expected return.  
Every investment problem is essentially unique, but many fit into two 
main categories. The first category is concerned with pricing problems. In 
other words, how much is a particular cash flow reasonably worth? The 
comparison principle is the main basis for solving the problem, and the 
correct, fair price can be deduced e.g. within a mean-variance setting, 
formalized in the CAPM model.57 For example, an investor given 
opportunity to participate with an equity stake in a project seeks to 
determine how much he or she is willing to pay for that stake.   
The second category deals with so called pure investment problems. In 
other words, where to invest available capital? The basic idea for solving 
this problem, in turn, is reliance on the risk aversion principle, and again a 
solution, i.e. an allocation can be deduced within the mean-variance 
setting, this time using the formal Markowitz portfolio model. For 
example, the analysis of potential investment projects and the capital 
structure of those projects take the form of a pure investment problem. 
Therefore at a rather high level of abstraction, companies that take capital 
and transform it into infrastructure, equipment, people and operations to 
make profit face essentially the same problem as do pension funds in the 
allocation of their funds.  
                                            
57 The mean-variance setting, the CAPM model and the Markowitz portfolio model will be reviewed 
in Section 2.3  
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2.2.2 Interest Rate Theory 
Interest 
The assumption that a well-developed financial market exists, gives rise to 
the concept of the time value of money, expressed concretely as interest. 
Within the framework of financial markets, it is possible to deposit an 
initial amount, a principal P, which during a single time period earns an 
interest i and increases to a future value FV, where FV = P(1 + i). The 
concept of debt D can conveniently be conceived as a negative deposit, in 
other words an obligation to repay the principal and interest. The 
calculation of the interest may vary from a simple interest, where the 
interest remains constant in subsequent periods (linear growth of 
principal), to continuous compounding, where the interest is added to the 
principal and a subsequent payment is based on the balance during the 
beginning of an infinitesimal period (exponential growth).  
Present Value 
A reversal of the concept of future value of money gives rise to another 
important concept, the present value PV. A cash flow received in the 
future is worth less than the same amount received in the present. The 
process of evaluating future obligations as an equivalent present value is 
called discounting. A cash flow to be received at a future date must be 
discounted by dividing its magnitude by the factor by which the money 
would grow. There is, accordingly a discount factor d for each future date.  
Given an interest rate r, and a stream of cash flows X = (x0, x1,…, xn), 
corresponding to discrete intervals i  = 0, 1,…, n, then the future value of 
the stream at the end of period n is given by FV = x0(1 + r)^n +…+ xn(1 + 
r)^n-1. If we were to replace that stream with a single flow in the present, 
it would amount the present value given by PV = FV / (1 + r)^n. 
Two cash flows are equal if and only if their present values are equal. 
Since the essence of investment analysis is to choose between alternative 
investments, to do this intelligently they must be evaluated with a logical 
and standard criterion. The criterion which is generally regarded as the 
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single best measure is the net present value (NPV), which, despite the 
letter N, is equivalent to PV, i.e. the total sum of the discounted 
magnitudes of the individual cash flows of the stream. The internal rate of 
return (IRR) is another widely used evaluation criterion, and can be 
defined conveniently as the discount factor d for which the NPV = 0.  
In business parlance, it is common to use the figure cost of capital (CoC) 
as the discounting factor. CoC is used as a measure of return a business 
must offer to investors, i.e. it is the rate of return r, which investors expect 
from a particular venture. The difference between an arbitrary rate of 
return r and an interest rate i is that i is used to evaluate deterministic cash 
flows, whereas r is used in evaluating uncertain cash flows from business 
ventures, by capturing the uncertainty in the analysis with an appropriate r 
> i, reflecting the degree of uncertainty.  
Fixed-Income Securities 
Well-developed financial markets employ some standardized cash flow 
streams, which involve obligations to pay money according to specified 
rules. These are called financial instruments, and when they are traded on 
a dedicated market they are called securities. In the case a cash flow, i.e. 
an investment opportunity, is neither nonstandard, nor has a dedicated 
market, but can nevertheless be bought and sold, it is called an asset. 
Interest rate theory is concerned with the analysis of deterministic cash 
flows. The concept of deterministic means that the cash flows under 
analysis are fixed, i.e. there is no uncertainty involved in the timing or 
magnitude of the cash flows. Securities, which possess this property, are 
called fixed-income securities. Although the cash flows are assumed to be 
fixed (except for variations in well-defined contingent circumstances), in 
reality they are subject to some measure of default risk. That is, there is a 
positive probability that the cash flows will not realize. This risk is 
characterized by default risk ratings assigned by specialized organizations, 
such as Standard & Poor’s, which ranks fixed-income securities into 
discrete classes ranging from AAA to D with increasing risk of default. 
Securities with a rating of BBB or above are typically called investment 
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grade, and securities ranking below BBB junk bonds. Securities issued by 
governments may lack a rating altogether, due to the assumption that they 
can be considered default risk free for all practical purposes. The rate of 
return, which certain government backed securities offer is often denoted 
as the risk-free rate rf and is often used as a reference point in practice as 
well as in theory. 
There are numerous standardized fixed-income securities with varying 
cash flow profiles. These securities have a trading price P at any given 
moment, a face value F paid at the very end of the cash flow sequence, at 
the maturity date, and often a periodic coupon payment C, expressed as a 
percentage of the F. The yield of a fixed-income security is a d, such that P 
= FV / (1 + d)^n, and thus the yield and price of a security have an inverse 
relationship.  
Again, given the existence of well-developed financial markets the yields 
of different securities track one another closely. The financial market in a 
sense exerts a force on all securities, urging their yields to conform to one 
another. However, the prices of securities that have long maturities are 
more sensitive to changes in the prevailing yield and interest rate 
conditions than those with shorter maturities. The measure of sensitivity is 
captured in the concept of duration D, which is a weighted average of the 
cash flow times, also called the average life of a cash flow. 
Fixed-income securities are best understood through the concept of the 
term structure of interest rates. In this structure there is, at any date, a 
specified interest rate for any maturity date. This is the rate, which would 
apply on an annual basis to a zero-coupon bond of the specified maturity. 
In other words, the rate is the yield of a security which is priced at P today, 
and entitles to the receipt of the face value F at the final date, but no 
coupon payments. These underlying interest rates are termed spot rates 
and together they define the term structure when plotted as a function of 
time to maturity. Spot rates are fundamental to the whole interest rate 
market as they allow calculating an appropriate discount factor and the 
present value of any fixed future cash flow. Investors generally prefer 
 
49 
liquidity, that is, they prefer short-term maturities relative to long-term 
maturities and therefore the term structure is typically upward sloping. 
Interest rate theory is probably the most widely used financial tool. An 
example of the applications of interest-rate theory include hedging against 
interest rate risk, i.e. mitigating the risks involved in possible shifts in the 
term structure of interest rates. An investor may have upcoming 
obligations, denoted by a negative cash flow sequence, and the possibility 
to initially acquire a portfolio, i.e. a combination, of securities that will be 
used to pay these obligations as they arise. Even if the PV of the cash flow 
stream resulting from holding the portfolio were equal to that of the 
obligations, the investor could still be exposed to the risk of not being able 
to meet his or her obligations as they rise. This is because the holdings in 
the portfolio and the upcoming obligations may have varying durations 
and thus the investor would be wise to match both present values, as well 
as the durations – a process called immunization. 
2.2.3 Portfolio Theory 
Portfolios 
Given a collection of assets it is possible to combine individual assets into 
a portfolio, a sort of master asset. From the cash flow stream viewpoint, 
portfolio theory is concerned with the analysis of a slightly more difficult 
class of problems – that of single-period stochastic cash flows. An 
example is an investment in a physical project that will not provide 
payment until it is completed. The single-period conceptualization also 
serves as a good approximation for many securities, especially equities, 
and the insights from single-period conceptualizations often carry over to 
many multi-period problems. The basic idea is to characterize an asset 
using just two measures, the mean and the variance, dismissing ethical or 
any other arbitrary dimensions. 
Portfolio Return 
As defined earlier, an asset is an investment opportunity with a resulting 
cash flow sequence, which can be bought or sold. Analysis usually 
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assumes that it is also possible to sell an asset, which is not owned, by 
initially borrowing and selling the asset, and at a later date repurchasing 
and returning it – a process of shorting. If an asset requires investing an 
initial amount I, but also pays back an amount F at the end of a single 
period, the total return R of the asset is R = F / I, or in percentage terms r 
= (F – I) / I, holding the relation R  = 1 + r. Given that n different assets 
are available, each with a random return of xn at the end of the period, and 
given that it is possible to acquire a combination of these assets into a 
master asset with an initial capital of X, it is possible to study the mean and 
variance characteristics of the resulting portfolio at the end of a single 
period. 
Assuming x is a random quantity with a finite number of specific values, 
x1, x2,…, xm, and assuming that with each possible xi there is a probability 
pi that represents the relative chance of an occurrence of xi. The pi’s then 
satisfy ∑pi = 1 and pi ≥ 0 for each i  = 1,…,m. The expected value, or 
“mean” of a random variable x, in the case of a finite possibilities is 
defined by E(x) = ∑xipi. The expected value of a random variable provides 
a useful quantity of the “center” of a range of possible values; however, 
typically it is useful to have another quantity measuring the “spread,” or 
degree of deviation around the mean. One such measure is variance, 
defined for any random variable y as var(y) = E[(y – E(y))^2]. Standard 
deviation is another frequently used measure and defined as the square root 
of variance. 
When there are several random variables, each with associated possible 
values and corresponding probabilities, it is possible to summarize the 
mutual dependence of any two variables by their covariance. If x and y 
represent two random variables, their covariance is defined as cov(x1, x2) = 
E[(x – E(x))(y – E(y))]. When cov(x1, x2) = 0, the variables are said to be 
uncorrelated, when cov(x1, x2) > 0 and when cov(x1, x2) < 0 the variables 
are said to be correlated positively and negatively, respectively. Knowing 
the covariance of two random variables, it is possible to calculate the 
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variance of the sum of the variables, defined as var(x + y) = E[(x – E(x) + 
y – E(y)^2]. 
These concepts can be used to determine the corresponding mean and 
variance of a portfolio. A portfolio can be defined by allocating fractions 
wi of initial wealth to individual assets i  = 1,...n. The sum of these weights 
must equal 1; but some of them may be negative when short-selling is 
allowed. The weighted return of a portfolio is the weighted sum of its 
individual assets. The expected return r of the portfolio is, likewise, equal 
to the weighted average of the expected returns r of the individual assets: 
E(r) = w1E(r1) + …+ wnE(rn). The variance of the return of the portfolio is 
defined by a more complicated formula: var(r) = ∑wiwj * cov(ri, rj), where 
wi and wj are the weights of assets i and j, and cov(ri, rj) the covariance of 
the return of asset i with asset j. 
Portfolio Diversification 
Portfolios with only a few assets may be subject to a high degree of risk, 
represented by a relatively large variance. By exploiting the covariance of 
individual assets, it is possible through diversification to reduce portfolio 
variance. If the returns of individual assets were all uncorrelated, it would 
be possible to reduce portfolio variance essentially to zero, by increasing n 
indefinitely. However, in practice, the assets in financial markets are as an 
aggregate to some extent positively correlated, because they are basically 
subject to the same macroeconomic conditions, which makes it impossible 
to diversify away all risk. The risk, which cannot be diversified away in 
actual markets, is called the market risk, or systematic risk. Non-systematic 
risk is the difference between the risk of an individual asset and the market 
risk. 
Portfolio Efficiency 
From a given collection of n risky assets, there results a set of possible 
portfolios made from all the possible weights of the n individual assets. 
When the set thus obtained is plotted in mean-standard deviation 
coordinates, it is called the feasible region. Investors who value a portfolio 
solely on the basis of its mean and standard deviation, and are both risk 
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averse (i.e. risk is acceptable only with a higher expected return) and 
insatiable (i.e. more is always better) in their attitude towards wealth, will, 
by implication focus on those portfolios with a minimum variance for any 
given expected return, or vice versa, on those with a maximum expected 
return for any given level of variance. This set of portfolios defines the 
Pareto efficient frontier, that is, the set of portfolios with expected returns 
that cannot be increased without a simultaneous increase (a trade-off) in 
variance. Points on the efficient frontier can be characterized and solved 
by a quadratic optimization problem originally formulated by Markowitz. 
Capital Asset Pricing Model 
Usually it is appropriate to assume, that there is, in addition to the risky 
assets, a risk-free asset included in the universe of available investment 
opportunities. This transforms the Pareto efficient frontier into a straight 
line, originating from the mean-standard deviation characteristics of the 
risk-free asset, and extending tangent to the original feasible region into 
infinity. This leads to the one-fund theorem: investors seeking efficient 
portfolios need only to invest in a combination of the one master fund F of 
risky assets (the point where the Pareto frontier is tangent to the feasible 
region) and in the risk-free asset. Yet, depending on their degree of risk 
averseness, investors may prefer different combinations of them. 
If everybody uses the mean-variance approach to investing and if 
everybody has the same estimates of the assets’ expected returns, variances 
and covariances, interesting implications follow. Because everybody 
invests in the same master fund F of risky assets and in the risk-free asset 
(although in varying proportions) the total sum of all the risky holdings of 
all the investors must naturally add up to the market portfolio M – that is, 
the total capitalization of the outstanding assets. Therefore the weight of 
any risky asset in the efficient master fund, which every single investor 
holds, also corresponds to the proportion of the capitalization of the asset 
relative the total market capitalization – a certain fractal-like quality of all 
individual funds being variations of the same master form. 
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Figure 6 Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
This approximation of real markets is formalized in the Capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM), in which most of the theory reviewed culminates. 
The model is derived in a mathematical form from the tangency condition 
that the master fund, i.e. the market portfolio is on the edge of the feasible 
region of risky assets. In a mean-standard diagram, a line which emanates 
from the risk-free asset and touches the feasible region tangent to the 
market portfolio is called the capital market line. Its slope is called the 
market price of risk, and any efficient portfolio must lie on it (Figure 6). 
Which efficient portfolio an investor prefers, depends on the investor’s risk 
attitude – the domain of utility theory. 
The CAPM states that the expected rate of return ri if any asset i satisfies 
E(ri) = rf + βi(E(rM) – rf), where rf is the risk free interest rate, E(rM) the 
expected return on the market portfolio and the value βi = cov(ri, rm) / 
var(rm) is referred to as the beta of an asset –  a measure of the covariance 
of an asset i with the total market portfolio, normalized with the variance 
of the market portfolio. The value E(ri) – rf is termed the expected excess 
rate of return, and the value βi(E(ri) – rf) is termed the risk premium.  
The beta of the market portfolio is by definition equal to 1, the beta of the 
risk-free asset is equal to 0, and for any asset, a greater beta implies a 
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greater expected return. This changes the concept of risk from the 
volatility of an individual asset i to the covariance of an asset i with the 
total market portfolio, normalized with the variance of the market 
portfolio. The interest of investors is essentially in the volatility of an asset 
relative to the market portfolio – beta, i.e. all risky assets provide an 
uncertain return, but the relevant measure of uncertainty is how sensitive 
assets are relative to general market conditions. 
The CAPM can be applied to pricing individual assets given estimates of 
the relevant parameters. It can also be used to e.g. evaluate fund 
performance,58 or to evaluate single-period projects within firms. 
Moreover, it is used frequently in association with the weighted average 
cost of capital model (WACC), to determine the cost of equity for a capital 
structure that consists of both debt and equity in given proportions. WACC 
is defined as r = (1 – t)(rd)(D) / (D + E) + (re)(E) / (D + E), where D 
represents debt capitalization, E equity capitalization, (D + E) total 
capitalization, t the appropriate tax rate, rd  the applicable cost of 
borrowing, and re the correct cost of equity as defined through the CAPM. 
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3 PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
In this chapter the notion of Public-Private Partnership is studied by 
approaching the subject from a number of relevant perspectives.  The real-
world phenomenon and the associated concept are by no means simple 
and warrant an in-depth and comprehensive investigation. Because the 
subject cuts across multiple knowledge domains, it has been addressed 
from multiple disciplinary backgrounds. Although PPP will ultimately be 
characterized in terms of fundamental economic concepts in the next 
chapter, the purpose of this chapter is to gather and summarize insights 
that other prominent academic backgrounds provide, namely:  project 
business, project finance and public procurement. The chapter is 
structured into subsections that address each academic discipline in turn. 
3.1 PPP as a Form of Project Business 
3.1.1 Discipline of Project Business  
Public-Private Partnership can be understood as a form of project business 
and a distinct more of organizing the delivery of major capital investment 
projects. As stated in the scope of the research, the overarching discipline 
in this study is project business, although the analysis primarily relies on 
the concepts of industrial organization and investment theory in its 
approach. Therefore the purpose of this section is to relate this research to 
the context of project business literature and study what insights on PPP 
can be drawn from this discipline.  
It is first helpful to distinguish between two disciplines in project business 
literature: project management and project marketing. The project 
management literature defines a project as a temporary organization, to 
which resources are assigned to undertake a unique, novel and transient 
endeavor, managing the inherent uncertainty and need for integration in 
order to deliver beneficial objectives of change.59 In the project marketing 
approach, a project is defined as a complex transaction covering a package 
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of products, services and work, specifically designed to create capital 
assets that produce benefits for a buyer over an extended period of time.60
The discipline of project management focuses on the delivery of a single 
project from the contractor’s perspective, emphasizing the concept of a 
temporary organization.61 The project marketing approach focuses on 
project business more broadly as interaction between clients and 
contractors, emphasizing the concept of a transaction.62 Project marketing 
is therefore the broader term; it always implicitly includes project 
management but not (necessarily) vice versa.63 The broader focus of the 
project marketing approach on project business as interaction between 
clients and contractors, and the implicit inclusion of the project 
management term make the project marketing discipline more suitable for 
the study of Public-Private Partnership, which, as the term itself suggests, 
is essentially a collaborative effort between the public and private 
sectors.64
The characteristics of project-marketing are captured in the rather abstract 
DUC model, where D stands for discontinuous, U for unique and C for 
complexity. Projects have a finite life (D), are all different (U) and involve 
several parties (C).65 PPPs are also concerned with finite-life legal entities, 
careful (e.g. financial) engineering is needed to take into account the 
unique (e.g. cash flow) requirements and constraints of any single project, 
and a key concern is distributing the expected rewards and risks 
efficiently, in a manner which creates a genuine community of interest 
among the various participants.66
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The idea that the PPP scheme is essentially a collaborative effort between 
the public and private sectors, signifies two important ideas. First, as in all 
trades, there are two distinct counterparts involved, in this case the public 
and the private entity, which conform to the two traditional roles of a client 
and a contractor in project business. Second, the concept of partnership 
refers to a certain positive mutual interdependence between the demand 
and supply sides. The parties are assumed to have some degree of shared 
interests in a PPP scheme, i.e. a non-zero-sum setting, in contrast to a 
purely competitive zero-sum situation, in which the gains of two parties 
are strictly opposite.67 These two principles form the core of PPPs, but the 
model involves other important features, which are captured in the 
definition below and elaborated in what follows.  
“PPP is defined as the procurement of public services and assets by 
government and local authorities where the private sector is 
responsible for the design, building, financing and operation of an 
asset or service for a specified period of time after which it is 
transferred back into the public sector. The public sector purchases 
the service from the private sector and pays a fee based on specified 
output criteria and usage. The private sector consortium uses the 
fee to repay loans taken out to finance the construction or 
refurbishment of the asset/service.”68  
The given definition integrates the procurement and delivery perspectives, 
and reflects the project marketing approach on project business as 
interaction between clients and contractors. The definition makes sense, 
since any project can be conceived of as two parallel projects: an 
investment project from the perspective of the client (government and 
local authorities) and a delivery project from the perspective of the 
contractor (private sector consortium).69 Moreover, with an assumed 
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partnership orientation, it seems inappropriate to view the perspectives in 
isolation. This project marketing conception serves as the basis for 
characterizing Public-Private Partnership in the following sections. PPP 
will be first reviewed from the demand perspective of a public and 
authority; second, from the supply perspective of private sector; and third, 
from a joint long-run relationship perspective. 
3.1.2 Public Project Procurement Perspective to PPP 
First, as a hypothetical case of constructing a highway amply 
demonstrates, public assets and services are typically broad in both 
physical and temporal dimension. A stretch of road in the middle of 
nowhere has little value, but when it is a part of a whole road system, its 
value increases dramatically. An essential feature of PPPs is that they too 
represent broader and more integrated procurement objects as opposed to 
traditional forms procurement, in which the main deliverable is broken 
down into a number of short-term sub-projects. As a result, activities 
previously procured through several agreements may now be included 
under one agreement. A PPP agreement, often called a concession, 
typically encompasses broad responsibilities in both physical and temporal 
dimensions, which has major implications for the procurement process.70
The implementation of PPPs is organized by granting a concession to a 
private sector entity, in which the client essentially specifies the service 
output, payment mechanisms and the term for which the private sector is 
entitled to operate.71  This practice necessitates an altogether different 
procurement procedure, to which traditional practices concerned with tight 
specifications and bidding lump-sum contracts is inadequate.72 This has 
evoked a number of statutory responses as exemplified by e.g. introduction 
of the negotiated competitive procedure in the EU.73 Moreover, this causes 
a shift in the responsibilities and required capabilities of road authorities. 
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In contrast to their traditional responsibilities of procuring the design and 
construction of a project, the authorities are increasingly responsible for 
compiling the output specification for the road service, reviewing the 
bidders’ proposals, and monitoring contract execution and performance.74  
Some prior studies in Finland have sought to evaluate the PPP model as an 
alternative model of procurement to assist construction industry clients, in 
general, in the strategic selection of the most efficient project delivery 
methods in relative terms.75 Results of preliminary empirical research show 
that the broader and more integrated service packages can provide better 
value for money and meet the needs and wants of the client better than the 
traditional ones. However, research also shows that each method should be 
applied only in appropriate circumstances. It is still often appropriate to 
use traditional, fragmented models of procurement when projects are 
relatively small, simple, have well-defined end results, and offer no 
opportunities to innovate or to generate revenue. The viability of broader, 
more integrated procurement models increases positively with the size, 
complexity, ambiguity, innovation and revenue generation opportunities of 
construction projects. 
In the UK, the HM Treasury has commissioned a number of studies on the 
performance of PPP projects.  HM Treasury’s 2003 research into 61 PPP 
projects showed that 89% of projects were delivered on time or early; 70% 
of PPP projects were delivered on time with no cost overruns borne by the 
public sector; and 77% of public sector managers reported that the overall 
performance of the private sector partner was matching up to expectations 
at the time of contract close. These findings are in stark contrast to the 
study of UK National Audit Office, which found that only 30% of 
traditionally procured construction projects were delivered on time and 
only 27% were within budget. An increasing body of evidence has shown 
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that the better risk management of PPPs results in a greater proportion of 
assets being delivered on time and to budget.76
3.1.3 Private Project Delivery Perspective to PPP 
Second, the participation in a PPP significantly expands the 
responsibilities of the private sector. For this reason several private sector 
parties typically join forces in multiple separate consortia in order to 
compete for a concession, concerned with e.g. major infrastructure and 
related services. No single party typically has the capabilities to deliver the 
project or to take on the risks involved alone. Organizing a consortium 
around a special project company diversifies the risk and allows the 
collaboration of specialized parties.77  
The basic idea in distinguishing between different project delivery 
alternatives is the allocation of responsibilities from the client to the 
contractor regarding a given project. It is possible to include an arbitrary 
number of classifying variables, since a project involves an arbitrary 
number of responsibilities depending on the level of resolution. 
Approaches differ from e.g. Pietroforte and Miller,78 who distinguish 
between two variables (finance and scope of delivery), to Kiiras,79 whose 
approach involves picking a unique solution from a “tray” of options 
resulting in a very large number of possible combinations. Another 
approach commonly used involves denoting certain key responsibilities 
with acronyms, such as D-Design, B-Build, O-Operate (or –Own), F-
Finance, L-Lease, T-Transfer (or –Train), and referring to the project type 
by the responsibilities allocated to the contractor, for example DB - Design 
and Build contract.  
These acronyms are also used as a reference to main phases of a project in 
time, conventionally in the sequence D-F-B-O-T. A prevalent construction 
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industry trend is the combination of previously separate responsibilities 
into larger wholes, in terms of scope and temporal dimension.80 This has 
spurred the development of several new construction management 
techniques. For example, the extension of the construction industry 
responsibilities from short-term execution to longer-term operation has 
contributed to the development of a number of new project management 
techniques, such as life-cycle planning and costing. 
The Finnish construction industry, in consonance with international trends, 
has recently adopted new models of delivering construction services. 
These non-traditional models have been reportedly developed to better 
respond to some of the industry’s challenges, more specifically, conditions 
characterized by high uncertainty in the process and/or high ambiguity 
about the final product.81 The delivery of projects with one or both of these 
attributes can benefit significantly from interaction on part of designers, 
implementers and clients. For example, to manage risks, identify efficient 
design solutions and to shorten the total time of delivery by making the 
project phases partly parallel.  
Examples of the new delivery models are: project implementation 
management; integrated design and implementation; and integrated design, 
implementation and maintenance (life-cycle contracting, i.e. PPP). The 
model of integrated design and implementation has received a good 
reception around the world, especially in the US, the UK and the 
Netherlands. In Japan over half of construction projects are based on this 
model of operation. Project implementation management, in turn, has been 
used in major industrial and power plant projects for some time already, 
but it is only recently that it has been utilized in public procurement and 
construction of commercial facilities. Finally, life-cycle contracting has 
been successfully implemented in joint public and private construction 
projects elsewhere in Europe, and more recently in Finland as well.  
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Nevertheless, the key idea from the private sector perspective is that PPPs 
are concerned with meaningful wholes, capable of being financed and 
functioning as an economically viable and technologically separable legal 
entity. This conception is arguably much more powerful, as well as 
practically useful, in understanding PPP than any amount of detail 
captured in combinations of detailed acronyms or project “trays.” The 
approach of using variations such as BOO, BLT, BOOM, is a legacy of 
construction management thinking and does not serve very well in 
capturing the holistic and cross-disciplinary nature of PPPs. From the 
perspective of construction management a PPP project is simply one 
composition of responsibilities and there is nothing special with adding a 
finance component to the tray. However, this is a rather narrow, even 
flawed assumption, as this study later argues.  
3.1.4 Joint Private-Public Perspective to PPP 
Third, the collaborative feature of PPPs deserves elaboration. A 
predominant feature of the construction industry has been the difficulty 
associated with integrating the interests of various organizational groups, 
mainly clients, contractors and consultants.82 Industry wide failures to 
achieve substantial increases in productivity in construction, and the need 
to control escalating construction dispute levels have raised arguments 
against the adversarial scenarios perpetuated in most traditional 
procurement paths. These often position the constructor against the 
architects/engineers/client, rather than encouraging teamwork toward 
common targets.  
In essence, a project collects together a temporary network of 
economically independent actors, whose interests converge in the objective 
of producing the final deliverable, but diverge in distributing the economic 
benefits gained thereby. This partly collaborative and partly competitive 
nature of project business, caused essentially by organizational 
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fragmentation,83 has recently attracted considerable attention among 
researchers.  
Within project industry, increasing awareness of these shortcomings has 
led to wide experimentation and a proliferation of procurement options, 
but even such initiatives have failed to achieve significant breakthroughs, 
and the search for appropriate procurement-delivery systems thus 
continues. Cox and Townsend attributed such shortcomings to a failure to 
deal with the ‘‘structure’’ of the construction industry and the 
consequential arrangements, which they saw as the root cause of its major 
problems.84 The same basic problem has been addressed by other scholars 
in an attempt to describe and potentially reconcile the tension through e.g. 
the concept of hybrid organizations and the framework of networks.85
3.1.5 Summary of Project Business Insights on PPP 
The figure below (Figure 7) summarizes the lessons on PPP, based on the 
literature of project business. The logic of the representation is again to 
show the line of thinking for each major insight, starting with the basic 
conditions of traditional project business practices (left side) and show an 
intermediate, development step describing the evolution in project 
business, leading to the conditions, which characterize PPP (right side).  
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Figure 7  Differences of PPP relative to traditional project business 
practices 
The top of the figure signifies the integration of traditionally fragmented 
works and services of design, building, financing and operation into more 
sizeable, broader project delivery. The second flow of development 
represents the development from lump-sum compensation schemes to 
performance based fees, which helps align the interests of traditionally 
adversial parties to a project. The third level signifies the extension of the 
construction industry supplier responsibilities from short-term execution to 
longer-term operation, and the consequent life-cycle responsibility thereby 
gained. The bottom row refers to a higher liberty given to the project 
supplier to design the project, based on specified output criteria instead of 
tight, client defined specifications. 
In summary, it seems PPP arrangements, while neither possible nor 
advisable on all projects, provide a means to address the over-
fragmentation of functions that has previously led to divergent - if not 
confrontational agendas of the multiple participants. While superficially an 
extension of the design-build mode, i.e. enhanced by the addition of two 
functions of finance and operation, PPP in reality differs in terms of 
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philosophy and potential benefits, spelling out a significant mind shift and 
a change in the procurement-delivery paradigm.86  
3.2 PPP as an Application Area of Project Finance  
3.2.1 Discipline of Project Finance 
The historical and disciplinary origins of PPP can be traced to another 
abbreviation known as PFI – the Private Finance Initiative. Interest in 
PPPs remained modest until the beginning of the 1990s, when a dramatic 
expansion of interest in PPPs was triggered by the launch of the PFI 
scheme under the Thatcher government in the UK in 1992. PFI viewed 
private finance as a formative part of a new public procurement model 
designed to meet the nation’s enormous infrastructure needs. The inclusion 
of private finance in the provision of public infrastructure assets and 
services falls under the discipline known as project finance.87 The purpose 
of this section is to relate this study to the context of project finance and 
study what insights on PPP can be drawn from this discipline in turn.  
To understand the concept and discipline of project finance it is necessary 
to first distinguish between direct-finance and project-based finance. 
Financing a project on a general credit basis is known as direct financing. 
In direct financing, a firm or a government is financed by taking into 
account information on all related assets, its current status, and future 
prospects, usually gauged in a single standard measure, such as a credit 
rating.  
Project financing represents an alternative to conventional direct financing, 
and can be defined as “raising funds to finance an economically separable 
capital investment project by issuing securities or incurring bank 
borrowings that are designed to be serviced and redeemed out of project 
cash flows.” 88  Therefore choosing project financing over direct financing 
also involves choosing an alternative organizational form, a project 
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company that is different from the traditional corporation, which is a key 
distinction and has certain fundamental implications explored later. 
3.2.2 Application of Project Finance in PPP Schemes 
The main application area of project financing is in large, capital-intensive 
projects. A great variety of investments have been project financed, 
including pipelines, refineries, electric power generating facilities, dock 
facilities, mineral processing facilities and highways. The PPP market in 
the UK is beginning to mature, with approximately 600 PFI facilities in 
operation, and over 450 deals with a value of more than €50 billion signed 
between 1999 and 2004. In spite of this activity, PFIs represent only a 
moderate share, approximately 6% of a total of €72 billion of annual 
public sector investment in public services. 89
On a global scale, since 1994 the private sector has invested funds totaling 
circa €220 billion into PPPs across the world, but mainly in the 
commonwealth countries UK, Australia and Canada. From January 1994 
to September 2005, PPP deals with a value of approximately €100 billion 
closed across Europe. Of these deals, two thirds closed in the UK, and 
approximately one tenth in each Spain and Portugal. In 2004 and 2005, 
around 206 PPP deals worth approximately €42 billion were closed in the 
world, of which 152 projects with a value of €21 billion were in Europe. 
Evidence of strong deal flow in the pipeline suggests PPP activity is set 
increase across Europe in the future.90  
The key project participants in a PPP project finance scheme include the 
granting authority, usually a government agency; the project supplier – 
typically called the project sponsor; and usually one or more financial 
institutions. The granting authority identifies project requirements, 
establishes the concession period, solicits tenders, and awards the contract. 
A private sponsor finances, designs, and builds the project and then 
operates it for a specified concession period. The project sponsor typically 
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is a consortium or a joint venture of engineering, construction, and venture 
capital firms. During this concession period, the sponsor collects revenues 
from operating the project to recover its investment and earn a profit. At 
the end of the concession period, ownership of the project is transferred to 
the granting authority. The financial institutions may involve corporate 
banks, insurance companies, or investment banks. 
Three of the major challenges facing a prospective sponsor are estimation 
of project costs, projection of revenues during the concession period, and 
financial engineering. Considering the enormous capital that major 
infrastructure assets typically require,91 and the participation of the private-
sector in funding the projects, it is not surprising that financing is one of 
the key issues in organizing PPPs.92 The financial package usually has a 
greater impact on a PPP project’s viability than the physical design or 
construction costs.93
PPP projects are usually funded with both equity and debt. The capital 
structure in most PPP projects is highly leveraged. Equity financing 
typically covers only 10–30% of total project costs, while debt financing is 
obtained for the remaining 70–90%. Equity investors may be those who 
are solely interested in a return on their investments, such as public 
shareholders and institutional investors, or those who have direct interest 
in project operation, such as general contractors, designers, and operation 
and maintenance firms.94 Granting authorities and lenders inevitably are 
concerned about the equity level in evaluating the risk and viability of the 
project.95 A significant level of equity investment is a competitive 
advantage when tendering a PPP project, because it demonstrates a high 
level of commitment by the project sponsors.96  
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Non-recourse debt instruments are used for debt financing of PPP projects 
to ensure that lenders have no recourse against the participants in the 
sponsoring consortium; instead, they must rely on the revenue generated 
by the project as the source for loan repayment. The objectives that PPP 
project sponsors try to achieve in structuring the debt financing are 
maximization of long-term debt, maximization of fixed-rate financing, and 
minimization of refinancing risk.97
Besides funds, the other side of the coin in financing is security. Lenders 
will not typically extend funds to a project if their loans are exposed to 
commercial or economic risk. Lenders are typically willing to bear some 
financial risk, but they will insist on compensated for bearing such risk.  
Security arrangements are designed to fortify the credit strength of a 
project. In effect, they increase the proportion of a project’s construction 
costs that can be funded with project borrowings.  
Since PPP projects involve two very different phases, a high-risk 
construction and a relatively low-risk operation period, security 
arrangements fall into two general categories: First, those that ensure 
project construction phase completion (or else repayment of project debt in 
full); and second, those that ensure timely payment during the operation of 
the facility. In some cases, long-term non-recourse debt financing cannot 
be obtained until construction is completed. Project sponsors may use 
equity to finance the construction and refinance with debt financing or 
public sale of stock once the major construction is completed. 
3.2.3 Insights on PPP from the Research on Project Finance  
The basic idea in this section is to review the academic research on project 
finance, and to explicate the conditions which are necessary and sufficient 
for an infrastructure to be financed on a project-basis, as well as the 
advantages and disadvantages, which follow from this choice. It seems 
helpful to first state the conclusion, so as to provide a foundation to which 
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the following review can be related.   In brief, the necessary condition for 
an infrastructure project to be a viable PPP candidate is that it must be 
capable of operating as a stand-alone economic unit; the sufficient 
condition for an infrastructure project to be organized through a PPP 
scheme is that it must provide comparative advantages to alternative 
courses of procurement.  
The problem from a theoretical perspective is therefore concerned with 
selecting between two alternative courses of action, financing on a direct 
or on a project basis, each resulting in a certain cash flow pattern, which 
need to be examined with an objective criterion such as the NPV. A 
comprehensive evaluation would therefore require quantification of all 
involved costs and benefits and discounting them into a single present 
value using appropriate discount factors for each course of action. This is a 
highly complicated exercise and practically impossible, and therefore 
research has been restricted to examining the advantages and 
disadvantages related to each alternative in a more qualitative sense. In the 
following paragraphs the disadvantages, advantages and their potential 
joint effect is explored in light of prior research.  
There are two main disadvantages related to financing on a project basis. 
The first is that project finance involves complications in the search of 
potential sources of funds, detailed financial planning, and extensive 
negotiations, leading to increased transaction costs as compared with the 
more simple procedure of borrowing on a general credit. Dudkin, in 
cooperation with the European Investment Bank (EIB), has sought to 
provide a tentative quantification of the relative transaction costs.98 In 
short, the results indicate that transaction costs of PPPs are substantially 
higher than those involved in traditional paths. 
The second important disadvantage is the fact that the project has no 
operating history and only indirect credit support, which together lead to 
an increase in risk and higher cost of capital. For any lender, and for any 
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given degree of leverage in the capital structure, the cost of debt is 
typically higher than in comparable direct finance. Because of the lack of 
operation, there is no evidence of actual performance – only financial 
projections, which are less credible, causing increased (perceived) risk. 
Moreover, the indirect nature of credit support increases the risk of default, 
because contractual commitments provide the basis for debt service instead 
of direct responsibility to pay.99 However, since it is impossible to evade 
the fact that projects are unique by nature, it can be argued that a fair cost 
of capital should reflect this property.  
Scholars have also sought to explain the advantages of project financing, 
which may partially offset the disadvantages of evidently higher 
transaction costs and cost of borrowing. In some instances project 
financing may even provide a comparative advantage over direct 
financing. The advantages are intimately tied to the property of an 
economically separable capital investment project. In the following 
paragraphs, five tentative explanations are reviewed. 
First, project financing may permit a higher degree of leverage than the 
sponsors could achieve on their own, leading to additional tax shield 
benefits, which may together result in a lower overall cost of capital, given 
that cost of equity is higher than the cost of borrowing and tax shield 
effects considered in union.100 
Second, project finance can reduce the costs of the agency cost of free cash 
flow, by giving investors the right to control reinvestment of the project’s 
free cash flow.101 In short, managers, when left to their own devices, i.e. 
without direct exposure to the discipline of capital markets, may not be 
sufficiently demanding when evaluating projects, and thus reinvest free 
cash flow into inefficient uses. Forcing the cash flow to be dispersed, gives 
investors control of the uses to which the free cash flow will be put.  
                                            
99 Finnerty 1996 
100 Finnerty 1996  
101 Jensen 1986 
 
71 
Third, project financing can mitigate the underinvestment problem that 
arises when firms have risky debt outstanding.102 A firm with a highly 
leveraged capital structure may prefer to forgo a capital investment project, 
which has a positive NPV, but a negative impact on shareholders, since 
management is essentially concerned with the interests of owners. The 
reason being that taking on more debt to realize a project may decrease 
equity share price, when the markets interpret the project prospects as less 
desirable than the risks arising from an even higher leverage. Financing the 
project separately would allow the project to be evaluated and financed on 
its own merits, thus creating economic value that would otherwise not be 
realized. 
Fourth, project financing may facilitate the design of debt contracts at a 
lower-cost, because the contracts can be linked directly to the cash flow 
characteristics of the project assets. The inherent conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and lenders give rise to a variety of agency costs, 
and lenders deal with these agency costs by negotiating covenant 
structures that are contained in loan agreements, and typically costly to 
implement.103 In a specific project, it is generally easier and therefore less 
costly to design a debt contract which gives lenders a senior claim on the 
cash flow of the firm, net of operating expenses. 
Fifth, project financing can enhance the effectiveness with which assets are 
managed. Brickley, Lease and Smith have explored the link between 
ownership structure of the firm and firm value.104 They note that when 
managers have a direct share in the profits of a project, they can be 
strongly motivated to make decisions that enhance its profitability, thus 
aligning more closely the objectives of the firm’s professional managers 
and its other investors. Moreover, Chemmanur and John have noted that 
management’s relative abilities differ across business, and it may be 
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advantageous to establish a separate project and hire management with 
comparatively superior abilities.105  
3.2.4 Net Effect of the Advantages and Disadvantages of Project Finance 
in PPP 
The figure below (Figure 8) summarizes the lessons on PPP provided by 
research on project finance. The logic of the representation is to show the 
advantages of project finance (left side) and the disadvantages of project 
finance (right side), and their net effect that determines whether or not 
project finance should be used in any particular instance (middle).  
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Figure 8 Net effect of advantages and disadvantages of project finance 
In light of prior theoretical study on project finance, when both financing 
alternatives are available, project financing is more cost-effective than 
conventional direct financing when: First, the benefits of a higher degree 
of leverage; second, the investors’ right to control reinvestment of the 
project’s free cash flow; third, the appropriate selection of investment 
opportunities; fourth, the design of less costly debt contracts; and fifth, an 
enhanced management offset the higher transaction costs and the risk 
premium that is required. 
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3.3 PPP in the Context of Public Procurement Legislation 
3.3.1 Public Procurement Legislation and Protocol 
PPP is also typically associated with the term public procurement, which 
is, in fact, somewhat misleading since a PPP concession is noticeably 
different from ordinary public procurement procedures and contracts. 
Nevertheless, literature on public procurement highlights the importance of 
a proper allocation of risk, when a public authority considers contracting 
out, delegating responsibility, or distributing risk related to an 
infrastructure project. This theme is also intimately tied with the 
distribution of rewards, since more risk and responsibility is customarily 
acceptable only with a higher expected return.  The purpose of this section 
is to relate this study to the context of public procurement and study what 
insights on PPP can be drawn from perspective. 
A public authority cannot arbitrarily choose how it contracts, delegates 
responsibility and distributes risks; it is subject to juridical constraints, 
captured in procurement law.106 Regardless of the country involved or the 
type of contract used, public procurement law involves responses to three 
interdependent domains of consideration (Figure 9).  
Legislative Framework
Supplier
Selection Protocol
Project
Contract
 
Figure 9 Illustration of the interdependence of legislative framework, 
supplier selection protocol and project contract in public procurement 
First, an appropriate legal framework must be set up to accommodate any 
given type of contract or selection protocol. Second, a public entity will be 
required to follow a specified contract award process within the legal 
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framework. Third, a contract must be introduced to bind both parties as an 
outcome of the selection protocol, within the legislative framework. The 
first two juridical considerations will be elaborated in turn in the following 
paragraphs, and project contracts will be reviewed in more detail in the 
following section. 
Generally speaking, the current statutory norms defining the procurement 
law were developed for the application of traditional, segmented, works 
and services procurement and direct funding of infrastructure projects, and 
based on the underlying idea that complete specifications are available. 
The Anglo-Saxon legal tradition calls for anticipating every potential 
scenario ahead of time,107 so that adaptations, such as variation orders are 
treated as anomalies, and little consideration is given to outline discussion 
conditions – so-called landscaping amenity clauses in jurisprudence.  
Over the years, the current procurement law has created both a ubiquitous 
and complex administrative system that is geared to undisciplined 
allocation of scarce public resources, a fierce competition among public 
agencies to access insufficient funds, and raising dispute levels, all 
contributing to inefficiencies. The continuous reliance on segmented 
delivery has fostered a facility planning culture of initial delivery only, 
away from a long-term approach in which a portfolio of facilities and their 
related life-cycle costs are considered. In the context of PPP, the use of 
integrated, long-term delivery methods (in conjunction with segmented, 
short-term delivery methods, where appropriate) can have a significantly 
positive impact on infrastructure portfolio performance.108 The planning 
and structuring requirements of these methods impose a holistic 
consideration of an infrastructure production process.  
From an economic perspective, the basic challenge in designing a proper 
supplier selection protocol is to overcome the problems arising from 
asymmetric information, by ensuring that the selection mechanism gives 
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those who possess hidden information the incentive to reveal it.109 In 
principle, the government and the suppliers could rely on bargaining to 
converge on a contract. However, we have already noted that under an 
information asymmetry,, bargaining may not be efficient, which basically 
stems from the fact that both parties would like to appropriate the gains 
from the trade, but run the risk of foregoing the trade by being too 
demanding. To ensure efficiency, i.e. that the party who is in the best 
position to undertake a project, the government typically relies on auction 
mechanisms, or more specifically,  reverse auctions – settings with one 
buyer and multiple potential sellers. 
The reason why a client uses a reverse auction mechanism instead of 
individual contract negotiations is simple: the competitive element 
between potential suppliers may lead the client to capture a greater share 
of the surplus that the trade implies.110 In a pure negotiation situation, a 
supplier is concerned with claiming a maximum share of the payoffs 
generated by joint action; in auctions, the supplier is also concerned with 
accessing any payoffs in the first place.  
Typically, contractors seek to maximize their expected payoff, that is, the 
product of contract payoff and the probability of winning. In minimum bid 
auctions, a low bid is associated with lower payoffs, i.e. a bad contract, but 
a higher probability of winning. A high bid implies high payoffs, but risks 
loosing the contract. A contractor is induced to submit a bid, which 
enables the client to capture a great proportion of the total gains implied by 
the project.  
In other words, the government, by including more than one supplier in the 
game, transforms individual negotiations into a reverse auction, thereby 
gaining higher bargaining power, and securing more of the surplus yields 
implied by the project. The figure (Figure 10) below illustrates the 
rationale schematically.  
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Figure 10 The competitive dynamics of a competitive sealed bid procedure 
The frontier denoted as efficient contracts represents the “size of the cake” 
to be divided, i.e. the maximum surplus yields that a project implies. The 
arrow signifies the competitive tension between supplier candidates, who 
are “pushed” to submit a low bid that leaves them with only a “small share 
of the cake”, i.e. minor payoffs relative to not trading at all. The 
government exploits this tension to receive the project at a lowest possible 
cost, which leaves the government with a “major share of the cake,” i.e. 
large net payoffs. 
There are multiple different mechanisms that the client can employ, for 
example the competitive sealed bid, the Dutch auction, the Vickrey 
auction, or the reciprocal bid.111 By far the most used is the competitive 
sealed bid, where each of several bidders submits a sealed-bid value for a 
given project, and the bid with the minimum value will win the project. 
For a typical example, a government awards the contract for building a 
certain facility, such as a stretch of a highway. Various contracting firms 
seek the project, each submits a competitive sealed bid with a fixed price, 
and the bid with the lowest cost to the government wins the contract.  
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These economic ideas are reflected in current public procurement 
provisions. According to Kurkela,112 the underlying objectives of 
procurement provisions are to increase competition, transparency, ensure 
fair treatment of bidders, and promote cost efficiency. Under current law, 
project contracts must be awarded through competitive sealed bids (open 
or restricted), the procurement unit must make bid evaluation criteria 
explicit, describe mutual relationship of separate contracts through bridge-
clauses, and employ standard boiler-plate clauses. The rationale is that the 
government minimizes project costs to the benefit of general welfare by 
acquiring a good or service through an auction, where competition 
guarantees the authority will receive it at the lowest possible price. Even 
though more advanced auction mechanisms involve multiple criteria, price 
is still the decisive factor for winning a project.  
The figure below (Figure 11) illustrates the flow of the traditional 
procurement protocol in selecting a supplier. The process begins with 
designing exhaustive specifications of the project, which are subsequently 
announced. Supplier candidates independently formulate tenders on basis 
of the specifications, submit bids, and the government awards the project 
to the supplier, which offers to match the specifications at the minimum 
cost. This procedure can be used when the government has a precise idea 
on the technical options and specifications to be chosen. Suppliers can be 
asked to submit bids in strict accordance with the specifications imposed 
by the government and final selection is made on a price basis alone and 
little room for negotiation is left to the selected candidate.  
Design of
tight project 
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Announcement
of project
specifications
Independent
tender
development
Competitive
sealed bid
Contract 
award
 
Figure 11 Illustration of the general flow of the competitive sealed bid 
procedure 
Nonetheless, the use of a bidding mechanism to procure a good or a 
service requires a near-exhaustive specification of the object of exchange. 
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The procurement of infrastructure assets and services through competitive 
sealed bidding is problematic, when projects are very large in physical 
scale, long in temporal duration, and when all future contingencies are 
impossible or too costly to specify.  
Under these conditions it seems to be advantageous not to seek precision 
from the outset, so as to save on contracting costs and provide flexibility 
over the life of the project.113 In particular when uncertainties remain on 
technical options to be retained, it may be undesirable or impractical to 
prepare complete technical specifications in advance. The past decade of 
industry experience tends to advance this position and suggests starting out 
general tender specifications and with incomplete contracts, which 
promote dynamic adjustment in the contract over time. If all contract 
parameters cannot be fully anticipated, if actors are developing some of 
new knowledge during the action process itself, the use of negotiation and 
arbitration procedures, designed as a learning process is to be favoured. 114  
Where the completeness of contracts decreases, the role of negotiation and 
arbitration mechanisms increases. Therefore, under complexity and 
uncertainty, a concessionaire selection protocol could benefit from 
increased reliance on negotiations as well as the involvement of an 
independent, specialized arbitration body from the outset. The competitive-
negotiated procedure detailed below (Figure 12) has been developed by 
various public organizations to respond to such conditions, and so as to fit 
in with European Union legal requirements. 
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Figure 12 Illustration of the general flow of the competitive negotiated 
procedure 
The process begins with a government designing general conceptual or 
performance specifications, followed by the announcement of the project, 
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where interested bidders are requested to register.  The government 
typically selects 5-6 qualified bidders to continue. In the next stage, 
bidders are allowed to consult the government for information as they 
formulate their tenders for the bidding stage. All pre-qualified bidders are 
first invited to submit an un-priced, technical bid based on a conceptual 
design, after which typically two candidates are selected to continue with 
negotiations. In the negotiations stage technical and commercial 
clarifications and adjustments are made, culminating in the submission of 
final technical proposals and priced bids (Best and Final Offers - BAFOs), 
from which the government selects the better one and awards the contract 
accordingly. 
3.3.2 Public Procurement Contracts 
Traditional public procurement typically consists of a budget-funded, 
short-term, segmented procurement procedure without consideration to 
private capital investment, a long-term contract period, or integrated 
responsibilities. To put PPP concession contracts in context, we will next 
study the various contracting alternatives to the production of 
infrastructure goods from a government-supplier relationship perspective. 
The figure (Figure 13) below summarizes the main types of alternatives 
available to public procurement and each of the alternatives, up to PPP 
concessions, will be elaborated briefly in what follows.  
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Figure 13 Classification of public procurement contracts based on the 
scope and duration of responsibilities conferred to the supplier 
The logic of the figure is to show on the horizontal axis the temporal 
scope, i.e. duration of responsibilities conferred to the supplier, and on the 
vertical axis the physical scope, i.e. the breadth of responsibilities with 
respect to both vertical and horizontal dimension. Broadly speaking, the 
risks and expected rewards of the supplier increase positively with 
physical and temporal responsibilities, in the direction of the upper-right 
hand diagonal. 
3.3.3 Works and Services Contracts 
Traditionally, government road agencies procure single works or services 
from the private sector for infrastructure purposes. DBB (Design-Bid-
Build) is a delivery system in which the client procures design and 
construction services separately. DB (Design–Build) is a delivery system 
in which the client procures design and construction services from a single 
entity. Design-Build is probably the oldest project delivery method in the 
Western world, since the origins of construction are characterized by the 
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lack of distinction between design and construction responsibilities. For 
example, the meaning of the Greek word architektòn is chief builder.115  
A turnkey contract is almost identical to DB, but its contract looks more 
like a sale than a contract for services. Turnkey may include financing, and 
payment by the client is typically made at the completion. It is a standard 
practice to award DB and turnkey contracts on the basis of preliminary 
design. A partial project (PP) is an arrangement in which specific parts of a 
meaningful, separate project are contracted out to different contractors 
(general contractors or subcontractors). Contractually these contractors are 
directly bound to the client, who acts as a general contractor or 
construction manager.  
3.3.4 Management and Maintenance Contracts 
Management and maintenance contracts are arrangements, where a private 
company is entrusted with various types of tasks usually performed by the 
public authority, relating to the organization of road maintenance 
operations. Usually, the function of the private firm is to respond to day-
to-day routine maintenance requirements by contracting private 
companies, on behalf of the public entity, to perform the works. 
Management contracts can also (or only) focus on operation management. 
In this case, typical tasks entrusted to the private sector are: traffic 
counting, axle-load weighing and providing traffic information, traffic 
management including surveillance, stand-by services for accidents, traffic 
regulation, toll collection (usually not remunerated on the basis of the 
amounts collected but rather on a fixed rate basis). 
3.3.5 Leasing Contract 
In a leasing contract, the lessee manages either the facilities side or the 
operations side of the project and is remunerated primarily through service 
fees paid by users. A leasing contract is in fact equivalent to the 
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management contract, with the addition of “success fee,” which is the 
disposing value of the asset or service.  
3.3.6 PPP Concession 
In a PPP concession, government designates a right to the supplier to 
undertake a project and entitles the supplier to remuneration. The 
concessionaire carries out all of the capital investment, operates the 
resulting service and is compensated primarily through service fees paid 
by the government (shadow-tolls) or users (tolls). The facilities are to be 
handed over to the oversight public authority at the end of the contract 
period.  
Several variations of PPP exist. In a BOOT (Build-Own-Operate-Transfer) 
model, several private entities via a series of contracts finance, build, own 
and operate an infrastructure facility designed to accommodate the set of 
needs established by the public authority, which in many instances acts as 
guarantor for the project. Ownership of the facility is to be transferred to 
the public authority upon expiration of the contract. BOT (Build-Operate-
Transfer) is another variant of the PPP contract, whereby facility 
ownership is transferred to the public authority once the building phase has 
been completed. In a BOO (Build-Own-Operate) model the facility 
ownership remains in the hands of the private investors beyond the 
contract’s expiration. Finally, in a reverse BOOT model, the public 
authority finances and builds the facility, and then confers service 
operations to a private firm which assumes ownership as the building 
phase winds down.116
There is also a growing body of jurisprudence that considers the requisite 
features of a PPP concession. This literature entails typically intuitively 
appealing notions, but reveals little about the economic rationales that 
underlie them, or how they are achieved in practice. Nevertheless, for 
background understanding and a reference, we can briefly characterize the 
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features that juridical literature suggests a PPP concession contract should 
reflect.117
First, the partnership nature of the government-concessionaire relationship 
requires that the loyalty principle is a defining feature of the contract, both 
as an informal attitude as well as a formal juridical obligation. As in all 
contracts, the parties are expected to “use best efforts” to honor 
commitments.118 However, a concession also presupposes that the parties 
to the trade should replace confrontational settings and instead exert 
continuous efforts, in an orderly manner, to serve the joint economic 
interests and divide resulting joint gains in a fair manner among the public 
agency and the operator company. The concession should acknowledge 
that the contract clauses are based on assumptions of future conditions, 
and where realized events deviate from expected ones, the parties should 
react to evolving circumstances so that contract balance is sustained. The 
parties are also encouraged to employ bonuses and sanctions so that 
unilateral, self-interested action is discouraged. 
3.3.7 Summary of PPP in the Context of Public Procurement 
A public authority cannot arbitrarily choose how it contracts, delegates 
responsibility and distributes risks; it is subject to juridical constraints, 
captured in procurement law. Regardless of the country involved or the 
type of contract used, public procurement law involves responses to three 
interdependent domains of consideration. First, an appropriate legal 
framework must be set up to accommodate any given type of contract or 
selection protocol. Second, a public entity will be required to follow a 
specified contract award process within the legal framework. Third, a 
contract must be introduced to bind both parties as an outcome of the 
selection protocol, within the legislative framework. Based on the review 
of the context of public procurement we may summarize the changes 
associated with using PPP instead of traditional contracting practices.  
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The table (Table 2) below summarizes the key insights. Starting with the 
top row, the contracts used in the traditional path of procurement conform 
to works and services contracts, whereas as a PPP is awarded through a 
concession – a temporary right to operate an asset. However, there are 
certain key variations of each contract, presented on the second row. The 
scope of responsibilities conferred to any particular supplier in the 
traditional approach is fragmented and the contract duration is typically 1-
2 years, whereas in PPP, the scope of responsibilities is integrated and the 
duration is typically 20-50 years. The supplier selection protocol employed 
in the traditional approach is a reverse auction mechanism, namely the 
competitive sealed bid, whereas a PPP concession is awarded through a 
competitive- negotiated procedure.  
Table 2 Description of the main dimensions of development in public 
procurement 
Dimension 
Traditional Public 
Procurement 
PPP 
Contract type Works and services Concession 
Main contract variations DBB, DB (Turnkey), PP 
BOOT, BOT, BOO, Reverse 
BOOT 
Scope of responsibilities Fragmented Integrated 
Duration of responsibilities 1-2 years  20-50 years  
Supplier selection protocol 
Competitive sealed bid; in 
strict accordance with pre-
formulated specifications  
Competitive-negotiated 
procedure; iterative 
tendering against general 
output criteria 
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4 ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
PRODUCTION 
In this chapter the underlying economics of transport infrastructure 
production and PPP are studied. It is important to inquire into why should 
both public and private sector involvement be desired and what roles they 
play, respectively. The basic idea is that this chapter clarifies what a PPP 
essentially is, and how it differs from the traditional path of public 
infrastructure procurement, which is a tension that will later be leveraged 
to study the comparative efficiency of PPP reduced to some fundamental 
concepts of  economic theory. The chapter is divided into four sections, of 
which the first characterizes the economic nature of transport 
infrastructure goods; the second describes the organization of their 
production through a PPP scheme; the third through the path of 
traditional public procurement; and the final one summarizes the key 
features of each approach. 
4.1 Economic Characteristics of Transport Infrastructure Goods 
The purpose of this section is to deepen and clarify the understanding of 
PPP by constructing an economic model of PPP and contrasting it with 
traditional public infrastructure procurement, based on the conceptual 
frameworks of industrial organization and financial theory. The ways in 
which PPP differs from the traditional path of public infrastructure 
procurement helps to understand the defining features of the scheme in the 
context of transport infrastructure production, but is also a tension that will 
later be leveraged to study the relative efficiency of PPP reduced to the 
fundamentals of economic theory (Figure 14).  
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Figure 14 Description of the polar alternatives to the production of 
infrastructure goods 
Given the relatively recent introduction of PPP schemes, there is not as yet 
a substantial body of academic literature on such projects and most 
descriptions are informal. It thus seems justified to rely on basic theory to 
develop a robust economic conception of PPP. There are four essential 
characteristics that infrastructure goods exhibit, elaborated in what 
follows. 
First, it is important to note that transport infrastructure is not a pure public 
good that exhibits no exclusion or rivalry; instead transport infrastructure 
is common property to which everyone has free access, but the benefits 
exhibit rivalry: by occupying a space on the highway excludes others from 
occupying the same space. The infrastructure is also a capital good, 
because the externalities are created over a long-run period, and the 
benefits are primarily valued as an input to the production processes of 
firms or individual citizen-consumers.119  
                                            
119 Although some enthusiasts may enjoy driving on a highway for the thrill in its own sake. 
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Moreover, it seems essential to highlight that infrastructure is best 
understood as an experience good. The product characteristics such as 
quality or total price (cost) are difficult to observe in advance before 
purchase, but these characteristics become evident upon consumption of 
the good over its total lifecycle. This experiential quality seems to capture 
a fundamental problem of the construction business, where the client 
cannot, in advance easily observe or verify, sometimes let alone specify the 
characteristics of the unique product in question. Client preferences may 
change over time, and the actual characteristics typically become evident 
only after a substantial time, sometimes only after the standard warranty 
period is over. In economic terminology, transport infrastructure thus 
involves the production of a common capital experience good. The 
reasoning behind this conclusion is illustrated in the figure (Figure 15) 
below.   
Common capital experience
good
Infrastructure creates
significant externalities
that are subject
to rivalry
Construction and operation
of transport infrastructure
Quality and cost
characteristics of
infrastructure are difficult
to ascertain in advance
Infrastructure is a factor
of production instead
of being the object
of end consumption
Infrastructure yields
benefits over
a long time period
 
Figure 15 The economic characteristics of transport infrastructure goods 
In summary, transport infrastructure assets and services create significant 
positive externalities that are difficult for a supplier to internalize, which is 
why the market fails to provide the good, and which is also the reason it is 
desirable for a government to intervene and ensure its production, given 
that the total, social revenues (private revenue plus the value of 
externalities) are higher than the total, social costs (private costs plus the 
costs of externalities.  
The road users internalize the positive externalities, and the government 
prices the externalities by raising various taxes, e.g. vehicle and gasoline, 
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taxes from road users. The government forwards some portion of the tax 
revenues to the supplier, so that the supplier internalizes some of the 
positive externalities it generates. The revenues of the supplier are termed 
as private revenue, and the supplier’s production costs are termed private 
costs. Even if the supplier were allowed to set tolls for the highway, i.e. 
generate private revenue, such as is the case in PPP, the government still 
typically subsidizes production, because tolls alone do not allow the 
producer internalizing all the benefits from road externalities, i.e. social 
revenue.  
4.2 Economic Model of PPP in Transport Infrastructure Production 
4.2.1 Production in PPP 
There are multiple representations of PPP in literature; however, they are 
typically directed at a non-academic audience and lack a rigorous 
theoretical foundation. The models of PPP typically describe the key 
parties and their contractual relationships,120 or key phases of a PPP 
project,121 and so forth.  Moreover, they do not seem to capture some of 
the basic requirements for an economic model of PPP. First, because a PPP 
is concerned with an inter-temporal, typically even 30-year project, the 
model must account for multiple time periods. Second, it is reasonable to 
assume that an infrastructure project is inherently risky, and therefore the 
model must account for uncertainty. Third, to maintain economic and 
financial orientation, the terms of the model must represent quantitative, 
monetary values.  
A motivation in this section is therefore to develop a deeper understanding 
of PPP by constructing a model that addresses these requirements. The 
development of the model necessitates making certain approximations, 
which should, however, not compromise the validity of the study, but 
simply clarify thinking. The objective is to develop a model, which is a 
                                            
120 Kankainen, Linholm, et al. 2001 
121 Kurkela 2003 
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broad enough approximation to be valid, but narrow enough to focus the 
study on only the critical aspects of PPP.  
To begin the development along these lines, let us first assume a 
hypothetical highway infrastructure project, in which the government is 
the sole buyer and the project is awarded through a project contract to a 
sole supplier (who may nevertheless use subcontractors to deliver the 
project). The project involves designing and constructing a highway and 
maintaining it for a time span of T years. The infrastructure will be in 
operation for T minus construction period P, after which it is simply 
disposed at zero value. Next, let us assume that the construction period P is 
one year, P = 1, and the engineering and construction of the infrastructure 
assets requires an investment of I. The investment I is used in full to 
compensate consultants for designing, and construction contractors for 
completing the highway infrastructure. 
When completed, having the infrastructure asset and the complementary 
services required to operate it effectively delivers total annual positive 
externalities of B. Let us assume for simplicity, that these benefits are 
constant122 and represent the total sum of all the annual value that citizen-
consumers gain from using the highway for their personal purposes, all the 
logistics benefits that firms and non-profit organizations gain, and all 
imaginable multiplicative effects of stimulating the economy in general, 
i.e. the social benefit minus private revenue.   
However, having the highway in operation also incurs a constant, annual 
private cost of C < B,123 which means that the highway is costly, but 
socially desirable. Suppose that the private cost C includes all the 
maintenance, repair, street lighting, management and any other imaginable 
operating cost related to the infrastructure. Let us assume for the present 
that the negative externalities of the infrastructure asset, such as air and 
                                            
122 This assumption can easily be relaxed, and the annual benefits can be treated as variable for 
calculation purposes 
123 Again, this assumption can easily be relaxed, and the annual benefits can be treated as variable for 
calculation purposes 
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noise pollution are irrelevant, for instance, because they are small enough 
to be negligible, or they are expected to be borne by the government. 
Moreover, the government prices the positive externalities by estimating 
the total social benefits, and charges the society appropriately in the form 
of taxes t, e.g. vehicle and gasoline taxes. 
Let us assume that the operating infrastructure asset can be represented 
with sufficient accuracy in terms of four dimensions: the units of passage 
along the route q, average availability of lanes l, the safety of the route s, 
and quality of maintenance m, so that we can characterize the asset as A = 
f(q, l, s, m) during any period after P. Let us assume that a good 
approximation of the social externalities that the asset generates, B, is a 
function of A, so that B = f(A) during any period after P. This seems to be 
a reasonable assumption, since as more units pass along the route; more 
lanes are available and so forth, the higher the value of the externalities to 
the society. 
The supplier of the infrastructure asset assumes responsibility of 
constructing the infrastructure and operating it until T, but the supplier will 
generate no revenue until the asset is in operation. When in operation, the 
supplier will receive private revenue R from the buyer, the government, 
specified by a typical payment mechanism, which is also a function of A, R 
= r(A), where r is a vector that represents the private revenue coefficients 
of the payment mechanism, corresponding to the units of passage along the 
route q, average availability of lanes l, the safety of the route s, and quality 
of maintenance m.  
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Figure 16 Distinction between infrastructure asset, value of externalities, 
social pricing, private revenue, private costs and environmental 
uncertainty 
Let us also approximate the annual cost of C as a function of B, C = c(A), 
where c is a vector that represents the private cost coefficients 
corresponding to the units of passage along the route q, average 
availability of lanes l, the safety of the route s, and quality of maintenance 
m. This seems to be a reasonable assumption as well, since as more units 
pass along the route, more lanes are available and so forth, the higher the 
effort that is required in terms of maintenance, repair, and so forth is. Let 
us further denote the private net revenues N of the supplier by N = R – C. 
Next, suppose that the project is also inherently risky. This is a very 
reasonable assumption for most economic activities. In the case of 
constructing and operating a highway for a long term, risks arise from 
material and labor cost, engineering calculations, technological solutions, 
geological uncertainties, weather conditions, plain human error, traffic 
forecasts and many other possible sources of disturbance to the project 
execution. The realization of these risks could cause extra costs, schedule 
delays, and lower-than-expected performance of the completed 
infrastructure.  
It is imperative to understand, that the aggregate, underlying risks of a 
venture are the same, regardless of how the risks are distributed among 
participants. The uncertainty related to a capital investment project is 
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independent of the client or the firm that undertakes the project. The value 
of the project is based on its ability to generate cash flows. If a particular 
firm can generate higher expected future cash flows, i.e. higher benefits, 
lower costs, or both, using the project’s assets, the project will add more 
value to that firm than to other firms. Differences in the value of a project 
among firms are reflected in the expected cash flows (not in the cost of 
capital), because the project risks depend on the project’s design.124
Let us denote all the underlying uncertain events related to a project by one 
term, θ. These uncertain events or pure risks therefore pertain to the 
expected C, to the expected B, and indirectly through B to R. In principle, 
we could model each of these three terms as random variables; however, 
capturing all the uncertainty in one term, θ, aligns the approach with the 
basic logic of financial markets. Within the framework of financial 
markets, investors share a simple way to reflect the uncertainty regarding 
future cost and revenue calculations: the cost of capital. For any capital 
investment project, i.e. asset, investors capture future uncertainty by 
applying an appropriate discounting rate, using the principles of interest 
rate theory and CAPM. Therefore, we can anticipate that the expected rate 
of return r financiers would expect from this particular project is closely 
related to θ, i.e. r ~ θ. 
Suppose that the supplier of the asset and related services is a separate 
private company, with no operating history or assets (except for a 
minimum equity contribution of E). The infrastructure requires an equal 
initial investment of I at period P. The private party would need to 
evaluate the project on its own merits and access the financial markets to 
raise funds for the project as a separate economic unit. Potential debt 
investors would assess whether or not C and R projections are realistic, and 
assuming so, they would be willing to lend an amount D of funds at an 
interest rate rd, which is a fair rate, given all actual risks inherent and other 
investment opportunities available. Let us assume that E << I, sot that we 
                                            
124 Flemming & Mayer 1997, Finnerty 1996; this idea will be explored in more detail in the next 
chapter 
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can for the present reasonably omit the effect of E and the rate of return re 
on E in the analysis, and assume that the supplier would finance the project 
entirely on debt D.  
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Figure 17 Illustration of the investment, private revenues and private costs 
in PPP 
Assuming that debt investors are prudent investment analysts, the interest 
rate rd is then also the appropriate discounting rate that captures the risks in 
the project. From a producer perspective, the project is worth realizing, if 
the project has a positive net present value initially, i.e. at period 0. The net 
present value of the project, as a function of the cost of capital rd, for the 
supplier is defined by NPV(rd) = ∑(Ni / rd ^i) – I, where i = 1, 2,…,T, and 
N = 0, for i = 1, and N = R – C, for all i = 2, 3, …,T. The figure above 
(Figure 17) gives a schematic representation of the supplier’s cash flows.  
The figure below (Figure 18) schematically summarizes the main 
participants and key terms in the model of PPP. The logic of the 
representation is to show the key parties, the key periodic cash flows, and 
the uncertainty of the project, reflected in the debt and equity cost of 
capital. The box in the middle represents the supplier, which in the case of 
PPP is a separate project company, for all practical purposes equivalent to 
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the underlying asset it manages. The engineering and construction of the 
infrastructure asset ties up capital equal to I, the cost of construction, 
which is raised from in the form of debt D from financial institutions in 
debt markets and the form of equity E from equity investors (for the 
present, we assume that E << I, so that E and re. are negligible).  
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Figure 18 A descriptive model of the key parties and flows of funds in 
Public-Private Partnership 
Having the asset in operation delivers annual aggregate benefits of B to the 
society, but incurs a constant annual cost of C to the project company, 
which goes to sub-contractors.  The government raises various taxes t, e.g. 
vehicle and gasoline, which it channels through its budget to pay for the 
supplier’s efforts as defined by R = r(B). The supplier uses this revenue to 
cover its operating costs defined by C = c(B), and to service its capital 
liabilities. The uncertainty θ related to future R (or equivalently B) and C 
projections are captured in an interest rate rd, which is the rate at which 
financiers are willing to commit capital for the project and therefore 
appropriate for evaluating the net present value of the project.  A PPP 
project is then defined analytically by the simple formula NPV(rd) = ∑(Ni /  
rd ^i) – I. 
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Similar representations of PPP are abundant in literature, but generally 
speaking they do not provide a unified treatment of the key parties, the key 
flows of money, a dynamic time conception and uncertainty. The model 
constructed here addresses all these features and suffices to tie to a single, 
common basis the themes that have emerged in the literature on PPP, 
namely value for money (VfM) considerations, relative efficiency of the 
public and private sector and cost of capital concerns.  
The first two common themes, namely relative efficiency and value for 
money considerations relate to the terms B and C in the model. Relative 
efficiency between the traditional paths of procurement and PPP simply 
refers to differences in C, holding B constant. Similarly, value for money 
considerations between the traditional paths of procurement and PPP refer 
to the differences in the ratio of B versus C. Effects of PPP on B and C will 
be elaborated after a review of the third theme. The third theme, the cost of 
capital concern refers to differences in discount rate rd, holding in turn 
both B and C constant, and will be addressed by an analysis based on 
investment theory in the next chapter.  
4.2.2 Contractual Relationship in a PPP Concession 
A most notable difference in the contractual relationship between the 
traditional procurement contract and a PPP concession are positive 
incentives, captured in the payment mechanism. Another important feature 
is the incompleteness of the contract, with the consequential allocation of 
(temporary) asset ownership to the concessionaire as well as neutral 
arbitration mechanisms that are typically set in place from the outset and 
designed to mitigate the moral hazards involved with incomplete contracts. 
As explained earlier, incentives are the only way to induce optimal effort 
and ensure the efficiency of a contract, when effort is not easily 
specifiable, observable or verifiable. The PPP concession therefore makes 
heavy use of incentives to induce high effort and thereby avoid agency 
costs. However, PPP schemes involve significant complexity and 
uncertainty as well, which is why a cost-minimizing contractual 
relationship involves the creation and allocation of limited authority to the 
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concessionaire as well as the enactment of neutral arbitration mechanisms 
to handle contingent circumstances at the lowest possible cost.   
However, let us for the present focus on the incentives in the contractual 
relationship, and next subject the payment mechanism in a PPP concession 
contract to an analysis based on the principal-agent framework. The 
analysis requires the development of a model of the government-
concessionaire relationship, which subsequently allows developing insight 
into the compensation scheme between the government and the private 
supplier. The purpose is, again, to develop an analytical model, which is a 
sufficient approximation of the principal-agent relationship between the 
government and the concessionaire and allows us to draw some 
conclusions within the limits of the model.  
First, let us assume that we can again characterize the infrastructure asset A 
with sufficient accuracy using the variables availability l, passages q, 
accidents s, and road conditions m, so that A = f(l, q, s, m).  Second, 
suppose we can approximate the relationship in terms of the 
concessionaire revenue R defined by the payment mechanism, the private 
costs C of operating the asset, and the total social benefits resulting from 
externalities B. As earlier, suppose all of these variables are directly 
dependent on A, so that R = f(A), C = f(A), and B = f(A).125 Third, suppose 
that R is, in fact, a fraction r of B, which simply means that the government 
remunerates the project company by leaking a share of the total value of 
social externalities to it.  
Let us also assume that the performance of the infrastructure asset depends 
on the efforts of the project company management, and that we can 
distinguish between two different types of effort, cost-saving ec and 
benefit-enhancing efforts eb. Finally, let us include a random variable θ, 
                                            
125 This is very reasonable, because the variables q, l, s, m that approximate social externalities are 
also the basis of the payment mechanism and presumably higher externalities require higher costly 
production  
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which captures all the pure risks related to the performance of the asset A, 
and which therefore pertain into R, C and B.  
Total social profit πs that the asset generates is then defined by πs = B(eb) – 
C(ec) – θ. The private profit πp is dependent on the performance of the 
infrastructure, its costs and a random term, so that πp = (r)B(eb) – C(ec ) – 
θ.  The government is a representative of the society and its “profit” πg 
resulting from the externalities net of payment to the project company is 
defined by πg = (1 – r)B(eb). This setting allows us to draw some simple 
conclusions (Figure 19). 
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Infrastructure Asset, A Performance of
infrastructure,
B = f(A)
Payment
mechanism, 
R = f(A)
Availability, l
Passages, q
Accidents, s
Conditions, m
Private costs, 
C = f(A)
Project company
Cost saving efforts,
ec
Benefit enhancing
efforts, eb
Environmental 
uncertainty, θ  
Figure 19 Principal-Agent model of the PPP concession 
First, the compensation structure of the concession makes the contract 
efficient, because it aligns the interests of the project company, whose 
profits are πp = (r)B(eb) – C(ec ) – θ, and the government πg = (1 – 
r)B(eb). The concessionaire has every incentive to contribute to the 
performance of the asset, because this increases its revenues, but this also 
improves the value of the service to the government. The contract thus 
represents a profit-sharing mechanism, which is incentive-compatible. 
Therefore, PPP seems to involve lower agency costs, because the project is 
acknowledged to be costly to monitor and effort is primarily induced 
through incentives. 
However, within the limits of this setting, it is easy to see that the private 
company has a much higher incentive to exert effort on cost savings C than 
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increasing the benefits B. This is so because it captures only a fraction r of 
the effort it gives to improving the service, but all the yields from cost 
saving efforts ec go to the project company – the government “profit” is 
independent of the costs, πg = (1 – r)B(eb). The concession therefore 
ensures efficiency, but unless the revenue mechanism is tied to the costs as 
well, it favors the project company in the long-run, and equitability of the 
contract is not ensured. 
Within the limits of this model we can also infer that the private company 
assumes all production risks related to general macroeconomic conditions 
and input and prices unique to the particular infrastructure asset. Or more 
accurately, the financiers of the private company assume the risk θ, which 
is reasonable, given that they are also entitled to all the surplus yields from 
cost savings.  
4.3 Comparable Economic Model of Traditional Public Procurement  
4.3.1 Production in Traditional Public Procurement 
The traditional procurement practice typically involves separation of e.g. 
design, engineering, construction, and operation functions, as well sub-
division of responsibilities within these functions, and is therefore 
customarily characterized as fragmented. The fragmented nature of the 
traditional procurement path stands in stark contrast to the broader and 
more integrated service package that characterizes PPPs, which means that 
comparing the traditional approach to the PPP scheme seems a good way 
to develop insight into the defining features and differences between the 
two. For this purpose, we will next develop a model that approximates the 
traditional path of infrastructure procurement. 
There is a diversity of contracts and associated organizational 
arrangements in project procurement, with some very recent and 
innovative schemes as well. However, the traditional, lump-sum, short-
term works and services contract remains by far the most used 
contemporary contracting model in the procurement of public 
infrastructure assets. Because there is basically an infinite variety even of 
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this contractual model, it is necessary to employ a stylized model, which 
(hopefully) captures the essential features of the traditional alternative.  
To develop a good comparable reference to PPP, we will again assume the 
same hypothetical highway infrastructure project as in the development of 
the PPP model. However, in the traditional approach no separate project 
company is established; the government finances the infrastructure 
investment by borrowing on its general credit rating; and contracts with 
construction companies and operators through fragmented, short-term, 
lump-sum competitive bidding, when it does not rely on its own producer 
units. The long-run management and integration of multiple works 
contracts remains with the public sector; works are exhaustively specified, 
and the public sector carries out design prior to procurement. Finally, 
private contractors are responsible for the deliverables only within 
standard warranty periods. The figure below (Figure 20) schematically 
summarizes the main participants and key terms in the traditional model of 
infrastructure production.  
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Figure 20 A model of the key parties and flows of funds in traditional 
procurement 
The most important issues to notice are that the infrastructure asset is 
represented as inseparable from the government, who finances and holds 
ownership to the asset, and that both construction and operation are 
fragmented. The long-term risks θ related to the asset are internalized and 
hidden in the government entity. The construction of the infrastructure 
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asset again ties up capital equal to I, the cost of construction, which is 
raised from in the form of debt D from financial institutions in debt 
markets at the risk-free rate of interest. 
Furthermore, having the asset in operation delivers annual aggregate 
benefits of B to the society, but incurs a constant annual private cost of C 
to the government, which goes to sub-contractors.  The government raises 
various taxes t, e.g. vehicle and gasoline taxes, which it channels through 
its budget to cover its operating costs defined by C, and to service its debt 
capital liabilities. The boxes representing construction and operation are 
split into sections to emphasize the idea, that the traditional procurement is 
typically concerned with more narrow works and services packages in both 
physical and temporal scope. The procurement and production of an 
infrastructure asset equivalent to a PPP project is thus achieved by a 
composite of multiple smaller projects in both physical and temporal 
scope. 
4.3.2 Contractual Relationship in Traditional Public Procurement 
Let us next briefly explore the consequences of the contractual relationship 
in traditional procurement practices more formally by applying the 
principal-agent framework. Let us denote the total social revenue of an 
infrastructure project by π, the contractor’s efforts by e, the contractor’s 
compensation by w, and include a random variable θ, which captures the 
risks of the project. It is important to note that the risks imply the potential 
for an upside as well as a downside. For example, the material or labor 
costs may turn out to be lower or higher than initially expected. 
Suppose next that the government enacts a typical competitive tendering 
process, through which it awards the project to the contractor that offers to 
deliver the project at the lowest constant wage w. In the principal-agent 
terminology, a lump-sum contract is a variant of the a fixed fee contract, 
where the wage w to the contractor is independent of π, or e, and the 
contractor takes on the risks θ, so that the government receives πg = f(e) – 
w. The cost-plus contract is equivalent to a hire contract, where the 
contractor receives remuneration based on some observable output 
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measure e and a unit wage w, so that the government receives πg = f(e) – 
we.  
Let us further assume that the total profit is positively dependent on some 
level of effort e that is costly to the contractor, who can also choose 
between two levels of effort, high e* and low e. Suppose that e* represents 
effort that conforms to the specifications of the government, and e 
represents deviation from the specifications. Suppose also that e* costs 
more than e to the contractor by a factor of c > 1, so that e* = ce.126 
Moreover, the government typically employs hostages, i.e. negative 
incentives, which take the form of a direct monetary post m, which the 
contractor loses in addition to the contract if its efforts deviate from what 
is agreed.  
Let us assume the project is ultimately completed by the contractor. The 
contractors profit πp, when it conforms to the contract specifications in a 
fixed fee contract is therefore πp  = w – ce + θ, and when it shirks, and 
does not to deliver what is specified, but is not caught, its profit is defined 
by πp  = w – e + θ; if caught, it loses the hostage m, and its profit is 
defined by πp  = w – e + θ – m. Similarly, in a hire contract, the 
contractor’s profit πp, when it conforms to the specifications is therefore πp  
= we – ce + θ, and when it fails to provide what it is paid to provide, its 
profit is defined by πp  = w – e + θ or  πp  = w – e + θ – m, depending 
whether the government catches the contractor shirking.  
The important idea to realize is that, in essence, both contract types require 
that the contractor’s effort e is specifiable, observable and verifiable by the 
government. Under these conditions, the government can choose the 
desirable level of effort e* and impose it on the contractor, with the threat 
of the large punishment m if the contractor shirks. These are valid 
practices, and ensure efficiency when the trade involves a specifiable 
                                            
126 A higher effort requires higher mental effort and or more sweat to ensure on-schedule delivery, 
high quality, and so forth. 
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object of delivery, and the principal can at a low cost observe and verify 
whether the contractor conforms to the specifications.  
However, the problem in the construction industry seems to be that it is 
typically very difficult for the government to judge the quality of the 
contractor’s efforts, even when short-term fragmented works and services 
contracts are used. Whether or not the contractor’s efforts conform to the 
specifications of the government can typically be determined only after a 
significant time, typically outside of the warranty period. In other words, 
even though the contractor risks being punished, the probability p of being 
caught shirking, i.e. choosing e, is so low that it can be very appealing to 
avoid the costs c, which accompany exerting the high effort e*, i.e. ec > 
pm. 
It is empirically well documented that construction projects in practice 
involve recurrent negotiation to accommodate e.g. variation orders, the 
client is intimately involved in supervising the progress of the project, 
projects often lead to costly disputes, and quality problems are frequent. In 
reality the efforts of contractors in infrastructure projects are therefore 
perhaps not as easily specifiable, observable or verifiable as presumed. 
Because the contractor has no incentive to protect the vested interests of 
the government, it is actually very likely that fixed-fee and hire 
compensation mechanisms do not result in efficient contractual 
relationships.  
The equitability of the contract can also be considered as low, because the 
government typically captures a majority of the surplus the project implies 
by engaging in competitive bidding. A contract that is highly unfair to the 
contractor may also in practice be related to the efficiency of the project: A 
contractor may feel uncommitted to an inequitable contract, which, as a 
consequence may turn out indurable, leading to costly disputes, i.e. 
inefficiency.  
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4.4 Description of Traditional and PPP Infrastructure Production 
Alternatives 
The basic objective of this chapter was to clarify what PPP essentially is, 
and how it differs from the traditional path of public transport 
infrastructure procurement. This is also a tension that will later be 
leveraged to study the relative efficiency of PPP, reduced to the 
fundamentals of economic theory. The table (Table 3) below summarizes 
the evidence from the multiple backgrounds that have been reviewed. 
More specifically, the rows of the table capture the insights gained from 
project business literature, research on project finance, and the context of 
public procurement, in light of the theory of industrial organization. 
 
Table 3 Stylized description of polar (traditional and PPP) infrastructure 
production paths 
Dimension Traditional  PPP 
Scale of responsibilities Minor, partial, subservient 
deliverables, characterized 
by a low level of output 
Major, whole, self-standing 
asset, characterized by a 
high level of output 
Scope of responsibilities Separation and 
segmentation  of design, 
engineering, construction 
and operation functions 
Unification and integration of 
design, engineering, 
construction and operation 
functions 
Duration of responsibilities Short-term works and 
services, standard warranty 
period 
Long-term construction 
works and operation 
services, lifecycle 
responsibility 
Supplier selection protocol Competitive sealed bid 
auction procedure  
Mixture of competitive 
auction and negotiation 
procedures 
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Tender specifications Complete, exhaustive rights 
and obligations 
Incomplete, general output 
criteria 
Compensation structures Fixed, lump-sum or cost-
plus wages 
Variable, performance-
based fees 
Resolution of potential 
disputes 
Reliance on general 
arbitration mechanisms, 
contract assumed to be 
court-enforceable 
Establishment of dedicated 
arbitration mechanisms, 
contract assumed to be 
partly self-enforceable 
Financing Direct, government credit-
rating-based public finance 
Project-specific, asset-based 
private finance  
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5 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FINANCING ALTERNATIVES 
Financing is one of the most important functions in PPP, and a key theme 
in the literature on PPPs. Differences in the cost of capital between the 
private and public sector are a recurrent topic of debate in research as 
well as media. The typical argument is that a government can save on debt 
service costs relative to private companies due to an excellent credit 
rating. However, debt service costs are only the explicit costs of capital, 
whereas an economic perspective also includes implicit costs that result 
from foregone opportunities – the opportunity costs. Prior studies have not 
embraced this economic perspective, which is why actual differences in the 
cost of capital between public and private financing alternatives deserve a 
separate elaboration in this chapter. The chapter is divided into four 
sections. The first outlines the typical argument against PPP grounded in 
the advantages of public finance; the second describes the public and 
private alternatives and sums up the conventional argument more 
formally; the third shows a flaw in the presumed advantages of the public 
financing alternative; and the fourth substantiates this result from two 
other perspectives. 
5.1 Debate on Public and Private Cost of Capital 
The differences in financing costs are a key theme in academic literature 
on PPPs,127 and deserve an in-depth and rather lengthy elaboration. A 
predominant conception in public discourse, sometimes shared by 
scholars,128 is that a PPP project is an expensive alternative for the 
procurement of infrastructure assets and services, because of PPP’s 
comparatively high financing costs, which are assumed to be ultimately 
transferred to the government and covered out of tax payers’ pockets.  
One motivation for this section is to show that this is a false conception, 
based on basic economic and financial theory. The aforementioned 
argument typically relies on results gained through hypothetical 
                                            
127 Finnerty 1996; Currie 2000; Franks 2002 
128 Kiiras, Erälahti, Maijala, Tuhola & Töyrylä 2005 
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calculations and conflicts with both the empirical fact that PPP activity has 
grown tremendously world-wide as an accepted means of providing 
infrastructure assets and services under certain circumstances, as well as 
conclusions that can be derived from a theoretically well-founded analysis, 
as this study shows.  
The purpose here is to doubt the validity of the resistance to PPP based on 
the cost of borrowing argument and show its weaknesses from a theoretical 
viewpoint. Financing costs are a highly relevant issue, but not the whole 
picture, and it is needless that much of public discourse on PPPs revolves 
seemingly perpetually around the cost of capital. A simple analysis in what 
follows is sufficient to make the point. With reference to the economic 
model developed earlier, we will focus the analysis on financing,129 and 
more specifically, the cost of capital. 
5.2 Description of Private and Public Financing Alternatives 
5.2.1 Description of the Conventional Argument 
The genesis of the conventional argument, typically favored by politicians, 
is that a government should fund infrastructure development, because it 
can borrow capital at a low interest rate. It is very true that infrastructure 
assets tie up enormous capital, major projects typically in the scale of 
hundreds of millions in euros, and therefore it is obvious that the costs of 
debt service make up a significant portion of total costs. It is also true that 
the governments in well-developed economies have a very low risk of 
default, having consequently an excellent credit rating, translating to a low 
cost of borrowing. 
It seems intuitively appealing then for a government to use its access to 
cheap capital to borrow and fund infrastructure development projects. 
However appealing the practice seems at first thought, it is based on an 
incomplete or even erroneous understanding of the framework of financial 
markets in both theory and practice. There is nothing wrong with a 
                                            
129 In other words, we will hold social externalities B, the required investment I, taxes t and private 
revenues R, and costs C constant. 
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government borrowing funds on its general credit, which is excellent and 
therefore the applied interest rate is low. But what happens when a 
government allocates these funds to an inherently risky venture is, in brief, 
that the government violates the principles of financial markets, incurring 
an opportunity cost and subsidizing a certain producer with an amount 
equal to the implicit costs included in the opportunity cost. 
5.2.2 Public Finance and Public Organization 
The line of thought needs some elaboration and simple notation. To keep 
the analysis simple, it suffices to accept a widely held assumption that 
financial markets operate on the basis of four basic principles discussed 
earlier in the review of the theory of investment.130 These principles 
effectively ensure that capital, a key input and production factor to any 
economic activity in the widest possible sense, is allocated efficiently. For 
the purpose of illustration, let us first assume a two-stage model, in which 
at stage one a government borrows a certain amount of capital denoted by 
D, at an interest rate of rf, which is presumably very close to the risk free 
rate given an excellent credit rating. At stage two the government invests 
the same amount I = D into a capital-intensive project.  
Let us also assume that one such alternative is a public-sector led 
infrastructure project, which involves constructing a highway and 
maintaining it for a time span of T years. The infrastructure will be in 
operation for T minus construction period P, after which it is simply 
disposed at zero value. Let us also assume that the project is inherently 
risky, which is a very reasonable assumption for any economic activity. In 
the case of constructing and operating a highway for a long term, risks 
arise from material and labor availability and cost, engineering 
calculations, technological solutions, geological uncertainties, weather 
conditions, plain human error, and many other possible sources of 
disturbance to the project execution. The realization of these risks could 
                                            
130 See section 2.2.1 
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cause extra costs, schedule delays, and lower-than-expected performance 
of the completed infrastructure. 
Let us again assume that the construction period P is one year, the 
construction requires an initial investment of I, and when completed, 
having the highway in operation incurs a constant, annual cost of C, and 
having the infrastructure asset and the complementary services required to 
operate it effectively delivers total annual societal benefits of B, where B > 
C. Then, in principle, we could rely on basic investment theory to evaluate 
intelligently the viability of the project. We would proceed by a standard 
calculation of discounting the annual net benefits N = (B – C) to the 
present day and comparing the resulting present value PV to the initial 
investment I to determine the net present value NPV. For the purpose of 
discounting, we would need to determine an appropriate discounting factor 
r for each of the periods I =1,2,…,T. Let us assume that the discounting 
factor is defined by r^i, for each of the periods i, respectively. The NPV of 
the project, as a function of r, would then be defined as NPV(r) = ∑(Ni / 
r^i) – I. 
5.2.3 Private Finance and Private Organization 
Let us next assume that there is another party, a private comparable to the 
public party and willing to consider taking responsibility of the project, in 
other words constructing the infrastructure and operating it similarly until 
T. The party is a separate private company, with no operating history or 
assets (except for a minimum equity contribution of E). The party would 
also finance the project entirely on debt D, and since E << I, we can 
reasonably omit the effect of E in the analysis. Let us also assume that this 
party has access to the exact same resources and is equally capable of 
delivering the infrastructure. In essence, the private party could create 
equal annual societal benefits of B at equal annual cost of C, and would 
require equal initial investment of I = D. The stream of the net benefits 
generated by the public and the private party throughout the time span T 
would then be identical, and the net present value as a function of the cost 
of capital, would be NPV(r) = ∑(Ni  / r^i) – I  for both. 
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The next task would be to determine an appropriate discounting factor. In 
business parlance, it is common to use a figure called the cost of capital rd 
as the discounting factor, which in essence captures the uncertainty related 
to the future B and C projections. It is a measure of return a business must 
offer to investors, i.e. what investors expect from a particular venture, all 
risks considered, within the framework of financial markets. In particular, 
since rf  is the rate of return expected from a completely risk free 
investment, the project cost of capital rd is obviously higher (rd > rf), since 
the project, as explained, is inherently risky, and more risk is acceptable 
only with a higher expected return. 
The private party would need to evaluate the project on its own merits and 
access the financial markets to raise funds for the project as a separate 
economic unit. Potential debt investors would assess whether or not C and 
B projections are realistic, and assuming so, they would be willing to lend 
an amount D of funds at an interest rate rd, which is a fair rate given all 
actual risks inherent and other risky investment opportunities available.  
5.2.4 Comparison of Public and Private Alternatives 
The question then is whether the project should be undertaken by the 
public or the private party. To evaluate these alternatives objectively, we 
could use the NPV as a standard criterion and require that the alternative 
with a higher NPV should be chosen. It inevitably follows that at stage 2 
the government should invest in the project, because given its excellent 
credit rating, the net present value associated with the course of action 
where the government invests is higher than the course of action, where a 
private company invests.  
More formally, since rd > rf , it follows that NPV(rd) < NPV(rf) – the 
discounting factor that the private party uses is higher than the government 
one, and therefore its NPV is lower. In other words, it would make sense 
for the government to take charge of the project, fund it on its general 
credit and overtake construction and operation activity (typically using 
private sector subcontractors, but this is not the point). This is essentially 
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what the argument against PPP and privately funded infrastructure 
development is. 
The argument suggests that it does not make sense to establish PPPs in 
well-performing economies, such as Finland, because governments 
typically have an excellent credit rating, and their cost of borrowing is 
often very closely the benchmark of financial markets, i.e. the risk-free 
rate of interest. Whereas the cost of borrowing, and especially the cost of 
equity of a separate legal entity will certainly be subject to a risk premium 
over and above the risk-free rate, because it is practically impossible to 
isolate an individual venture from all sorts of risk (e.g. commercial, 
technological, natural). In other words, PPP is a poor alternative to 
procuring infrastructure in well-performing economies. 
The reverse is true for developing countries with poor national credit 
ratings and tight budgets. The cost of borrowing on a project basis can 
provide more leverage and a significantly lower cost of borrowing, leading 
to a lower WACC, because the project’s viability is evaluated as a separate 
economic entity, with greater independence from the respective economic, 
political, legal conditions and many other variables, which are typically 
unfavorable (but which are nevertheless factored into the analysis). 
5.3 Analysis of the Explicit and Implicit Costs of Financing 
Alternatives 
5.3.1 Opportunity Cost of Public Finance 
However, there is a crucial flaw in the conclusion regarding PPPs in well-
developed economies reached above, but it is not necessarily easy to see. It 
is, nevertheless, obvious that the above conclusion leads to a course of 
action that violates the principles of financial theory, since capital is 
allocated at a risk-free rate to an essentially risky project. What, in effect 
happens – and this is the crucial step – is that the government, by investing 
capital borrowed at the risk-free rate in the project simultaneously incurs 
an opportunity cost OC. In other words, the government does not consider 
the implicit costs of committing capital resources to a particular use, but 
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takes into account only the explicit costs of debt service. To quantify the 
implicit costs we can calculate the opportunity cost and subtract from that 
the explicit costs of debt service in what follows.131
To review, opportunity cost is the value of the best alternative use of the 
resources, in this case pure capital. Basically, there is an infinite variety of 
alternatives that the financial resources could be put to, but it is not 
possible or meaningful to consider the whole universe of alternatives, if we 
assume that a government has determined that a certain infrastructure asset 
would be beneficial from a social welfare viewpoint. However, one 
obvious alternative that should not be overlooked in this context is pure, 
financial investment, which represents a relevant comparable, alternative 
course of action the government could follow.  
In other words, the government could choose to use the resources I for 
investing in an efficient portfolio of risky assets with an expected rate of 
return rp in the financial markets. The government, in essence, would 
function like any bank, taking in funds amounting to D = I, for which it 
pays an interest rate rf,, and subsequently investing these in an efficient 
portfolio of assets that generate an expected rate of return rp > rf. The 
government would thus be expecting revenues of R = I(rp) each year, debt 
service costs of I(rf) each year, and making an expected investment profit 
of πi = I(rp – rf) each year.  
Then exactly how high is rp? To answer this question, suppose next that 
the hypothetical debt investors who consider investing in the project are 
also able to access funds at the risk free rate of rf,132 and since we assume 
that they are willing to finance the project by providing debt capital at a 
rate of rd, they are expecting revenues R of R = I(rd) each year, debt 
service costs C of C = I(rf) each year, and making an expected investment 
profit πd of πd = I(rd – rf) each year.  
                                            
131 See section 2.1.3 
132 Typically banks are able to access funds at an even lower rate. The interest that banks pay to 
consumers and firms that make deposits, their main source of funds, is lower than the prevailing 
risk-free interest rate. 
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Then the government, in considering functioning like a bank, should be 
willing to invest in the project if it is offered the same rate of return rd that 
other debt investors expect from this venture, considering all the risks 
inherent in the project projections. Therefore, the government should be 
indifferent between investing in some other portfolio of assets and 
investing in the project, if rp = rd.133 And the periodic opportunity cost of 
investing itself in the project, and not in a portfolio of assets, is equal to 
the revenue foregone, OC = I(rd). Moreover, the total OC over the life of 
the project is I(rd)^T. 
5.3.2 Implicit Costs of Public Finance 
The government, by investing itself in the project, thus foregoes the 
opportunity of receiving revenues of I(rd). Its periodic explicit debt service 
costs are, given an excellent credit rating, still defined by the risk-free rate 
rf  of borrowing, and amount to only I(rf). However, the opportunity cost 
just calculated includes both the explicit and implicit costs, and therefore 
the periodic implicit costs of investing itself in the infrastructure project 
are defined by I(rd) – I(rf) = I(rd  – rf), where rd  > rf,, because the project is 
inherently risky. The total implicit costs of the government investing in the 
project are thus defined by I(rd – rf)^T, and are essentially equal to the 
customary conception of differences in private and public sector cost of 
capital. 
This implicit, economic cost is typically ignored in PPP analysis, 
and explains – moreover quantifies – the apparent cheapness of 
sovereign funding. 
The figure (Figure 21) below illustrates the line of thought. At stage 1, the 
government borrows D, at the risk-free rate, shown by (1). At stage 2, the 
government leaks the funds at the same cost to a public party to invest in a 
risky infrastructure project, denoted by (2). The government 
simultaneously incurs an opportunity cost, because given that the 
                                            
133 The rate rd is essentially also the rate at which the private supplier can raise capital. 
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government has access to cheap capital, it could have at stage 2 chosen to 
invest the same capital amount in an efficient portfolio of assets, which 
provide an expected rate of return rp = rd > rf, denoted by (3). 
Government
Infrastructure Asset
Debt Markets
D
I
rf
Public supplier
Private supplier
I
D
Financial Markets I
rp
D
rd
D
(1)
(3)
(5)
(4)
(2)
 
Figure 21 Illustration of the implicit costs the government incurs  
By choosing to forego this investment opportunity, the government 
therefore loses a lucrative opportunity to make an investment profit. If the 
government were a typical rational, risk-averse, insatiable investor, and a 
responsible governor of citizens’ funds, it would, like everybody else 
within the framework of financial markets, be indifferent between 
investing in the infrastructure project, which has a risk level captured in rd, 
or investing in an efficient portfolio of risky assets, which provide an equal 
expected return of rd. The rate of return rd is consistent with what outside 
investors would expect from this particular infrastructure venture, all risks 
considered, within the framework of financial markets, denoted by (4). 
5.3.3 Competitive Market Perspective to Public Finance 
What happens from the perspective of the private supplier candidate is that 
the government intervenes in the construction market and favors a public 
producer, usually a government agency, by supplying it with unnaturally 
cheap capital, which in the case of a capital-intensive infrastructure project 
represents a key production factor and a decisive competitive advantage, 
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equal to the government’s implicit costs of capital. This is nothing else 
than a form of subvention, which, in fact, is prohibited by competitive 
legislation.  
Economic theory attests that it is beneficial for a social planner, i.e. the 
government, to ensure that certain public goods such as highways are 
provided, but economic theory also promotes fair competition and that for 
any given purpose the most efficient means are chosen. Our analysis so far 
assumes that the public and private parties are identical in their 
capabilities, so it is awkward that the analysis automatically leads to 
choosing the public alternative. In fact, this is wrong: there is no reason 
why a government should favor a public party over a private party when 
alternatives are available, and the government is effectively violating 
sound economic principles captured in legislation as well. The government 
could, in principle, borrow on its general credit and leak the funds at the 
same cost of capital to the private party, which would ensure a fair 
competitive setting, which is shown by arrow (5) in the figure above. 
5.4 Further Illustration of the Implications of Public Finance 
5.4.1 Description of Approach 
This conclusion is an inevitable, logical result from the analysis taken, 
when the concept of opportunity cost is factored into the analysis. 
However, to illustrate the rationale of the result further, it is possible to 
explore the implications of a counter-assumption. In other words, let us 
assume for a while that the practice is economically sound and a good 
basis for public policy. 
To make this point absolutely clear, it is helpful to use an extreme example 
of financing all economic activity on a general government rating. In other 
words, to study the implications of extending the same practice from an 
arbitrary infrastructure project to all projects concerned with economic 
activity. This is a hypothetical, but similarly practically appealing 
opportunity, because, in essence, a government could be tempted to 
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stimulate investment and total production leading to increased welfare by 
providing all domestic businesses with low cost capital. 
5.4.2 Consequences of the Unconsidered Implicit Costs of Public Finance 
The appeal is that the government could borrow on its excellent credit 
rating and subsequently leak these funds at the same cost of capital to all 
private firms. However, should this occur, the international financial 
markets would eventually realize the actual risk inherent in the 
governments deteriorating loan portfolio, which would obviously include 
some very risky ventures (stimulated, partly, by cheap capital), lower the 
general credit rating of the nation as a consequence, and thereby correct 
the pricing of capital inevitably. Thus, by the logic of induction, because 
the practice is undesirable if extended indefinitely, it follows that the 
practice must be undesirable for a singular case too. Where alternatives 
are available, a government should not arbitrarily subsidize some 
economic parties by allocating funds at a lower cost than is fair within the 
framework of capital markets: The cost of capital must reflect the actual 
risk involved. 
Of course a single infrastructure investment is insignificant on a national 
scale and thus has little effect on the general rating of a nation and cost of 
borrowing. However, despite the practical appeal, the main theoretical 
problem remains plain: by financing projects on a general credit rating, a 
government may distort the cost of capital used to finance individual 
ventures, promote unfair competition, and taken to extreme would 
eventually result in an average (higher) pricing of loans through the 
mechanism of credit rating within the international financial markets. As 
already noted, economic theory does insist that it is beneficial for the 
government to intervene and ensure certain economic activity, but in 
comparing alternative arrangements to organize this activity, a public or 
any other alternative should not be favored by supplying it at an unfair 
price of capital.   
From the perspective of a private PPP candidate the government 
effectively favors a public party by supplying it with unnaturally cheap 
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capital, which in the case of a capital-intensive infrastructure project is a 
decisive competitive advantage, and in fact equal to the government’s 
opportunity cost. By confusing its role as a social planner and a producer 
unit, the government distorts the functioning of markets. A public option 
may not be economically the most low-cost alternative, but it is 
nevertheless chosen when low-cost capital offsets higher production costs.  
The practice however practically appealing is simply not economically 
sound. The reliance on the government’s excellent credit rating and 
funding of infrastructure does not deliver a free lunch. To finalize the 
argumentation, let us once more illustrate this idea, this time with a 
slightly different representation (Figure 22).  
A government is tempted to think that it can benefit a domestic economy 
by borrowing funds from the international financial markets (1), leaking 
these resources to a producer (2), who invests these in a venture (5), which 
in this case is an infrastructure project.  
Government
Ventures
I
Producers
(3)
(5)
(1)
International Financial Markets
rf
D
rd
D
I
rp
(4)
Domestic Economy
Drf(2)
 
Figure 22 Summary of paths available to finance the production of 
infrastructure  
The appeal is that a domestic economy saves on debt service costs, 
because it needs to return only an interest of rf on the debt capital the 
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government raises, where as it should return a higher rd on the debt capital 
that a private producer would raise (4). The glitch, however, is that the 
government could produce the exact same outcome by borrowing (1) and 
subsequently investing (3) the funds in the international financial markets. 
The domestic economy would in this case make an investment profit that 
offset precisely the higher costs of debt service that a private financing 
alternative incurs. The domestic economy does not benefit from financing 
tricks – the economy relies on fundamental production efficiencies.    
5.4.3 Equitable Comparison of Public and Private Suppliers 
The government’s low default risk and low-cost capital is grounded in 
government ability to raise taxes. Assuming a public producer is less 
efficient than a private alternative, higher production costs are paid out of 
taxes and if risks materialize, additional tax funds are routed into the 
project to cover the resulting costs. In a PPP, the expected costs of risk are 
captured in the cost of capital, and the expected economic performance is 
captured in B and C projections.  
Traditional
Procurement
PPP
General Credit
Budget Finance
Asset Based
Project Finance
Public Supplier Private Supplier
(1) (2)
 
Figure 23 Level evaluation of public and private supply alternatives 
To evaluate a public and private led production on a level, fair basis, the 
government should, itself, finance on a project basis (1), or allow the 
private party access to the low-cost funds available on the government’s 
credit rating (2). The figure above (Figure 23) illustrates this idea. 
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Although this practice would make the alternatives fairly comparable in 
production cost terms, it would still not account for transaction costs – 
most importantly the contractual hazards that arise from information 
asymmetry between the government and suppliers, but also the contractual 
inefficiencies that may be prevalent in government agencies. 
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6 COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIP  
PPP is a relatively novel means of organizing economic activity and 
stands in rather stark contrast to traditional paths of public procurement. 
Consequently, PPP is subject to significant on-going debate in Finland 
and elsewhere in Europe. Although the comparative efficiency of PPP can 
ultimately be answered only through empirical studies, a number of 
arguments against PPP have been developed, based on hypothetical 
calculations. Because hypothetical calculations employ multiple 
assumptions, which are not necessarily accurate, a theoretically well-
founded study is warranted to inquire into the underlying economics of the 
phenomenon to develop clarity and in-depth understanding of PPP, and to 
provide a strong foundation with which to evaluate the validity of 
hypothetical calculations and guide empirical research in the future.   The 
first section of the chapter reviews the logic of comparative evaluation of 
different alternatives to organize the production of infrastructure goods. 
The second section derives four propositions on the comparative costs of 
PPP versus traditional paths of public procurement. The third section 
takes these propositions as given and presents two more propositions on 
the implications regarding the efficiency and equitability of PPP.    
6.1 Logic of Comparative Evaluation 
The PPP scheme is best understood and evaluated in comparative terms, in 
other words as a distinct alternative among other available opportunities. 
As Williamson has noted in more general terms within the framework of 
transaction cost economics, there is no universally optimal mode of 
organizing economic activity.134  The challenge is to select the cost-
minimizing arrangement from multiple alternatives for any particular 
activity, in this case, the delivery of transport infrastructure assets and 
services. Since we already know that the cost of capital is not a valid basis 
for choosing between alternative procurement paths, we can focus the 
                                            
134 See e.g. Williamson 1991 
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analysis on the underlying production and transaction cost economics of 
the available alternative approaches.  
To start off, we should keep in mind that we are concerned with evaluating 
two polar paths of action that can be followed to produce transport 
infrastructure, which is best characterized as a common capital experience 
good. From the inquiry into PPP and comparable traditional public 
procurement, we have already characterized two paths, representing 
traditional procurement and PPP, on basis of certain key dimensions 
(Table 3). We will next evaluate the two on the basis of the costs of 
production and transaction that result from following either course of 
action.  
The analysis of the differences in private (production) costs and 
transaction costs between alternative courses of action, translates to a 
theoretically valid analysis of relative efficiency, which is a key concern 
that has emerged in PPP literature. The concern is whether it makes sense 
to organize the production of infrastructure assets and services through a 
PPP, taking into account both the costs of inputs as well as all the costs 
beyond the price paid inputs – the transaction costs. In other words, can 
PPP produce the same societal benefits that a transport infrastructure 
generates at a lower productive and contractual cost than the traditional 
approach?  
With the model of PPP in mind and a representation of the traditional 
approach, we may begin to inquire into possible causes of differences in 
the terms C, i.e. private (production) costs,135 as well as the transaction 
costs of enacting the whole production scheme in either alternative 
approach. To review, the private costs refer to operating the facility and 
exclude any negative externalities such as pollution, and the transaction 
costs refer to all other costs beyond these. 
                                            
135 Moreover, the study of any factor related to positive externalities B, could in fact be formulated as 
a study on the differences in cost, given a higher or lower level of societal benefits B*. In other 
words, study differences in C, holding B* = B + ∆B constant. 
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Ultimately, differences in these costs can be quantified only through 
empirical research, but it is beyond the scope of this study to subject these 
concerns to empirical analysis. Nevertheless, given the relatively recent 
introduction of PPP schemes and their evident complexity, there is not as 
yet a disciplined inquiry into the subject, which motivates the formulation 
tentative propositions on the relative efficiency of PPP – it seems further 
research could benefit from a set of disciplined propositions to direct 
further studies.  
In order to make a valid comparison, it is also important to also keep in 
mind that in the traditional procurement approach, any given infrastructure 
asset and services are produced by a composite of multiple smaller works 
and services projects, in both physical and temporal scope. Therefore, we 
are not comparing PPP with some arbitrary, minor, works or services 
project; instead, we hold the production of some major transport 
infrastructure constant and view the two paths as two distinct alternatives 
to implementing that good.  
Let us denote the traditional path as Design-Bid-Build (DBB), which refers 
to a typical scheme, where the government procures design or planning 
separate from implementation, which is subsequently awarded through 
competitive price bidding to the lowest bidder.  The comparable DBB 
scheme approach thus involves multiple smaller projects and recurrent 
contracting over the life of a major, long-term infrastructure facility. 
6.2 Propositions on the Comparative Costs of PPP 
6.2.1 Production Costs 
Physical Scale and Scope 
First, we know from the technological view of the firm that the enlarged 
physical scale that is associated with the integrated nature of PPP may 
provide opportunities for technological synergies, which contribute to 
lower total costs. Technological synergies are achieved by a decrease in 
the production cost of a single unit of output (economies of scale) in a 
single product firm, or a decrease in the production cost of a single unit of 
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output in a multi-product firm (economies of scope). In both cases 
technological synergies result in a lower total cost, and the concept is 
captured in the concept of subadditivity, which encourages gathering 
separate activities within a firm, i.e. integrating separate economic 
activities. 
In contrast to traditional, fragmented procurement, PPPs involve a single 
point of responsibility for all the functions and facilities that are necessary 
to constitute an economically independent, viable operating entity. Almost 
by definition, a PPP project must be broad enough in physical scope to be 
able to cover the fixed costs of establishing and running a separate capital 
asset. Integration of physical and functional responsibilities can lead to 
significant improvements in economies of scale and scope contributing to 
lower costs and thereby increased productivity. For a project of any given 
physical scale and scope, PPP allows better opportunities to exploit 
technological synergies, because the traditional approach breaks the end 
deliverable into a number of sub-projects. This recognition allows us to 
formulate the first proposition: 
Proposition 1: The comparative unit production costs of PPP are 
negatively related to the physical scale and scope of the project 
In both schemes, unit production costs, in absolute terms, are negatively 
related to the physical scale and scope of the project. However, the 
proposition states that the unit production costs of a PPP scheme fall by a 
greater absolute amount as the project size increases. If we were to study a 
unit cost differential, defined by the production costs of PPP minus the 
production costs of the traditional path of procurement, as a function of the 
project size, the differential would plot a strictly decreasing line. In other 
words, the cost advantage of PPP would increase in the increasing 
direction of project size. 
First, the fixed construction site costs would be reduced as a result of 
avoiding duplicate machinery, site accommodation and related services. 
Second, it is also possible that a private-sector party could be able to 
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reduce organizational bureaucracy and associated overhead costs. Third, 
resulting from a broader object of delivery and associated higher material 
needs, the supplier would enjoy higher bargaining power leading to unit 
material cost savings. Fourth, the integration of design, engineering, 
construction and operation responsibilities could allow for economies of 
scope, reducing e.g. lifecycle capital expenditure.  
Construction industry wide failures to achieve substantial increases in 
productivity have often been attributed precisely to shortcomings in 
dealing with the fragmented structure of the industry. Project business 
literature views the integration of traditionally fragmented activities into 
broader packages advantageous. Similarly, empirical evidence to date 
suggests that PPP is appropriate where there are major capital projects with 
significant ongoing maintenance requirements. 
Moreover, other mature utilities industries such as oil and electricity that 
are characterized by a low pace of technological development involve 
highly consolidated producers. Even more technologically advanced 
markets, such as the telecom infrastructure, are typically served by very 
large players. In contrast, the road infrastructure market is surprisingly 
fragmented, but understandable with reference to segmented government 
procurement practices. In any case, comparing the road infrastructure 
market to markets with similar characteristics, suggests that the market 
exhibits opportunities for technological synergies and therefore it is 
reasonable to assume that a trend towards more integrated projects will 
continue. 
Temporal Duration 
We also know from the complete contracting view of the firm that a long-
run relationship may provide opportunities for idiosyncratic investment in 
dedicated capital, and consequently, cost savings. PPP concessions involve 
a single, long-term point of responsibility to design, engineer, construct 
and operate all the functions and facilities of a major project. A PPP 
project must operate temporally long enough to be capable of standing 
alone as an economically independent unit in a going concern and 
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returning the capital to investors. This long-run nature of PPP seems ideal 
to induce investment in specialized capital to yield surplus gains.  
In the traditional approach, a supplier has almost no possibility, let alone 
incentive, to make project-specific investments in specialized capital. Any 
bid that would incorporate such specialized investments would seriously 
risk losing the project. Thus, for a project of any given physical scale and 
scope, PPP allows better opportunities to invest in specialized capital, 
because the traditional approach employs short-term works and services 
contracts, which allows us to formulate the second proposition: 
Proposition 2: The comparative unit production costs of PPP are 
negatively related to the temporal duration of the project  
Again, the proposition states that the total production costs of a PPP 
scheme fall by a greater absolute amount as the temporal duration of the 
project increases. If we were to study the cost differential, defined by the 
production costs of PPP minus the production costs of the traditional path 
of procurement, as a function of the temporal duration, the differential 
would plot a strictly decreasing line. In other words, the cost advantage of 
PPP would increase in the increasing direction of project duration. 
This argument can be backed by a number of considerations. First, because 
the project company will bear the costs of operating the asset for a long-
run it is motivated to make front-end investment in high-quality design, 
engineering, equipment and materials. Second, as an example of 
investment in human capital, a PPP makes is possible to hire professional 
management to run a separable company and allow them to specialize in 
managing the asset.  Management’s relative abilities typically differ across 
businesses and a separable project company can have the benefit of 
managerial specialization, compared to management managing a portfolio 
of assets. Third, employees, who are assigned to operating the asset, may 
increase their efficiency through learning by doing during a longer time 
horizon.    
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Figure 24 Illustration of the comparative production costs of the 
alternatives 
The joint effect of these propositions is schematically illustrated in the 
figure (Figure 
24
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Figure 24) above. The logic of the figure is to signify the increasing 
physical scale and scope, as well as the increasing temporal duration on the 
horizontal axis. Physical scale and scope is captured in a euro value proxy 
of a project and temporal duration is represented in years.  
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The vertical axis represents unit production costs UPC, i.e. the total of 
variable and fixed costs per one transportation passage along a highway 
route (UPC  = c + F / q) . The two solid lines falling to the right represent 
the unit costs associated with either DBB or PPP at different project sizes 
and durations. The basic idea is that a significant increase in the project 
size and duration (from €1-2m and 1-2 years to €100-1000m and 20-50 
years) denoted by arrow (1); decreases unit and fixed production costs by a 
greater amount when arranged through a PPP scheme (2), than when 
arranged through traditional procurement practices (3).  
6.2.2 Transaction Costs 
It seems there are, indeed, better opportunities to exploit economies of 
scale and scope as well as to invest in specialized capital that yield long-
run cost savings in PPP. However, the main point predicted by the theory 
of industrial organization is that these cost savings are inevitably offset to 
some extent by an increase in the transaction costs associated with writing 
contracts under progressively more difficult circumstances, i.e. with more 
sizeable projects and longer-run contracts.  
Another problem with sizeable projects and long-run contracts is also that 
due to cognitive constraints and unforeseeable events, it may be impossible 
or highly costly to design contracts that account for all contingencies.136 
However, for the purpose of maintaining clarity and simplifying the 
analysis, let us hold complexity and uncertainty constant. That is, we will 
not explore the implications of increasing complexity and uncertainty to 
neither the traditional approach nor PPP. Nonetheless, the basic point is 
that increasing the scope of physical and temporal responsibilities are 
likely to result in production cost advantages, but an increase in 
complexity and uncertainty yields only additional transaction costs.    
In principle, an increase in the transaction costs associated with a more 
sizeable and longer project is unavoidable. However, the common motive 
                                            
136 As the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition calls for. 
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of minimizing costs still applies, and there are alternative contracting paths 
that can be followed to minimize transaction costs under progressively 
more difficult circumstances. Foremost, the costs of contracting can be 
broken down into components. The costs of crafting more detailed 
contracts have to be weighed against the possibility and costs of inducing 
the same effort by incentives, or the costs implied by employing arbitration 
mechanisms to complement incomplete contracts. Nevertheless, the point 
is that an efficient contractual relationship minimizes transaction costs.  
As the project size and duration increase, it seems that a PPP concession 
makes proper use of the transaction cost minimizing contractual 
mechanisms advocated by theory; whereas the contractual mechanisms of 
the traditional approach seem inappropriate. In a long-run setting that 
exploits specialized capital and where contracts are complete, efficiency in 
contracting is achieved through monitoring to reduce information 
asymmetries; or incentives to induce desirable effort when monitoring is 
costly or impossible. In a dynamic setting, where contracts are incomplete, 
even monitoring and incentives cannot sustain efficiency, and arbitration 
mechanisms for adapting the agreement as conditions change must be used 
along with reliance on monitoring and incentives. A PPP concession is 
incomplete, signed for the long-run, and makes heavy use of positive 
incentives, and dedicated arbitration mechanisms to augment contract 
monitoring.  These ideas allow us to formulate another specific 
proposition, drawn directly from the theory of industrial organization: 
Proposition 3: The comparative transaction costs of PPP are 
negatively related to the physical scale and scope, and the temporal 
duration of the project 
Again, the proposition states that the total transaction costs of a PPP 
scheme fall by a greater absolute amount as the physical scale and scope, 
and the temporal duration of the project increases. The critical difference 
in contrast to the propositions regarding production costs – which are 
always lower, in absolute terms, given any project size and duration – is 
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that under rather simple contracting circumstances, the traditional path of 
procurement results in lower transaction costs, in absolute terms.  
This is a reasonable assertion, because the traditional approach favors 
segmented works and services and short-term responsibilities, where the 
object of delivery is easier to specify, the simple practice of competitive 
sealed bidding can be used, monitoring is presumably easier, and 
unforeseeable contingencies leading to costly disputes are less likely. On 
the other hand, in a PPP setting, even under rather simple contracting 
circumstances, the government and the supplier(s) always first engage in 
costly bargaining; and second, in costly drafting, monitoring, enforcing 
and even adapting of rather long and detailed contracts that ensure their 
vested interests are protected. This means that the transaction costs of a 
PPP scheme are higher, in absolute terms, under rather simple contracting 
circumstances associated with a small and short-term project.  
Physical scale and
scope; temporal 
duration of the project
Transaction
Costs
€0.1-1bn
20-50 yrs.
€1-2m
1-2 years
(2)
(3)
(1)
Transaction costs 
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Transaction costs 
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Figure 25 Illustration of the comparative transaction costs of the 
alternatives 
The figure (Figure 25) above again illustrates these ideas schematically. A 
shift on the horizontal axis (1) inevitably increases transaction costs TC.  
However, the contractual mechanisms associated with a PPP concession 
result in a smaller increase (2), than the ones associated with the traditional 
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path of procurement (3). However, the curve representing the transaction 
costs of the traditional approach starts off at a lower level, and at some 
point the paths are equal from a transaction cost perspective. The 
justifications for these views are elaborated in more detail in what follows. 
Monitoring Mechanisms 
First, with regard to specifications, PPP does not seek contract precision 
from the outset, so as to save on contracting costs and provide flexibility 
over the life of the project.. The procurement of infrastructure assets and 
services through competitive sealed bidding is problematic, when projects 
are very large in physical scale, long in temporal duration, and when all 
future contingencies are impossible or too costly to specify. In particular 
when uncertainties remain on technical options to be retained, it may be 
undesirable or impractical to prepare complete technical specifications in 
advance. A client may not know the best specifications in the first place, 
let alone the best options that become available over time. PPP therefore 
starts out with general output specifications and with incomplete contracts, 
which promote dynamic adjustment in the contract over time.  
Another important condition is that the existence of a stand-alone 
economic unit and its exposure to the discipline of capital markets 
contributes to proper monitoring. The exposure to the discipline of capital 
markets ensures that PPP projects are properly planned and evaluated in 
advance, and monitored continuously during construction and operation. 
Before delivery, lenders impose strict due diligence requirements, 
appointing, for example, technical consultants to ensure all cost 
calculations are robust, and market consultants to ensure that revenue 
forecasts are realistic, etc. contributing to proper specification. During 
delivery, lenders within will also require regular information updates 
which helps identify and prevent potential problems. Finally, management 
will be under continuous assessment, and under-performing management 
is likely to be identified and replaced.  
With regard to the traditional path of procurement, the associated 
competitive bidding protocol, and resulting lump-sum and cost-plus 
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contract types assume that the contractor’s efforts are specifiable, 
observable and verifiable by the government. Under these conditions, the 
government could in principle choose the desirable level of effort and 
impose it on the contractor, with the threat of the large punishment if the 
contractor shirks.  
However, it is well documented that projects in practice involve recurrent 
negotiation to accommodate variation orders suggesting that effort is not 
easily specifiable in advance. Second, clients are typically intimately 
involved in the progress of the project, suggesting that substantially costly 
monitoring takes place. Third, projects often lead to costly disputes, 
suggesting that performance is not easily verifiable in front of court. 
Finally, quality problems are frequent, suggesting that either specification 
or observation is difficult. 
The basic problem is that in reality the production of infrastructure goods 
is concerned with experience goods, which exhibit durable information 
asymmetry. In other words, it is typically very difficult for the government 
to specify, monitor and verify even works and services contracts, i.e. to 
determine and assess the contractor’s actual efforts. Whether or not the 
contractor’s efforts conform to the specifications of the government can 
typically be determined only after a significant time, typically outside of 
the warranty period. This means that fixed wage compensation 
mechanisms are bound to result in efficient contractual relationships.  
Incentive Mechanisms 
With a stand-alone economic unit it also is possible to design 
compensation schemes that align more closely the objectives of the firm’s 
client, professional managers and its investors. When managers have a 
direct share in the profits of a project, they can be strongly motivated to 
make decisions that enhance its profitability, either by lowering costs, or 
improving revenues. These profit sharing incentives can take e.g. the form 
of bonuses that were discussed in the section on agency theory.  
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The typical PPP payment structure, based on output specifications and 
usage, contributes to aligning the interests of the lenders, the management, 
the project company and the public sector. Debt and equity returns can 
only be guaranteed if the project operates satisfactorily, i.e. the client 
receives benefits, pays for the service, generates revenues for the sponsor, 
and allows service of debt and returns on equity. This contributes to 
addressing the divergent, if not confrontational agendas of the multiple 
participants, which are often seen as the root cause the construction 
industry’s traditional, major problems such as costly disputes. Moreover, 
higher managerial incentives can contribute to early completion and 
thereby higher usage and availability. 
During operation, yardstick competition allows comparing the 
performance of PPP management with other managers in similar situations 
and filtering out effects of random factors, such as changes in demand or 
costs of inputs. The shareholders may oversee, for example, two similar 
PPP projects that serve markets with correlated demands or costs. The 
possibility of being caught underperforming, incentivises management to 
exert higher effort, which is not as likely in the public sector. 
Moreover, firms in a competitive environment are more hard-pressed to 
reduce costs and end up being more efficient. For example government 
units, which are financed on a budget-basis, typically have no incentive to 
improve efficiency if there costs are simply covered out of tax-payers’ 
contributions. The shareholders of a competitive PPP firm can base 
managerial rewards on the competitor’s profits, which would not be 
possible if there are no competitive references.  
The traditional approach makes no use of variable compensation schemes. 
Therefore, we should be critical about the efficiency of the contractual 
mechanisms associated with traditional procurement even under simple 
circumstances. Even if transaction costs are lower, in absolute terms, due 
to simpler contracts, the traditional path of procurement may not minimize 
transaction costs, i.e. make proper use of contractual mechanisms. 
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Efficiency should be ensured, most importantly, by inducing effort through 
long-run incentives, when information asymmetry prevails for a long time.  
Moreover, in contractual relationships that employ sanctions, even though 
the contractor risks being punished, the probability of being caught 
shirking is so low that it can be very appealing to avoid the costs, which 
accompany exerting high effort. Moreover, a contract procured through 
competitive bidding that is especially unfair to the contractor may also in 
practice be related to the efficiency of the project: A contractor may feel 
uncommitted to an inequitable contract, which, as a consequence, may turn 
out indurable, leading to costly disputes, i.e. inefficiencies.   
Adaptation Mechanisms 
The approach in PPP promotes a new balance in the contractual effort over 
time. It seems to be advantageous not to seek precision at all costs from the 
outset, so as to save on contracting costs and provide flexibility over the 
life of the project. 137 In the preparatory phase, it is not advised to advance 
the design studies too far before selecting the supplier, since the 
preliminary design may be quickly superseded and will, in any event, 
overlap with the chosen supplier’s input. 
When long-term contracts cannot forecast all project parameters with 
accuracy, contracts must stipulate arbitration or discussion clauses to 
handle situations in which the PPP’s initial hypotheses prove invalid. 
Every potential scenario cannot be anticipated ahead of time; however, 
invalid contracts and consequent revisions should not be viewed as project 
crises. This point is a critical one as contractual adaptation has often been 
perceived as a failure, as an attempt by the firm to realign the contract to 
its advantage. Under incomplete contracting, contractual adaptation is 
nothing more than a normal adjustment mechanism for coping with 
changes in the initial conditions. Nevertheless, the establishment and use 
of arbitration mechanisms incurs costs. 
                                            
137 Henry 1997 
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The traditional path of procurement favors segmented works and services 
and short-term responsibilities, which basically result in lower transaction 
costs, in absolute terms, because the object of delivery is easier to specify, 
the simple practice of competitive sealed bidding can be used, monitoring 
is presumably easier, and unforeseeable contingencies leading to costly 
disputes are less likely. We should, however, be critical about the 
efficiency of the contractual mechanisms associated with traditional 
procurement. Even if transaction costs are lower due to simpler contracts, 
the traditional path of procurement may not minimize transaction costs, i.e. 
make proper use of contractual mechanisms. 
6.3 Efficiency and Equitability Implications of the Propositions 
6.3.1 Efficiency 
PPP, from a total social welfare perspective is efficient, when the benefits 
gained from technological synergies related to a more sizeable project 
deliverable as well as the opportunities to invest in dedicated, specialized 
capital and the consequent long-run yields offset the higher costs of 
contracting. The figure (Figure 26) below illustrates the basic line of this 
thought by combining the two earlier figures in one representation. The 
idea is that the most important distinction between PPP and the traditional 
procurement path is a significant increase in the scale and scope of 
responsibilities conferred to the supplier, as well as the duration of these 
responsibilities, denoted by the arrow (1) on the horizontal axis.138 The 
vertical axis, in turn, represents the unit production costs (UPC = c + F / 
q) and transaction costs TC. 
                                            
138 The axis thus represents the two axis of the earlier figure (Figure 13) folded on their diagonal. 
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Figure 26 Illustration of the unit production and transaction cost 
implications of increasing the physical scale and scope, as well as the 
temporal duration of the project 
The solid lines that fall in the increasing direction of the horizontal axis 
signify the decreases in unit production costs associated with either the 
traditional approach or PPP. The dashed lines that rise in the increasing 
direction of the horizontal axis represent the increases in transaction costs 
associated with either the traditional contracting practices or the PPP 
concession. The proposition thus states that under certain circumstances 
the reduction in production costs is, indeed, greater than the associated 
increase in transaction costs, which means that PPP is comparatively 
efficient. In other words, a significant shift in the size and duration of the 
project (1) decreases production costs (2) by a magnitude greater than it 
increases the transaction costs (3). This allows us to formulate the next 
proposition: 
Proposition 4: There exists a point in the increasing direction of the 
size and duration of a project at which PPP becomes comparatively 
efficient 
The figure (Figure 27) below illustrates the proposition, by showing the 
total T of unit production costs and transaction costs (T = UPC + TC = c 
 
135 
+ F / q + TC) associated with the traditional approach and PPP, as a 
function of the project size and duration.  
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Figure 27 Illustration of the total comparative costs of traditional 
procurement and PPP 
The dashed vertical line signifies a hypothetical point p, at which the PPP 
scheme becomes comparatively efficient. Because the PPP curve falls 
below traditional one, the figure also attests that due to the opportunities to 
exploit technological synergies and invest in specialized capital, it would, 
indeed be beneficial to increase the physical scale and scope as well as the 
duration of project contracts, as long as appropriate transaction cost 
minimizing contractual mechanisms are put in place. Nonetheless, the 
logic does not carry on forever: at some point the transaction related and 
organizational complexities of managing an utterly large and long project 
become disadvantageous.   
This argument is supported by a substantial increase in PPP activity, as 
well as a growing body of world-wide empirical evidence, which suggests 
that with sizeable projects where there are significant on-going 
maintenance requirements, the private sector can offer project management 
skills resulting in a greater proportion of assets being delivered on time 
and to budget, and more innovative design and risk management expertise 
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to provide better value for money, and to meet the needs and wants of the 
client better than the traditional models of procurement. 
6.3.2 Equitability 
Let us next assume that the previous proposition is correct and that we are 
beyond point p, in the increasing direction of the horizontal axis, meaning 
that due to cost advantages PPP results in a higher net surplus than the 
traditional path of procurement. In other words, there is a larger cake to be 
shared. From an efficiency perspective it is irrelevant how the resulting 
surplus is distributed. In practice, on the other hand, the parties to a trade 
are likely to be more concerned with their own welfare instead of total 
welfare – which brings us to equitability considerations.  
The figure (Figure 28) below illustrates the higher surplus associated with 
PPP with an alternative representation. The logic of the figure is to show in 
the middle the total societal benefits that an infrastructure project of a 
given size and duration (beyond point p) generates during its whole 
lifecycle, and illustrate the total production costs, total transaction costs 
and resulting net surplus that organizing the production of the 
infrastructure asset and services throughout the lifecycle either by PPP 
(left side) or a traditional scheme (right side) involves. Assuming that the 
previous proposition is correct, we can next focus on the implications to 
equitability. 
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Figure 28 Illustration of the trade-offs between PPP and traditional 
procurement predicted by the theory of industrial organization 
In brief, economic theory also predicts that the competitive-negotiated 
procedure, the profit sharing mechanism and contract adaptation 
mechanisms associated with PPP do not allow the government to capture 
as large a share of the net surplus. In other words, the government captures 
a smaller share of a larger cake, and the supplier captures a larger share 
of a larger cake. 
Proposition 5: Government captures a comparatively smaller share 
of the higher surplus associated with PPP 
The figure (Figure 29) below illustrates this proposition in turn. The 
justification for the proposition is two-fold. First, at the time of 
contracting, the competitive tension of a partly negotiated procedure is 
lower than in the pure auction mechanism used in traditional procurement, 
and therefore the government is unable to “push” the outcome to the 
proximity of the horizontal axis. Second, in the long run, the government 
induces the contractor to exert higher effort by sharing some of the societal 
externalities created with the contractor through a variable wage structure, 
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which essentially means that the supplier captures even more of the surplus 
associated with the project. 
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Figure 29 Illustration of the equitability considerations of PPP predicted 
by economic theory 
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7 RESULTS 
In this chapter the results of the study are presented. The chapter consists 
of three parts, of which the first focuses on a description of PPP, the 
second on the differences in public and private cost of capital, and the 
third on the propositions on the comparative efficiency of Public-Private 
Partnership relative to the traditional path of procurement.  
7.1 Description of Public-Private Partnership 
Ultimately, the theories of industrial organization and investment provided 
a conceptual framework for describing PPP in the study, but the 
phenomenon was first addressed as a form of project business; second, in 
view of the discipline of project finance; third, based on a review of 
prevalent public procurement contracting legislation.  
First, the insights on PPP given by the literature of project business were 
reviewed. A PPP signifies the integration of traditionally fragmented 
works and services of design, building, financing and operation into more 
sizeable, broader project procurement and delivery. PPP also represents the 
development from lump-sum compensation schemes to performance based 
fees, which help align the interests of traditionally adversial parties in a 
project. PPP signifies the extension of the construction industry supplier 
responsibilities from short-term execution to longer-term operation, and a 
consequent life-cycle responsibility. Finally, PPP represents a higher 
liberty given to the project supplier to design the project, based on 
specified output criteria instead of tight, client-defined specifications. 
Moreover, empirical evidence to date suggests that PPP is appropriate 
where there are major and complex capital projects with significant 
ongoing maintenance requirements. Here the private sector can offer 
project management skills resulting in a greater proportion of assets being 
delivered on time and to budget, and more innovative design and risk 
management expertise to provide better value for money, and to meet the 
needs and wants of the client better than the traditional models of 
procurement. 
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In summary, it seems PPP arrangements, while neither possible nor 
advisable on all projects, provide a means to address the over-
fragmentation of functions that has previously led to divergent - if not 
confrontational agendas of the multiple participants. While superficially an 
extension of the design-build mode, i.e. enhanced by the addition of two 
functions of finance and operation, PPP in reality differs in terms of 
philosophy and potential benefits, spelling out a significant mind shift and 
a change in the procurement-delivery paradigm.  
Second, the lessons on PPP provided by research on project finance were 
reviewed. In light of prior theoretical study on project finance, when both 
direct and project-based financing alternatives are available, project 
financing is more cost-effective than conventional direct financing when: 
First, the benefits of a higher degree of leverage; second, the investors’ 
right to control reinvestment of the project’s free cash flow; third, the 
appropriate selection of investment opportunities; fourth, the design of less 
costly debt contracts; and fifth, an enhanced management offset the higher 
transaction costs and the risk premium that is required. 
Third, a public authority cannot arbitrarily choose how it contracts with 
suppliers; it is subject to juridical constraints, captured in procurement law, 
which involves responses to three interdependent domains of 
consideration. First, an appropriate legal framework must be set up to 
accommodate any given type of contract or selection protocol. Second, a 
public entity will be required to follow a specified contract award process 
within the legal framework. Third, a contract must be introduced to bind 
both parties as an outcome of the selection protocol, within the prevailing 
legislative framework.  
The contracts used in the traditional path of procurement conform to works 
and services contracts, whereas as a PPP is awarded through a concession 
– a temporary right to operate an asset. Although there are certain key 
variations of each contract, the key points are that the scope of 
responsibilities conferred to any particular supplier in the traditional 
approach is fragmented and the contract duration is typically 1-2 years, 
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whereas in PPP, the scope of responsibilities is integrated and the duration 
is typically 20-50 years. The supplier selection protocol employed in the 
traditional approach is a reverse auction mechanism, namely the 
competitive sealed bid, whereas a PPP concession is awarded through a 
competitive-negotiated procedure.  
Fourth, the underlying economics of transport infrastructure production 
were studied. In economic terminology, a transport infrastructure project 
involves the production of a durable capital good that creates significant 
positive externalities over a long-run period, which is why the market fails 
to provide the good, and which is also the reason it is desirable for a 
government to intervene and ensure its production, given that the total, 
social revenues (private revenue plus the value of externalities) are higher 
than the total, social costs (private costs plus the costs of externalities. In 
the PPP setting, the road users internalize the positive externalities, and the 
government prices the externalities by raising various taxes, e.g. vehicle 
and gasoline, taxes from road users. The government forwards some 
portion of the tax revenues to the supplier, so that the supplier internalizes 
some of the positive externalities it generates.  
Moreover, it seems essential to highlight that infrastructure is best 
understood as an experience good. The product characteristics such as 
quality or total price (cost) are difficult to observe in advance before 
purchase, but these characteristics become evident upon consumption of 
the good over its total lifecycle. This experiential quality seems to capture 
a fundamental problem of the construction business, where the client 
cannot, in advance easily observe or verify, sometimes let alone specify the 
characteristics of the unique product in question. The actual characteristics 
typically become evident only after a substantial time, sometimes only 
after the standard warranty period is over.   
Finally, an economic model of PPP was developed. The model shows the 
key parties, the key periodic cash flows, the uncertainty of the project 
reflected in the debt and equity cost of capital. The dynamics and 
uncertainty of the periodic cash flows in PPP were captured in the 
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analytical NPV model, as a function of the project risk level, given 
investment, revenue and cost projections NPV(r) = ∑(Ni / r ^i) – I 
Similar representations of PPP are abundant in literature, but generally 
speaking they do not provide a unified treatment of the key parties, the key 
flows of money, a dynamic time conception and uncertainty. The model 
constructed here addresses all these features and suffices to tie to a single, 
common basis the themes that have emerged in the literature on PPP, 
namely value for money (VfM) considerations, relative efficiency of the 
public and private sector and cost of capital concerns. The first two 
common themes, namely relative efficiency and value for money 
considerations relate to the terms B and C in the model. Relative efficiency 
between the traditional paths of procurement and PPP simply refers to 
differences in C, holding B constant. Similarly, value for money 
considerations between the traditional paths of procurement and PPP refer 
to the differences in the ratio of B over C. The third theme, the cost of 
capital concern refers to differences in discount rate r, holding in turn both 
B and C constant. 
With respect to the contractual relationship in PPP, the associated 
competitive-negotiated supplier selection protocol, and resulting 
performance-based contract types do not require that the contractor’s 
efforts are wholly specifiable, observable and verifiable by the 
government, and effort is primarily induced through incentives. Both the 
efficiency and equitability of a PPP concession were addressed. 
First, the compensation structure of the concession is efficient, because it 
aligns the interests of the project company and the society. The 
concessionaire has every incentive to contribute to the performance of the 
asset, because this increases its revenues, but this also improves the value 
of the service to the government. The contract represents a profit-sharing 
mechanism, which is incentive-compatible. Therefore, PPP seems to 
involve lower agency costs, because the project is acknowledged to be 
costly to monitor and effort is primarily induced through incentives. 
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However, the private company has a much higher incentive to exert effort 
on cost savings than increasing the benefits the asset delivers, because it 
gains only a fraction of the effort it gives to improving the service; 
whereas it captures all the yields from cost saving efforts – the government 
“profit” is independent of the costs. The concession ensures efficiency, but 
unless the revenue mechanism is tied to the private costs, the contract 
favors the project company, and equitability is not secured in the long-run. 
Within the limits of the model developed it also possible to infer that the 
private company assumes all production risks related to general 
macroeconomic conditions and input and prices unique to the particular 
infrastructure asset, or more accurately, the financiers of the private 
company assume the risks, which is reasonable, given that they are also 
entitled to all the surplus yields from cost savings. More risk is generally 
acceptable with a higher expected return. In the traditional path of 
procurement, taxpayers, who effectively provide the funds as well as credit 
insurance to the sovereign state, are not remunerated for the risks they 
assume. 
7.2 Cost of Private Finance Relative to Total Cost of Public Finance 
A conventional argument, typically favored by politicians, has been that a 
government should fund infrastructure development, because it can borrow 
capital at a low interest rate. However appealing the practice seems at first 
thought, it is based on an incomplete or even erroneous understanding of 
economic theory and the framework of financial markets in both theory 
and practice.  
This study showed that when a government allocates funds borrowed at a 
risk-free rate to an inherently risky venture, the government violates the 
principles of financial markets, by allocating capital at a risk-free rate to an 
inherently risky project, and incurring an opportunity cost thereby. The 
government effectively subsidizes a public producer with an amount equal 
to the implicit costs, included in the opportunity cost in addition to the 
explicit costs of debt service. 
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Most importantly, the government does not consider the implicit costs, 
which are a basic, but fundamental concept in economic theory. Given that 
the government has access to cheap capital it could have chosen to use the 
resources by investing in an efficient portfolio of assets, which provide an 
expected rate of return higher than the risk-free rate. By choosing to forego 
this opportunity, the government in fact loses a lucrative opportunity to 
make an investment profit.  
To review, opportunity cost is the value of the best alternative use of 
resources, in this case pure capital. One course of action the government 
could follow instead of investing itself in the infrastructure project is pure 
financial investment. The government, in essence, would function like any 
bank, taking in funds amounting to D, for which it pays an interest rate rf,, 
denoted by (1), and subsequently investing these resources I = D  in an 
efficient portfolio of assets that generate an expected rate of return rp > rf,. 
The government would thus be expecting revenues of R = I(rp) each year, 
debt service costs of I(rf) each year, and making an expected investment 
profit of πi = I(rp – rf) each year.  
The government, in considering functioning like a bank, should be willing 
to invest in the project if it is offered the same rate of return rd that other 
debt investors expect from this venture, considering all the risks inherent 
in the project projections. Therefore, the government should be indifferent 
between investing in some other portfolio of assets and investing in the 
project, if rp = rd.139 This is essentially equal to the government investing 
in the project at a fair cost of capital. And the periodic opportunity cost of 
investing itself in the project, and not in a portfolio of assets, is equal to 
the revenue foregone, OC = I(rd). Moreover, the total OC over the life of 
the project is the cumulative total of periodic opportunity costs I(rd)^T. 
The government, by investing itself in the project, thus foregoes the 
opportunity of receiving revenues of I(rd). Its periodic explicit debt service 
costs are, given an excellent credit rating, still defined by the risk-free rate 
                                            
139 The rate rd is essentially also the rate at which the private supplier can raise capital. 
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rf  of borrowing, and amount to only I(rf). However, the opportunity cost 
calculated includes both the explicit and implicit costs, and therefore the 
periodic implicit costs of investing in the infrastructure project are defined 
by I(rd) – I(rf) = I(rd – rf), where rd  > rf,, because the project is inherently 
risky. The total implicit costs of the government investing in the project are 
thus defined by I(rd – rf)^T, and are essentially equal to the customary 
conception of differences in private and public sector cost of capital. 
These implicit, economic costs are typically ignored in PPP 
analysis, and explain – moreover quantifies – the apparent, but 
erroneous cheapness of sovereign funding. 
What happens from the perspective of the private party is that the 
government intervenes in the construction market and favors the public 
party by supplying it with unnaturally cheap capital, which in the case of a 
capital-intensive infrastructure project represents a key production factor 
and a decisive competitive advantage, and equal to the government’s 
implicit costs, I(rd – rf)^T. This is nothing else than a form of subvention, 
which, in fact, is prohibited by competitive legislation.  
Economic theory attests that it is beneficial for a social planner, i.e. the 
government, to ensure that certain public goods such as highways are 
provided, but economic theory also promotes fair competition and that for 
any given purpose the most efficient means are chosen. There is no reason 
why a government should favor a public party over a private party when 
alternatives are available, and the government is effectively violating 
sound economic principles captured in legislation as well. The government 
could, in principle, borrow on its general credit and leak the funds at the 
same cost of capital to the private party, which would ensure a fair 
competitive setting.  
To illustrate the rationale of the result further, the implications of a 
counter-assumption were explored. More specifically, an extreme example 
of financing all economic activity on a general government rating was 
used. Should this occur, the international financial markets would 
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eventually realize the actual risk inherent in the governments deteriorating 
loan portfolio, which would obviously include some very risky ventures 
(stimulated, partly, by cheap capital), lower the general credit rating of the 
nation as a consequence, and thereby correct the pricing of capital 
inevitably. Thus, by the logic of induction, because the practice is 
undesirable if extended indefinitely, it follows that the practice must be 
undesirable for a singular case too.  
By confusing its role as a social planner and a producer unit, the 
government distorts the functioning of markets. A public option may not 
be economically the most low-cost alternative, but it is nevertheless chosen 
when low-cost capital offsets higher production costs. A government 
cannot, by borrowing and investing itself in the project benefit the 
domestic economy, because it could achieve the same effect by adopting 
the role of a pure investor and letting the project company raise funds at a 
fair cost of capital. Therefore, to evaluate a public and private led 
production on a level fair basis, the government should, itself, finance on a 
project basis, or allow the private party access to the low-cost funds 
available on the government’s credit rating. However, even this approach 
would fail to account for differences in transaction costs between a PPP 
and a traditional government led approach. 
7.3 Comparative Economic Efficiency of Public-Private Partnership 
Since the cost of capital is not a valid criterion for evaluating the 
traditional, government funded paths of procurement and the privately 
funded PPP, the analysis focused on the underlying production and 
transaction cost economics of the two alternative approaches in the 
organization of the production of infrastructure goods.  
The analysis omitted costs of externalities to focus on the differences 
between private (production) and transaction costs. The analysis of private 
and transaction costs corresponds to the key theme of relative efficiency 
that has emerged in the literature on PPPs. The concern is whether it 
makes sense to organize the production of infrastructure assets and service 
through a PPP. In other words, whether or not a PPP can produce the same 
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societal benefits at a lower cost relative to the traditional approach? 
Ultimately, this question can be answered only through empirical research; 
but the study addressed the question based on a theoretically well-founded 
framework and logical reasoning, and produced explanatory propositions 
in result.  
The study focused on the implications of increasing the physical scale and 
scope as well as the temporal duration of transport infrastructure projects. 
It seems there are better opportunities to exploit economies of scale and 
scope as well as to invest in specialized capital that yield long-run cost 
savings in PPP. However, the main point predicted by the theory of 
industrial organization is that these cost savings are inevitably offset to 
some extent by an increase in the transaction costs associated with writing 
contracts under progressively more difficult circumstances, i.e. with more 
sizeable projects and longer-run contracts. Another problem with sizeable 
projects and long-run contracts is also that due to cognitive constraints and 
unforeseeable events, it may be impossible or highly costly to design 
contracts that account for all contingencies. However, for the purpose of 
maintaining clarity and simplifying the analysis, complexity and 
uncertainty were held constant. The table (Table 4) below summarizes the 
propositions and the key justifications for each proposition: 
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Table 4 Summary of the propositions on the comparative economic 
efficiency of PPP predicted by theory 
Proposition Justification 
The comparative unit production costs of 
PPP are negatively related to the physical 
scale and scope of the project 
PPP reduces comparative unit production 
costs due to higher economies of scale and 
scope associated with a more sizeable 
deliverable 
The comparative unit production costs of 
PPP are negatively related to the temporal 
duration of the project 
PPP reduces comparative unit production 
costs due to higher (front-end) potential to 
invest in specialized physical and human 
capital 
The comparative transaction costs of PPP 
are negatively related to the physical scale 
and scope,  and the temporal duration  of 
the project 
PPP makes proper use of incomplete 
contracts, positive incentive and dedicated 
neutral arbitration mechanisms under 
persistent information asymmetry; whereas 
the traditional paths of contracting fail to 
account for  the persistent information 
asymmetry related to infrastructure goods 
There exists a point in the increasing 
direction of the size and duration of a project 
at which PPP becomes comparatively 
efficient 
The benefits of a reduction in unit production 
costs of PPP outweigh the associated 
increase in transaction costs, which is an 
assertion also supported by empirical 
evidence 
Government captures a comparatively 
smaller share of the higher surplus 
associated with a PPP scheme 
PPP is associated with the dynamics of a 
competitive-negotiated procedure and the 
use of variable, profit-sharing compensation  
Nonetheless, the point is that, in principle, an increase in the transaction 
costs associated with a more sizeable and longer project is unavoidable. 
However, the common motive of minimizing costs still applies, and there 
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are alternative contracting paths that can be followed to minimize 
transaction costs under progressively more difficult circumstances.  
PPP, from a total welfare perspective is efficient, when the benefits gained 
from technological synergies related to a more sizeable project deliverable 
as well as the opportunities to invest in dedicated, specialized capital and 
the consequent long-run yields offset the higher explicit costs of 
contracting. Assuming so, the resulting surplus is also divided more 
equitably between the government and the supplier. In other words, the 
private supplier captures a proportionally greater share of the surplus 
implied by infrastructure production than in the traditional approach. In 
reverse, the government surplus is proportionally lower, even if it is higher 
in absolute terms due to more efficient production and transaction cost 
economics. 
As already noted, the analysis did not incorporate comparative changes 
resulting from increasing uncertainty and complexity. It, however, seems 
warranted to argue that when a project is of a highly complex and 
uncertain nature, it is ill-suited for a PPP arrangement. For example, it is 
difficult to enact a proper payment structure if the value of the output is 
difficult to assess, that is, when quality plays a significant role in contrast 
to quantity, making monitoring very costly, if not impossible.  
In services such as hospital care, where the experience of the patients is 
strongly affected by the empathy, discreteness and other intangible 
qualities of the personnel and where many unique, unforeseeable events 
may arise, PPP is hardly viable. It would be extremely difficult to specify 
all contingencies, let alone monitor the intangible qualities of the service. 
In road networks, in contrast, where complexity and uncertainty are 
relatively low, PPP seems more viable.  This view is consistent with 
world-wide empirical evidence and, in fact, gives an explanation of why 
PPP projects are first launched in markets with mature, tangible goods, 
where complexity and uncertainty are relatively low.  
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8 DISCUSSION 
In this chapter the outcomes of the study are discussed. The chapter is 
organized into four sections. In the first two sections, the results of the 
study are reflected against prior research and evaluated by their practical 
relevance and theoretical contribution. Basically, there are implications 
that result from each of the results corresponding to the three, largely self-
standing research questions. Some implications of the results for 
practitioners involved in PPP projects as well as scholars focusing on the 
subjects are explored.  The third section discusses the reliability and the 
domain of validity of the study, and the final one suggests some attractive 
avenues for further research. 
8.1 Practical Relevance of the Study 
First, the inquiry into the underlying economics of the production of 
transport infrastructure assets and services yielded a number of profound 
insights into PPP. The rationale for the joint participation of the public and 
private sectors can be reduced to concept of externalities, and subsequent 
market dysfunction that makes centralized government intervention in 
decentralized markets necessary. The contracting difficulties typical in the 
construction industry, and project business at large, can be reduced to the 
concept of experience goods, whose quality and cost characteristics are 
difficult to ascertain prior to purchase and only come evident as the good is 
used over a long-term period.  
Foremost, the concept signifies the idea that the information asymmetry 
between the government and the supplier is not fully resolved at the time 
of contracting, or the point of construction completion, or not necessarily 
even within the standard warranty period. This in turn, has major 
implications on the design of contract mechanisms in the construction 
industry at large. Very roughly, under information asymmetry, lump-sum 
or fixed cost-plus structures do not induce optimal effort in part of the 
supplier and are therefore inefficient contractual mechanisms. 
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Second, the economical model developed can be used to evaluate the 
viability of PPP projects from a total social welfare viewpoint, and the 
perspectives of the government (client) and the concessionaire (the 
supplier). The model can also be considered a contribution on its own as it 
embodies the underlying characteristics of PPP, namely multiple parties, 
key cash flows, uncertainties, private costs and revenues, social 
externalities and social pricing. The robustness of the model is supported 
by the subsequent chapters, where the model served well as a basis for 
analyzing the key recurrent concerns related to PPP. 
Third, the result that sovereign finance is not cheaper than private finance, 
when both implicit and explicit costs are considered, suggests that the cost-
efficiency of the PPP is substantially higher than is customarily assumed. 
This can be considered as a highly important result with profound 
implications in practice. In brief, researchers, government officials, and 
even potential project consortia should take this fact into account in 
developing further PPP schemes. The figures that were developed, on basis 
of the earlier model, serve to tie the argumentation into a more easily 
comprehendible form and to facilitate communication.  
Fourth, a theoretical analysis shows that incorporating traditionally 
segmented, fixed-fee, short-term contracts under a single, long-term 
performance-based concession provides opportunities for technological 
synergies, investment in specialized capital and contract mechanisms that 
minimize production costs relative to traditional procurement resulting in 
higher net surplus from a total social welfare perspective, given that the 
associated transaction costs increase proportionally less. The five 
propositions developed in the study represent theoretically well-founded 
causalities, which contribute to a fundamental understanding of the 
economic phenomenon that has come to be denoted as PPP.   
The consideration of the implicit costs of capital, and the propositions on 
the comparative efficiency of PPP presented, predict that we can expect to 
see significant growth in the PPP market if these results are accepted and 
once political inertia is surmounted. Based on well-founded economic 
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theory, PPP does, indeed, seem more cost-efficient than traditional, public 
procurement paths for producing infrastructure assets and services.   
The viability of PPP thus endangers officials in government agencies that 
are subject to downsizing if more transport sector activities are conferred 
to PPP arrangements. We can also predict resistance from government 
officials who confuse their role as a social planner (a representative and 
advocate of the total interests of the economy), with their role as a 
representative of a local government profit maximizing unit. The market 
also appears attractive to construction companies, who could take this into 
account in their strategic positioning considerations. An increase in PPP 
activity and consequent cost-efficiency should also have a positive effect 
on social welfare and citizen-consumers, whose tax liabilities could, to 
some degree, be anticipated to be relieved.  
8.2 Theoretical Contribution of the Study 
First, the conception in the field of construction economy that a PPP 
project is simply one alternative among nearly infinitely many project 
delivery alternatives, obscures the fact that financing on a project-basis 
involves an altogether different form of organization: an independent 
economic unit with a finite life. The economic and financial approach 
adopted in this study shows that PPPs represent a fundamentally different 
alternative mode of project delivery and should not be regarded as a mere 
variation of traditional project delivery.  
This seems to be an important result, because it directs attention to the 
multiple necessary conditions and consequential implications that follow 
from having a separate legal entity, capable of functioning economically 
on a stand-alone basis, and subjected to the discipline of capital markets. 
Based on this conception, the model of PPP developed in this study is a 
broad enough approximation to be valid, but narrow enough to focus the 
study on only the critical aspects of PPP. There are multiple 
representations of PPP in literature; however, they are typically directed at 
a non-academic audience and do not capture the basic requirements for an 
economic model of PPP.  
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The basic problem of the research approach adopted by some scholars is 
that they seem to fail to reduce the study of the complexities of PPP to the 
underlying economic fundamentals; moreover, they sometimes do not even 
seem to attempt to relate their studies to scientific discourse.140 Although 
this approach does not conform to the basic principles of science, it could 
be argued that these are liberties, which an established scholar can assume. 
Nevertheless, the consequence is that the validity of such studies is 
inevitably undermined (on the other hand, the conflict of such results with 
world-wide trends is explained).   
Another important contribution to project management literature can be 
drawn from the analysis of the traditional lump-sum and cost-plus 
contracts based on the principal-agent framework. The basic point is that 
project management literature views lump-sum and cost-plus contracts as 
the polar extremes of contractual options, and positions performance-based 
contracts somewhere in the intermediate region of these two. From the 
viewpoint of principal-agent theory this is a conceptual confusion.  Lump-
sum and cost-plus contracts are essentially fixed compensation structures 
that rely on complete specifications and do not vary with the performance 
of the contractor. In essence, they do not encourage optimal effort, when 
effort costly or impossible to observe. Theory posits that under such 
conditions, i.e. information asymmetry, effort must be induced by 
performance-based variable compensation schemes, which are 
fundamentally different from fixed wages, and should therefore not be 
positioned in between, so as to avoid obscuring the key distinction.  
Second, the study has shown, based on basic investment theory and 
standard logical induction, that arguments against PPPs, which are based 
on the lower cost of borrowing on a government’s general credit, typically 
favored by politicians, are incomplete. Economic theory does insist that it 
is beneficial for a government to intervene and ensure certain economic 
activity, but in comparing alternative arrangements to organize this 
                                            
140 See e.g. Kiiras et al. 2005 
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activity, a government led alternative should not be favored by evaluating 
it with an unfair cost of capital. The theoretical analysis therefore does not 
show that the procurement and delivery of major public infrastructure, 
such as highways, through a PPP arrangement is inferior or superior to 
traditional forms of procurement, but only that arguments relying on the 
cost of borrowing are incomplete and may lead to undesirable action  
While there is some support in academic literature for arguments that insist 
public government finance is preferable, because of ability to borrow at 
risk-free rate of interest or better ability to diversify investment risk, the 
result of this study is consistent with current theoretical orthodoxy, which 
suggests that the cost of capital of the public sector is not below that of the 
private sector.141  
The contribution of this study is that it takes this result further by 
providing a specific interpretation of what happens when a government 
allocates funds borrowed at a risk-free rate to an inherently risky venture. 
The consequence is that the government violates the principles of financial 
markets, incurring an opportunity cost and subsidizing a certain economic 
activity with an amount equal to the implicit costs included in the 
opportunity cost. The controversy, in fact, dissolves, once PPP is subjected 
to a robust economic analysis that takes into account all costs, both 
implicit and explicit. This result substantiates the challenge to public 
finance contended by Klein:142  
“The apparent cheapness of sovereign funds reflects the fact that 
taxpayers, who effectively provide credit insurance to the sovereign 
state, are not remunerated for the contingent liability they assume. 
If they were to be remunerated properly, then the advantage of 
sovereign finance would – almost by definition – disappear.” 
                                            
141 Flemming & Mayer 1997; Klein 1997 
142 Klein 1997 
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The results of this analysis are something that scholars in, e.g. the field of 
construction economics have failed to see. They have consistently insisted 
on the practically appealing practice of borrowing on a government credit 
to fund infrastructure development, which, in fact, may violate the 
economic principles of market economy and even prevailing legislation. 
Consequently, their calculations are theoretically inconsistent and the 
results thereby gained invalid. A low-level project procurement, or vice 
versa, delivery approach should be replaced with a higher-level economic 
approach, that searches for the cost-minimizing form of organizing the 
production of infrastructure goods and services within an economy. 
Third, regarding the comparative efficiency of PPP relative to traditional 
paths of procurement, the nine propositions derived in this study build on 
general economic concepts, in other words a theoretically sound 
foundation. The propositions stand in profound contrast to hypothetical 
calculations that require multiple assumptions, and, as anyone familiar 
with modeling knows, can easily be “tweaked” to serve any arbitrary 
interests, although this is certainly not necessarily the case. 
Although all of the propositions presented in this study are in conflict with 
some research,143 they are consistent with a number of theoretical findings. 
For example, many authors have argued that principal-agent problems are 
likely to be lower in the private than in the public sector. Brealy et al.,144 
for instance argue that “the private sector appears to be better than the 
public sector in handling agency problems. It can consequently produce 
more efficiently.” According to Currie,145 principal-agent relations are 
more complex in the public sector; whereas the presence of the profit 
motive incentivises good performance in the private sector, helping to 
align the goals of the principal and the agent, and thereby mitigate 
transaction costs.  
                                            
143 Kiiras et al. 2005 
144 Brealy, Cooper & Habib 1997 
145 Currie 2000 
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Most importantly, the theoretical results are consistent with practice, where 
PPP activity has significantly increased world-wide and the experiences 
have been highly positive. In Finland, political pressure to increase 
efficiency, and increasing pressure from the private sector, has led to the 
incremental development of arrangements that are aimed at correcting the 
confusion between the role of the government as a social planner and the 
role of producer units. New arrangements are being adopted in Finland, 
more widely e.g. in Rovaniemi county sector under the term Client-
Contractor model (Tilaaja-Tuottaja malli) and more narrowly in the road 
sector, by the name PPP (Elinkaarimalli). The development is 
controversial, partly since the interests of government bureaucrats are 
divergent: the new arrangements typically lead to restructuring, or more 
plainly, down-sizing of the public sector organizations. 
8.3 Reliability and Validity of the Study 
8.3.1 Reliability 
Reliability is a concept scientifically associated with statistical analysis, 
and is concerned with the possibility and quantity of error in the use of 
statistical methods. In a study based on inductive reasoning and case study 
such as this, reliability is primarily concerned with the replicability of the 
results, i.e. would another researcher arrive at the same results?  The 
reliability of the results therefore relies on the objectivity and logical 
consistency of the research.  
In this study two primary measures were taken to ensure objectivity and 
logical consistency. First, the study is grounded in basic, theoretically 
well-founded conceptual frameworks that served as the basis for guiding 
attention, articulating arguments and organizing analysis. Second, the line 
of thinking has been made explicit as far as possible within the limits of a 
written report. Most of the conceptual results gained are consistent with 
empirical evidence, which could be interpreted as a signal of reliability. 
Generally speaking, the reliability of the study is deemed high. 
Nevertheless, it is up to the audience to decide whether the reasoning is 
explicit, critical and unbiased. 
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8.3.2 Validity 
Validity is a concept again primarily associated with statistical analysis, 
and is concerned with the congruence between the concepts used and the 
data obtained through measurements. Validity of a study refers to an 
accurate operationalization of the conceptual framework into measurable 
variables. In a study based on inductive reasoning and case study such as 
this, validity is primarily concerned with the consistency of the theoretical 
framework, the discipline of the research procedure and the domain to 
which the results can reasonably be generalized. 
First, it seems that the primary theories employed, industrial organization 
and investment theory are consistent, since they all draw from the same 
background: economics. Investment theory is often characterized as 
applied economics, and industrial organization is a branch of 
microeconomics that conforms to the ideas of optimizing behavior and 
motive for cost-minimization. In fact, they are both based on the paradigm 
of rational decision making, applied to industrial markets and financial 
markets, respectively. The study intentionally chose to rely on the explicit 
conceptual frameworks of basic theories so as to avoid an intellectual 
exercise that is systematic and resembles science, but is in effect 
intellectual nonsense.  
It can be argued that the paradigm of rational decision making is not a 
valid description of the actual behavior of people in firms and markets. 
Yet, it would make no sense to dismiss the paradigm as useless, since 
conceptual analysis always relies on approximations of reality, and rational 
decision making provides a particularly weathered, and conceptually 
consistent framework. Any conceptual framework always falls short of the 
complexities of reality, but at least the abstraction used is explicit and 
analytically and not merely intuitively appealing. The framework provides 
a strong foundation, whose assumptions can be relaxed to study deviations 
that are not explained by the framework as such.  
The discipline of the research procedure has been attempted to make 
visible by writing out the lines of thinking explicitly throughout this report, 
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and is, therefore, deemed high. The study arrived at three substantial 
results, which, as long as the study is reliable, are valid within the settings 
of Finnish PPP industry and financial markets.  
One weakness of the study is that ultimately, the results need to be 
validated through empirical research. The overarching research tradition 
that this study belongs to values empirical evidence, but concerning the 
novelty of the subject and the surrounding conceptual confusion, it seemed 
justified and foremost necessary to adopt a rather theoretical approach to 
an empirically relevant phenomenon. The topics that were treated in the 
study are highly relevant and a theoretically fertile ground for further 
study, but a profound investigation was warranted in the first place. In 
conclusion, it was beyond the scope of this study to subject the models and 
propositions to empirical analysis, but it seems the theories and reasoning 
are disciplined enough to suggest a high level of validity.   
8.4 Suggestions for Future Research 
First, to structure and guide the study PPP in the future, it would be 
beneficial to make a certain logical distinction. Whether an infrastructure 
can be implemented through a PPP scheme, depends on certain factors, 
which can be termed as the necessary conditions. Whether an 
infrastructure should be implemented through a PPP scheme depends on 
an additional set of factors, which can be termed as the sufficient 
conditions. The necessary conditions, i.e. to be viable as a PPP, the project 
must be capable of operating as an economically independent unit (which 
certainly has fundamental implications). The sufficient conditions, i.e. to 
be optimal as a PPP, the project must have a higher net present value than 
a traditional arrangement, all costs, benefits, and risks considered.  
Second, the suggested five propositions, which explore the comparative 
economic efficiency of PPP relative to traditional paths of procurement, 
could be subjected to empirical analysis, once the Finnish PPP market 
matures. However, the basic problem with an empirical study of the 
subject is the difficulty of obtaining data on a phenomenon, which is an 
on-going process for even more than twenty years. It is also very difficult 
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to quantify the transaction costs associated with different contractual 
relationships. It seems intuitively clear and, as this study showed, 
analytically justified that the contractual practices used in the public sector 
result in considerable inefficiencies in comparison to private companies. 
For instance, government officials are typically compensated with fixed 
wages, where any innovativeness and associated risk taking only have a 
downside for the individuals concerned.146  
Nevertheless, the basic purpose of this study was to conceptually clarify 
some of the key concerns on PPP, and it seems warranted to translate these 
ideas more concretely to the Finnish context of PPP. The particular 
question of choosing between procurement alternatives (a “construction 
management” problem), also translates to a question of choosing between 
alternative organizational arrangements (a “strategic management” 
problem), which can be studied as a question of choosing between two 
alternative courses of investment (an “investment theory” problem), which 
translates to a question of differences in cash flow patterns (a “managerial 
accounting” problem), which finally reduces to fundamental economic cost 
and value factors (an “economic” problem) influenced by economies of 
scale, scope, management incentives, specialization, etc.  
The study has shown that arguments against PPPs, which are based on the 
lower cost of borrowing on a government’s general credit, typically 
favored by politicians, are incomplete and possibly faulty. Much of public 
discourse still revolves around this issue, and although relevant, the 
argument is incomplete and scholars would do well to proceed with a more 
advanced analysis, which focuses on the underlying economics.  
This analysis would relax the assumption that the public and private sector 
are identical in their capabilities of planning and delivering a service, and 
could proceed by a systematic analysis of the differences in costs (e.g. 
overheads, engineering costs, material costs, labor costs and capital 
expenditure) and societal benefits (e.g. units of usage, units of available 
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capacity, and value of each unit) between a public and private sector 
project. It could for example, be possible to study differences in the timing 
of net benefits (e.g. affected by project delays and availability) and the 
costs (e.g. construction costs, maintenance costs, cost overruns), based on 
empirical data. With a fair characterization of the net benefits, i.e. free 
cash flows, and a fair cost of capital, it would be possible to subject public-
sector and private-sector led alternatives to an objective investment NPV 
evaluation.  
This comparative evaluation would also serve to evaluate an organizational 
phenomenon known as hybrids. Specifically, a PPP project is a hybrid 
arrangement – it involves reliance on the market mechanism in awarding 
the concession as well as a quasi-vertical organization to administer the 
exchange. And yes, hybrid arrangements have been proposed to have 
comparative advantages under certain circumstances – but research has not 
shown just how advantageous. A quantitative comparison of PPP and 
traditional procurement arrangements would also be a quantitative analysis 
of alternative organizational arrangements and could be related to this 
prominent theoretical discourse.  
Third, in PPPs the cash flows from the project are paid directly to the 
project investors, instead of being reinvested by management, which is a 
rather unique property of the project company setting. Optimal portfolio 
growth theory has shown that in multi-period investment situations, an 
investor may actually benefit from the volatility of individual assets, given 
that there is low correlation between their return, by allowed to pump 
capital between them during successive periods.147 Since PPPs return all 
available cash flows to investors, and thus permits pumping, it could be 
that this benefits growth seeking investors in the capital markets at large. 
Although somewhat eclectic, from a social welfare perspective this could 
be a factor that further promotes the provision of public goods through 
project-based financing, and worth researching. 
                                            
147 See e.g. Luenberger 1998, Log-Optimal Growth Strategy 
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Fourth, project finance shares a number of interesting common features 
with leveraged buy-outs (LBOs), the business of financial entrepreneurs in 
the industry of private equity. Both LBOs and PPPs are treated as separate 
economic units; they are both highly leveraged and essentially dependent 
on the stability of cash flows. It would be interesting and potentially 
beneficial to explore what lessons could be transferred from one field to 
another. The potential for research synergies, along with the rapid 
development of these already significant industries makes this another 
attractive course of research to follow. 
Finally, it would be interesting to direct more attention to the contractual 
mechanisms used in the construction industry at large, for which the 
principal-agent framework provides excellent conceptual tools. It seems 
warranted that compensation schemes in the construction industry were 
addressed through the concepts of specifiability, observability, 
verifiability, and adaptation. Moreover, it seems also attractive to study 
current contract legislation to see how these economic essentials are 
translated to and represented in jurisprudence. Most importantly, it would 
be interesting to see how a legal framework, based on the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition, acknowledges the presence of information asymmetry of 
experience goods, incomplete contracts and primarily negotiated supplier 
selection protocols – as an anomaly or a sound, standard practice. 
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